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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the temporal interpretation of noun phrases. The leading
questions throughout are the following: (1) Is the temporal interpretation of a
noun phrase determined by the temporal interpretation of the rest of its clause?
(2)" What kind of further interactions take place between the interpretation of
noun phrases and the temporal interpretation of the main predicate of a clause?
The framework in which these questions are answered exploits an ontology that
assumes individuals, stages of individuals, and kinds as basic entities. Determiner-
quantification is argued to be quantification over stages of individuals rather than
individuals in their whole temporal extendedness.
Chapter I provides a survey of the main topics of this thesis. It is argued that an "
account of the temporal interpretation of noun phrases must investigate at least
two issues that are to be distinguished: the temporal loc~tion of individuals and
the temporal location of predication times.
In Chapter II, the temporal location of individuals is ~xplained as an effect of life-
time presuppositions that are introduced by the lexical semantics of stage-level
predicates and individual-level predicates, but not by a third type of predicate,
existence-independent predicates. Life-time effects associated with individual-
level predicates are captured as a pragmatic phenomenon in terms of Grice's
Maxim of Informativity and related implicatures. In temporally specific contexts,
life-time effects are neutralized. This is related to certain effects that topic-focus
structure has on temporal interpretation.
Chapter III explains the temporal location of predication times associated with
noun phrases.. In contrast to previous research, it is argued that the temporal
location of predication times of nouns depends on the temporal interpretation of
the rest of the clause. The notions of 'temporally dependent' and 'temporally
independent' noun phrases are introduced. It is shown that the distribution of
temporally dependent and temporally independent noun phrases involves the
distinction between weak (or cardinal) and strong (or presuppositional) noun
phrases as well as the distinction between existence-independent arguments and
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other arguments. This distribution is explained as a consequence of (1)
determiner-quantification being analyzed as quantification over stages of
individuals, (2) independently motivated mechanisms of implicit quantifier
restriction, and (3) a particular account of weak and strong determiners. This
account analyzes both types of determiners as restrictive quantifiers, and
attributes differences between them to whether the noun is Inapped at LF into the
restrictive clause or into the nuclear scope of the detf(rminer. The mechanisms
introduced in this chapter are also applied to generic noun phrases, certain kind-
denoting noun phrases, and to the distinction between object-related readings
and event-related readings.
Chapter IV deals with the semantics of certain types of noun phrase internal
temporal modifiers, in-modifiers and of-modifiers. It is argued that in-modifiers are
obligatory restrictors of quantifiers. Moreover, they impose constraints on the
tense interpretation of their clause by activating the Upper Limit Constraint,
which has also been used to explain certain aspects of the behavior of sequence-
of-tense constructions and double-access constructions.
Chapter V offers a summary of results achieved in the preceding chapters and
suggestions for future research.
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Kai von Fintel
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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION
1. The central question
This thesis is about the temporal interpretation of noun phrases. For a first
illustration of the issues we will be concerned with, consider the examples in (1)
and (2). (Ia) and (lb) exhibit a contrast with respect to the times at which the
individuals talked about are fugitives. Thus, the individuals talked about in (Ia)
can be former fugitives - in particular, they can be individuals who escaped from
jail at some earlier time, got caught, and are back in jail now. But the individuals
mentioned in (Ib) have to be fugitives now - i.e. they are individuals that escaped
from something else but the jail.
(1)· a. Many fugitives are now in jail.
b. . There are now many fugitives in jail.
Why is it that the individuals talked about in (Ia) do not have to be fugitives at
the time of being in jail, but the individuals talked about in (lb) do?
(2a), and (2b) also show an interesting contrast. When confronted with (2b),
one concludes that Gregory is dead; but when confronted with (2a), one doesn't
conclude anything about Gregory's being alive or dead.
(2) a.
b.
Gregory was silent.
Gregory was from America.
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How come (2a) and (2b) exhibit this contrast?
The contrasts between sentences like (la) and (lb) on the one hand and (2a)
and (2b) on' the other hand concern the temporal interpretation of noun phrases. ·
Although the temporal interpretation of verbs is by no means a settled issue
today, all of us have at least a vague idea of how it works: sentences contain
verbs and tenses and sometimes temporal adverbials, and i~ some way or other
the tense of a clause tells us roughly whether the state of affairs denoted by the
main predicate of the clause - or at least a crucial part of it - is located at a past,
present, or future time. And in some ~ay or other, temporal adverbials can specify
the time at which the state of affairs is located. Thus, because of the past tense, it
is clear that the jumping of the cat in (3a) took place at some time in the past.
And because of the combination of past tense and the temporal adverbial
yesterday morning the jumping in (3b) took place yesterday morning.1
(3) a.
b.
The cat jumped from the closet.
Yesterday morning, the cat jumped from the closet.
Since at first sight, tenses and temporal adverbials seem to be mainly responsible .
for the temporal interpretation 'of verbs (or in general: of main predicates of
clauses) and noun phrases do not in general contain tense-like or adverbial-like
items, we may ask whether the temporal interpretation of noun phrases is
determined by anything at all. Since noun phrases do not in general contain
items that might determine their temporal interpretation, any determining effects
can only come from outside the noun phrase. Thus, the topic of this dissertation
can be made more precise as the question in (4).
(4) Is the temporal interpretation of noun phrases determined or affected by
the temporal interpretation of the rest of their clause?
It is important to note that there are two core issues concerning the temporal
interpretation of noun phrases - times of existence and predication times. The
common semantic representation of a noun phrase (except perhaps for proper
1 For detailed investigations of the temporal interpretation of verbs, see, for instance,
Bauerle (1977, 1979), Binnick (1991), Kratzer (1978), Partee (1973, 1984), von Stechow
(1992, 1995).
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names), consists at least of two parts. One of these is the noun, which
corresponds semantically to a predicate. The other is an individual variable to
which the predicate is applied. Thus, the semantic representation of the noun
phrase a student is at least an expression like "student (x)".2
Both the predicate and the individual variable can be temporally located. For
the predicate, temporal location concerns the time interval during which the
predicate is asserted to hold of an individual. I will call this time interval the
PREDICATION TTh1E of the predicate. For the individual that the variable denotes
under a particular variable assignment, temporal location concerns the time at
which the individual exists. This time will be referred to as the TIME OF
EXISTENCE of the .individual. Applied to the example of the noun phrase a
student, we may thus ask, first, at what time the time of being a student is located,
and second, at what time the individual denoted by x under a particular variable
assignment is located. Thus, talking again in general terms, the central question in
(4) should be split into two questions:
(5) Is the temporal location of times of existence of individuals affected by the
temporal interpretation of the rest of the clause?
(6) Is the temporal location of predication times of nouns affected by the
temporal interpretation of the rest of the clause?
In the next section, I want to sketch briefly how these questions have been
answered in previous research.
2. Previous results and counterevidence
2.1. Predication times
As far as the temporal location of predication times is concerned, there is one
major contribution in the literature, the thesis of En9 (1981). This work clearly
favors the view that the temporal location of predication times is independent of
2 I don't want to go here into a discussion of whether the indefinite determiner corresponds
to an existential quantifier. I will assume here' that it doesn't, adopting an analysis of
indefinites as suggested by Heim (1982).
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the temporal interpretation of the main predicate of the clause. According to En~,
the temporal location of predication times depends only 011 the context. Eny
structures her argument as a critique of a classical analysis of tense where tense is
treated as a sentence operator. Her argument is t\\'ofold.
First, she illustrates the freedom of interpretation with examples like (7). (7)
~hows that noun phrases can have readings where the nominal predicate has a
temporal interpretation that cannot be prq.vided by the tense of the sentence.
The tense in (7a) is present tense. But the predication time of the nominal
fugitive can get a past tense interpretation, as indicated in (7b).
(7) a. . Every fugitive is now in jail. (p65)
b. Every former fugitive is now in jail.
Thus, there.is no past tense morpheme present in (7a) that could account for
the past interpretation of the nominal predicate, i.e. there is no appropriate tense
operator that could provide the intended reading for the interpretation of the
noun phrase in question. Mor~over, the present tense of the sentence does not at
all affect the temporal interpretation of the noun phrase every fugitive. The
freedom of interpretation illustrated here can be used to argue that the temporal
interpretation of noun phrases is not be affected by tense, but rather it is ,
completely independent and distinct from tense - irrespectively of particular tense
analyses. Thus, given the interpretational freedom illustrated above, the temporal
interpretation of noun phrases appears to be independent of tense and only
restricted by the context.
Second, En9 shows that the assumption that tense determines the temporal
interpretation of noun phrases leads to several wrong predictions. According to
the classical analysis of tense, tense is a sentence operator whose interpretation is
associated with an existential quantifier. As a consequence, tense and its scope
do not only determine what time interval a given expression is to be evaluated in,
but also what the scope relations between tense and quantifiers are (p67). En9
develops several arguments that show that the predictions following from this are
not borne out.
Due to common assumptions on scope ambiguities, the classical tense analysis
predicts that for a sentence like (8a), the two readings (Bb, c) can arise. (8b) is a
reading where no noun phrase is quantified in (or raised at LF, depending on the
14
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framework). (8c) represents a reading where the noun phrase all rich men IS
quantified in (or raised to a position higher than tense).
(8) a.
b.
c.
All rich men were obnoxious children. «1) p58)
PAST 't/x [rich-man (x) ~ obnoxious-child (x)]
(b) is true iff there is a time in the-past when everybody who was a
rich man at that time was an obnoxious child at that time.
"Ix [rich-man (x) --7 PAST (obnoxious-child (x))]
(c) is true iff there is a past moment when everybody who is a rich
man now was an obnoxious child at that time.
En~ argues that the scope analysis of tense causes several problems in connection
with the temporal interpretation of noun phrases. According to her, noun phrases
can give rise to certain readings that cannot be explained with the scope analysis
of tense.
The first- problem arises with readings that involve quantification over more
than one tense slot. In (9), for instance, the quantifier must be allowed to range
over past and present rich men to account for the reading (9b) of (9a), which is
clearly available. And in (10), the quantifier must be allowed to range over
present and future representatives of the club to account for the reading (lOb).
(9) a.
b.
(10) a.
b.
All rich men were obnoxious children. «1) p58)
All present and past rich men were obnoxious children.
Every member of our investment club will buy a house. «4) p60)
All present and future members of our investment club will buy a
house.
That is, noun phrases have to be interpreted relative to more than one tense .slot
simultaneously (p63). En~ argues that the classical scope analysis of tense
cannot account for this reading.3, 4
A second problem arises when tense cooccurs with two quantificational
noun phrases in a clause. These constructions lead to scope paradoxes. Thus,
according to En~, (11a) "may be uttered about a future time after the presidency
3 Bob Stalnaker (pc) poi~ted out correctly that under slightly different assumptions, this
would not be a problem: under the assumption that determiner-quantifiers quantify over all
individuals that exist at any past, present, or future time, the desired interpretation could be
achieved by implicit restrictions on the quantifier.
4 The examples here exploit only subject noun phrases, but En~ shows that the same
effects can be found with object noun phrases.
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has been abolished. At that future time, a party will be given for individuals who
are congressmen then, and who are old enough to remember a president. We
want every congressman to be in the scope of future tense, a president to be in
the scope of every congressman (they may remember different presidents), and a
president to be outside the scope of future time (there will not be any president
at that time). This, of course, is impossible, because if a president is outside the
scope of .every congressman, then it cannot be outside the future tense." (pp65f).
(11) a.
b.
Every congressman who remembers a president will be at the party.
(17) p65)
There will be ~ future time f such that for every. f-congressman x
there is a non-f-president y such that x remembers y
FUT < every congressman
every congressman < a president
a president < PUT
A third problem is that sentences "like (12) can ha,'e readings with non-
simultaneous events that cannot be accounted for under the classical tense
analysis. The existential quantifier associated with tense gives rise to a system
which is too weak to account for all possible readings where simultaneity and
tense interpretation are varied independently of each other. Under the scope
analysis, only (12b) and (12c) are predicted to be available. But (12d) is also a
possible reading for (12a).
(12) a.
b.
c.
d.
All lizards will die. «(19) p68)
PUT Vx [lizard (x) ~ die (x)]
There is a future time such that everything that is a lizard at that
time dies at that time. (The lizards die simultaneously.)
Vx [lizard (x) -7 PUT (die (x))]
For every present lizard, there is a future time where that lizard dies.
(The lizards die non-simultaneously Of, accidentally,
simultaneously.)
Every future lizard will die, but they will die at different moments.
In order to deal with the sentences and readings indicated above, En~ argues
that the temporal interpretation of noun phrases should not be affected by tense
operators, but rather should be kept completely independent and distinct from
tense. En~ argues t~at the temporal interpretation of nouns can best be
"16
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captured by an indexical analysis. That is, the context of utterance provides the
information for the adequate temporal interpretation of nouns.
En~ argues that the indexical aspect of noun interpretation is not only
relevant for the associated temporal interpretation, but it can also account for
other restrictions that apply to a noun phrase. E.g. in (13), the context specifies a
property P, whi~l1~is the property relevant to the discussion at hand (p81),.namely
the property of being a virgin at the moment of death.
(13) All virgins will go to heaven. «34) p80)
To summarize, under the assumption of a sentence operator analysis of tense,
there .seem to be good reasons to conclude that the temporal location of
predication times of nouns is independent of tense. This supports En~ts claim that
such tempor~l location is only restricted by the discourse context and criteria of
contextual plausibility.5
Convincing though En~ts arguments appear at first sight, there are data that
indicate that her results may be an overgeneralization made on the basis of some
cases of temporally independent noun interpretations.
We have already seen such a case in (1b) above. Consider also the contrasts
exploited in (14) and (15). (14a) can easily mean "Some of today's directors of
tortilla chip factories considered in the eighties shipping their product to Europe",
. But with the very similar sentence (14b), this reading is not available." (14b) is a
sentence ·about individuals who were directors of tortilla chip factories in the
eighties. I.e., the times of being a director of a tortilla chip factory and of
considering shipping tortilla chips to Europe have to coincide here.
(14) a.
b.
In the eighties, some of the directors of tortilla chip factories
considered shipping their product to Europe.
In the eighties, there were some directors of tortilla chip factories
considering shipping their product to Europe.
Similarly, (l5a) can easily mean "All of the individuals who are professors today
were young in the fifties", e.g., they may have been kids then. But with (15b), an
analogous reading is not available when the underlined noun phrase is
5 Bauerle (1983, 124f and 130f) and Larson (1983, 196ff and 261f) basically come to the
same conclusion.
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interpreted generically. Here, the times of being a professor and of being young
have to coincide for any given individual~
(15) a.
b.
In the fifties, all professors were young.
In the fifties, professors were young.
Thus it seems that the underlined noun phrases in (14b) and (i5b)
obligatorily get interpretations that are dependent on the temporal interpretation
of the main predicate of their clause - or, for short, these noun phrases must get
TEMPORALLY DEPENDENT INTERPRETATIONS. In light of En~'s generalization,
data like these are surprising and call for a more detailed investig~tion of the
temporal location of predication times.
2.2. Times of existence
With regard to the time of existence of individuals, there are to my knowledge
only two contributions in the literature that go beyond the footnote level: a paper
by Anderson (1973) and a sketch of some important data and hypotheses by
Kratzer (1989). Both Anderson (1973) and Kratzer (1989) basically defend the
view that at least in some cases, tense applies to individuals. They view LIFE-
TIME EFFECTS as observed in (16) as evidence for this. The crucial observation
here is that the past tense in (16) somehow implies that Gregory is dead now.
This ~ffect can be explained if one assumes that past tense applies directly to the
noun phrase Gregory and consequently locates Gregory, i.e. his time of
existence, in the past.
(16) Gregory was from America.
Thus, Anderson and Kratzer assume that at lea.s~t~..~ometimes, noun phrases are
strongly affected by the temporal interpretation of t~eir clause.
On the other hand, there are data that force us to reconsider this conclusion.
In (2a), repeated here as (17), we have already seen a sentence where the effect
does not show up at all. Moreover, the effect observed in (16) does not show up
consistently with the same predicate. This is illustrated in (18), where the example
(16) is put into a more specific context.
18
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(17) Gregory was silent.
(18) On that day, I was introduced to Gregory and Eva-Lotta. Gregory was
from America.
ti;
Again, these data make it advisable'10 investigate the apparent effects of tense
on noun phrases in more detail.
'Tmglaiwearebst
Oherwise, werouldn' t seetllli."
-Fatirm-
3. Preview
In Chapter II and Chapter III, I will present a thorough account of the two·
fundamental questions in (5) and (6).
Chapter II investigates the temporal location of times of existence of
individuals. In contrast to Anderson and Kratzer, who assume a strong
interaction between tense and individuals, I will argue that tense never applies to
individuals directly. I will show that life-time effects can best be explained by a
pragmatic account.
Chapter III is concerned with the temporal location of predication times.
Since temporal location concerns times of existence as well as predication times, it
is important to look at nouns that denote temporary properties of individuals in
order to investigate the temporal location of predication times of nouns. Only
with these nouns is it really possible to split apart the two issues of the temporal
location of times of existence and of the temporal location of predication times. I
will show that certain kinds of noun phrases are systematically temporally
dependent on the interpretation of their clause. Quite in contrast to the
generalizations of En~ and Larson, I will argue that the temporal locat~on of
predication times of nouns is in general not at all independent of the temporal
interpretation of the rest of their clause. Rather, I will show that the default is in
19
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fact that the temporal location of predication times of nouns depends highly on
the temporal interpretation of the rest of the clause. Whenever temporally
independent noun phrase interpretations are available, this is a consequence of
additional mechanisms that affect the interpretation of noun phras·es. Specifically,
I will show that the occurrence of temporally dependent noun phrase
interpretations is not a direct effect of tense but rather a consequence of
quantification over stages of individuals (instead of quantification over
individuals in their whole temporal extendedness) in combination with
independently motivated mechanisms of quantifier restriction. I will thus
introduce a semantics that assumes stages of individuals as primitives of its
ontology.
Aside from the two questions cOl1cerning the temporal location of times of
existence and of predication times which we have mentioned so far, there are
further problems concerning the temporal interpretation of noun phrases. Thus,
one may also ask more ~omplex questions like (19).
(19) How is the temporal interpretation of noun phrases affected by temporal
modifiers that modify the noun?
Chapter IV investigates a particularly interesting range of phenomena related to
the question posed in (19). It is an investigation of a particular type of temporal
modifier of nouns, namely prepositional phrases as in the quarrel on Monday.
Chapter V provides a survey of the interactions between temporal
interpretation and noun phrase interpretation that are dealt with in ~hapter II to
IV and starts investigating some additional questions.
I want to add here that there are of course more questions concerning the
temporal interpretation of noun phrases which I wasn't able to deal with in this
thesis. One especially interesting topic is the question of how the temporal
interpretation of noun phrase internal clauses depends on the mechanisms that
determine the interpretation of the noun phrase's time of existence and
predication time.
I will introduce and develop the semantic framework of my work step by step
in the course of the thesis at the points at which {ilerespective aspects of the
semantics become relevant. For ease of reference, I want to mention here that
most of the crucial details concerning the temporal interpretation of main
20
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predicates can be found in Section 3.2. of Chapter II. Section 4.2.1. of Chapter
III is a survey of the stage-ontology I will be exploiting. Section 4.2.2. of
Chapter III presents some important notions concerning quantification and
restrictions. My proposal concerning the interpretation of cardinal noun phrases
and presuppositional noun ptrrases is 'presented in Section 4.2.3. of Chapter Ill.
The reader who wants to survey the conclusions of this thesis is referred to
Chapter V, Section 1.
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CHAPTER II.
TEMPORAL LOCATION OF INDIVIDUALS
In this chapter, I will explain in which way the temporal location of individuals is
determined by the temporal interpretation of a clause. The most drastic effects
show up in past tense individual-level clauses (Section 1). I will argue in Section
2 that predicates provide lexically determined minimal requirements on their
arguments'life-times. The role of tense for life-time effects is an indirect one: by
virtue of its determining the temporal interpretation of the main predicate of a
clause, it triggers implicatures which cause life-time effects. This proposal is
refined in Section 3 so as to be able to explain the blocking of life-time effects in
certain contexts. This blocking is due to the choice of topics and the related
choice of values for temporal adverbials. In Section 4 I will compare my proposal
to a proposal of Kratzer (1988) and argue that my account is more adequate.
Kratzer's main claim that the temporal location of individuals is sometimes directly
determined by tense runs into several problems, which are avoided in my account.
1. Life-time effects with individual-level predicates
Kratzer (1988) notes that past tense sentences exploiting individual-level
predicates, in contrast to stage-level predicates, impose restrictions on the life-time
i
~
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of tJ1eir subjects. Thus, when the sentences in (1) are uttered out of the ~lue, they
suggest that Gregory is dead at the time of utterance of the sentence; the
sentence is either false or a qase of presupposition failure in a situation where
Gregory is still alive. But 'the sentences in (2) can be true and perfectly
acceptable when Gregory is alive. The sentences in (1) contain the INDIVIDUAL-
LEVEL PREDICATESI be from America, have blue eyes, and resemble Jorg
Bieberstein, whereas the sentences in (2) contain the STAGE-LEVEL
PREDICATES be happy, have a cold, and eat cookies.
(1) a.
b.
c.
(2) a.
b.
c.
Gregory was from America.
Gregory had blue eyes.
Gregory resembled Jorg Bieberstein.
Gregory was happy.
.Gregory had a cold..
Gregory ate cookies.
Kratzer accounts for the contrast between (1) and (2) by proposing that tense in
individual-level clauses does not locate the event time of the main predicate, but
the subject individual.2 Since the past tense seems thus to limit the life-time of the
subject, I will call effects like the one observed in (1) LIFE-TIME EFFECTS.
However, the life-time effects observed disappear systematically when the
sentences in (1) are put into certain contexts, as in (3):
(3) a.
b.
On that day, I was introduced to Gregory and Eva-Lotta. Gregory
was from America, and Eva-Lotta was from Switzerland.
I had a chance to have a closer look at him. Gregory had blue eyes.
1 Some of the predicates can also have stage-level readings. Here and below, the
predicates are to be understood as having the individual-level reading. Thus, I am only
referring to have blue eyes and resemble Jorg Bieberstein under their individual-level
reading. Since be from America is a predicate that cannot have a stage-level reading at all,
it will be my favorite predicate for my argument in this chapter. The use of this predicate
was recommended to me by Angelika Kratzer.
2 For details of Kratzer's account, see below. These and related phenomena were in fact
already discussed in Anderson (1973). Interestingly, Anderson has basically the same
intuition as Kratzer - namely that in the relevant examples tense, which is overtly associated
with the verb, applies to the existence of subject individuals (p48~). Moreover, Anderson
is already aware of some related phenomena that will become relevant later in this chapter:
that life-time effects can be neutralized in certain discourse contexts (p484), and that subject
noun phrases and object noun phrases exhibit asymmetries with respect to life-time effects
(p488).
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c. Suddenly I realized a remarkable thing: Gregory resembled Jorg
Bieberstein. '
Thus, it seems that the context can playa crucial role for the occurrence or non-
occurrence of life-time effects.
In the following section, I will explain how the life-time effect observed in (1)
comes about and provide an account of the co~trast between (1) and (2). The
contrast is explained independently of any systematic grammatical differences
between stage-level prediC?ates and individual-level predicates.3 In Section 3, I
will refine my proposal in order to deal with the contrast between (1) and (3).
finally, in Section 4, I will compare my proposal to the one of Kratzer.
1'Ihllll.:ridon' twearplaid' I
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2. A pragmatic explanation of life-time effects
2.1. Preliminaries
The data discussed in this chapter involve mainly past tense sentences and
present tense sentences. Thus, let me introduce a simple, tentative semantics for
past tense and present tense as a first basis for considering the relevant data. I
will adopt for, the purpose of this chapter a semantics that exploits three basic
types, e, t, and i, which are the semantic types~of entities, truth values, and
,(
p
3 That is not to say that I claim there are no grammatical differences between stage-level
predicates and individual-level predicates. I simply remain neutral on this issue.
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(possibly instantaneous) time interv.als, respectively. Tenses are defined as
functions from properties of time intervals into properties of time intervals. Since I
won't be concerned with complex sentences in this chapter, and the evaluation
time and the time of utterance coincide for matrix clauses, the time interval that a
tensed clause applies to, for the1?,Jesent purpose, can safely be identified with the
time of utterance. For ease of presentation, I will identify the time of utterance
with the present time, i.e. now.
(4) [PAST<I>]]=thefunctionf: Di --7 {a, I}
such that, for any t E Di, f(t) = 1
iff 3t* E Di such that t* < t and ITcI> ]] (t*) = 1.
Thus, according to the definition of a -past tense clause in (4) and the role
attributed to the time of utterance, Gregory was happy (which corresponds to
. PAST Gregory be happy) uttered now is true if and only if there is a time t*
before now such that Gregory was happy at t*.
For present tense clauses to be true, I will assume that present tense requires
the tenseless proposition to be true at an environment of the evaluation time,
where an environment of a time is defined as follows:
(5) A time interval t is an environment of a time' interval t'
iff 3 t*, t** such that t* and t** are included in t
and t* and t** are not included in t'
and t* is located before t' and t** is located after t'.
Thus, the tenseless proposition has to be true,at an interval that properly includes
the evaluation time and reaches beyond it on both sides.4 - The truth conditions
of a present tense clause are for the present purpose defined as in (6).
(6) [PRES <I>]] = the function f: Di --7 {O, I}
such that, for any t E Di, f(t) = 1
iff 3t* E Di such that t* is an environment of t and [[<1>] (t*) =1.
According to this definition, Gregory is happy (which corresponds to PRES
Greg(Jry be happy) uttered now is true if and only if there is a time interval t*
4 For theory internal reasons I need to define t1environment t of t' " to contain an interval t*
that precedes tie As far as I can see, it doesn't have to contain an interval t** that follows
t'. I am addi~g the latter condition to the definition mainly for reasons of symmetry.
25
MUSAN: TEMPORALlNTERPREfATIONOFNPS - n. INDIVIDUALS
such that t* properly includes now and reaches beyond now on both sides and
Gregory is happy at t*. - The definitions in. (4) and (6) will later be revised, but as
a first approximation they are sufficiently adequate.
The contrast between (1) and (2) involves individual-level predicates and
stage-level predicates. The relevant difference between these two types of
predicates concerns the relationship between the time when the predicate can be
asserted of an individual and the time of .existence of that individual. In the
following,. I will refer to the time interval for which a predicate is asserted to hold
of an individual as the PREDICATION TIME of the predicate. The time interval at
which a certain individual is located, i.e. tpe time at which the individual exists,
will be referred to as the TIME OF EXISTENCE of the individual.
STAGE-LEVEL PREDICATES - such as, for instance, be happy, have a cold, or
-eat cookies - refer to temporary properties of individuals. Their predication time
usually covers only a relatively small part of the time of existence of an individual.
Thus, an individual that is eating cookies does so usually only for a certain time.
Thus, eat cookies can be truly predicated of an individual x if and only if the
predication time of eat cookies covers a certain part of the time of existence of x,
but its predication time does not have to cover all of the time of existence of x.
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL PREDICATES - such as, for instance, be from America,
have blue eyes or resemble Jorg Bieberstein - refer to long-time properties of
individuals. They cover at least a relatively large part of the individual's time of
existence; with ideal individual-level predicates - as is clearly the case with the
predicate be from America - their predication time covers all of the time of the
individual in question. Thus, a person who is from America is from America
during all his/her life. Thus, be from America can be truly predicated of an
individual x if and only if be from America can be truly predicated of x during all
the time when x exists.
Note that I assumed above that the predicates m~!ioned so far can only be
predicated of an individual if that individual is alive at the time when the property
is asserted to hold of the individual. This can be shown with the sentence
Gregory is from America, which is uttered in two different situations in (7). I will
assume here and below that Gregory was born in 1947 and that he is or was in
fact from America. In (7a), the sentence is uttered in a situation Where Gregory is
26
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still alive, and in (7b) in a situation where Gregory is dead. (7a) is perfectly
acceptable, while (7b) is inappropriate.
(7) a. Utterance: "Gregory is from America." - Situation: Gregory is still alive.
b. # Utterance: "Gregory is from America. 1I - Situation: Gregory is dead.
All predicates we have encountered so far behave the same in this respect;
somehow they require the individuals they are predicated of to be alive. Here is a
stage-level clause that shows an analogous effect..
(8) a. Utterance: "Gregory is happy." - Situation: Gregory is still alive.
b. # Utterance: "Gregory is happy." - Situation: Gregory is dead.
?j
.~.~.f'
Note though that not all predicates impose such a requirement on their subjects.
The predicate famous is one that doesn't:
(9) a.
b.
Utterance: "Gregory is .famous." - Situation: Gregory is still alive.
Utterance: "Gregory is famous." - Situation: Gregory is dead.
Since these predicates do not impose any requirements on their subject's
existence, I will henceforth distinguish them from both stage-level predicates and
individual-level predicates and call them EXISTENCE-INDEPENDENT
PREDICATES. - I will come back to their behavior and the behavior of of stage-
level predicates later; at the moment, I want to focus only on individual-level
predicates.
I account for the inappropriateness of (7b) by assuming that lexical entries of
individual-level predicates specify LIFE-TIME P~ESUPPOSITIONS, i.e.,
presuppositions that impose minimal requirements on the temporal location of
individuals relative to the time at which the predicate is asserted to hold' of the
individual. In order to capture this basic idea, I suggest lexical entries for
individual-level predicates as exemplified in (10).5
(10) [be-from-America] = the function f: Di --7 D<e,t>,
such that, for any t E Di, f(t) = the partial function g: D ---7 {O, 1},
such that, for any xED, x is in the domain of g iff x is alive at t,
and for each x in the domain of g, g(x) =1 iff x is from America at t.
5 For ease of presentation, I am treating certain complex expressions as lexical items.
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Thus, the lexical entries for individual-level predicates contain a presuppositional
condition on their argument's being alive.
Consequently, the inappropriateness of (7b) is explained as a case of
presupposition failure: since the assumption was that Gregory is dead now, there
is no environment t of now such that Gregory is alive at t. ,Thus, there is no
environment t of now such that Gregory is in the domain of be from America at t.
Hence (7b) doesn't receive a truth value at all.
(7a) on the other hand is predicted to be true. The truth conditions of (7a)
are shown in (7a'). Note that since I will be looking at cases where the
presupposition is satisfied and the sentence as a whole is tru~, it is sufficient - for
the present purpose - to treat the presupposition as part of the truth conditions of
the sentence. For ease ot presentation, I will do so when giving explicit truth
conditions, as in (7a').6
(7a') [Gregory is from America] (tu) = 1
iff [PRES Gregory be from America] (til) = 1
iff 3t, s. t. t is an environment of tu and IT Gregory be from America] (t) =1
iff :3t, s. t. t is an environment of tu and Gregory is alive at t and Gregory is
from America at t.
.t=~it·
6 Note that there is a serious problem here that concerns the way iIi, which the
presupposition can be integrated into a statement of the truth conditions. Thus, it is
obviously not enough to state that
"Gregory was happy has a truth value iff 3t*, such that t* < tu and 'Gregory is alive
at t*. If Gregory was happy has a truth value, then its truth value is 1 iff 3t*, such
that t* < tu and Gregory is happy at t*."
The problem is that since we have two distinct existential quantifiers over times, there can
be different times that fulfill the presupposition and make the sentence true. It is equally
inadequate to state something like
"Gregory was happy has a truth value iff \7't*, such that t* < tu, Gregory is alive at
t* ..."
Here the problem is that the presupposition is much too strong. Obviously, Gregory
doesn't have to be alive at all times before the time of utterance in order for the sentence to
have a truth value. - This problem was already observed by Karttunen and Peters (1979).
Since I don't know yet how to solve this problem, I will state the truth conditions of the
relevant examples here and below only for the case when the sentence is true and integrate
the presupposition as a condition on the sentence's being true. Strictly speaking, this is of
course not an adequate treatment of the presupposition, but it seems to me to be the best
way to deal with the problem until I can solve it. Note also that it is (somewhat more
unexpectedly) not obvious how exactly related problems can be avoided in the modified
semantics of tense I use later in this chapter.
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Since Gregory, according to the situation described for (7a), is alive now, he is in
the domain of be from America at a set of intervals that are environments of now.
Since Gregory is from America, the sentence is true. However, when commenting
on the truth conditions of sentences more informally in the text, I will make clear
that we are in fact dealing with presuppositions.
2.2. Informativity
I want to turn now to a pragmatic aspect of past tense sentences and present
tense sentences. In particular, I will claim that the sentences Gregory is from
America and Gregory was from America differ with regard to their
informativeness. A lack of informativeness of sentences leads to a certain type of
inappropriateness. The relevant notion of informativeness will play an important
role in the explanation of life-time effects.
Consider the sentence Gregory was from America in (lla, b), which is uttered
in specific situations as indicated - in (lla) in a situation where Gregory is still
alive; and in (11b) in a situation where Gregory is dead. Whereas (Ila) is
inappropriate, (lIb) is perfectly acceptable. Note that the difference here is
simply a question of whether Gregory is alive or dead. Furthermore, (lIe) shows
that the present tense sentence is, in contrast to the past tense sentence (lla), fine
in a situation where Gregory is alive.
(11) a. # Utterance: "Gregory was from America." - Situation: Gregory is still alive.
b. Utterance: "Gregory was from America." - Situation: Gregory is dead.
c. Utterance: "Gregory is from America. II - Situation: Gregory is still alive.
The oddness of (lla) must have a different source than the oddness of (7b). As
we have seen above, (7b) is inappropriate because of presupposition failure. This
is not the case with (lla). Since Gregory is born in 1947 and is still alive, there is
a time t before now such that Gregory is alive at t. Thus there is a time t where
Gregory is in the domain of be from America. Thus, (lOa) does not suffer from
presupposition failure. Moreover, according to the semantics sketched so far,
(lOa) is true.
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(I 1a') IT Gregory was from America] (tu) = 1
iff IT PAST Gregory be from America] (tu) = 1
iff 3t, s. t. t < tu and IT Gregory be from America] (t) =1
iff 3t, s. t. t < tu and Gregory is alive at t and Gregory is from America at t.
Since there is a time in the past such that Gregory is alive at this time a~d Gregory
is from America, (11 a) is predicted to be true.
r think that the "inappropriateness status" of sentences can often be
identified by considering the type of correction with which one can potentially
react to the inappropriateness. With (7b), one would tend to correct the
inappropriateness of the utterance by saying something like: "No, he WAS from
America; he died last year...". But with (lla), one would tend to say something
like: "... and he still IS from America - he is still alive.... ". Thus, the
inappropriateness of (lla) seems to be caused by a lack of information. By
saying "... and he still IS from America...", one adds more information. This is not
the case with' (7b); when correcting the utterance Gregory is,from America in
(7b) by saying "No, he WAS from America... ", one explicitly marks the origin,!!.
t
utterance Gregory is from America as somehow fundamentally wrong. .~
Thus, (lla) is odd because it lacks information. The correction of (11a)
suggests that the crucial information it lacks concerns the temporal duration of
Gregory's being from America. therefore, what r want to argue now is that in a
situation where Gregory is still alive, Gregory is from America (= (lIe)) is more
informative than Gregory was from America (= (lla)). The idea is ~hat in contrast
to (lla), (lIe) exploits the maximally possible degree of informativeness with
respect to the temporal duration of Gregory's being from America.
Let's have a closer look at (lla) and (~Ic) under the assumption that Gregory
was born in 1947 and is still" alive and is from America. With the semantics for
past tense and present tense as proposed in (4) and (6), respectively,
(4) [PAST <I> ] = the function f: Di --7 {O, I}
such that, for any t E Di, f(t) = 1
iff 3t* E Di such that t* < t and ITcI> ] (t*) =1.
(6) [PRES <P n= the function f: Di ---7 {O, I}
such that, for any t E Di, f(t) =1
iff :3t* E Di such that t* is an environment of t and [<1>]] (t*) = 1.
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both (lla) Gregory was from 4merica and (lIe) Gregory is !rC!m America are
predicted to be true. (11a) is true because there is a time t* before now such that
Gregory was from Ame~ica at t*. (lIe) is true because there is a time interval t*
such that t* properly includes now and Gregory is from America at t*. But there
is a crucial difference with respect to how informative the sentences are about the
duration of Gregory's being from America. With (lla) Gregory was from
America, the set of times that make the sentence true is the set of all time intervals
that start at or after Gregory's birth and end before now. The largest time interval
that makes (lla) true is the time interval that starts at Gregory's birth and ends
right before now. With Gregory is from America, the set of times that make the
sentence true is the set of all time intervals that start at or after Gregory's birth and
include now. The largest time interval that makes (lIe) true is the time interval
that starts at Gregory's birth and ends at some time after now, at the time of his
death. The pfcture below illustrates this; the largest time intervals that make (lla)
and (lIe) true are marked with a label "ta" and "te", respectively.
t-c
I
Gregory's birth now
•";,, (12) ---...I===============-=--=--..-I----4.~
t-a
Thus, what makes (lie) more informative than (11a) is the fact that the maximal
time interval that makes (lIe) true is larger than the maximal time interval that
makes (lla) true. In this sense the present tense sentence (lie). provides more
information about the duration of Gregory's being from AmerIca than the past
tense sentence (lla).
It follows from the particular relationship between the present tense clause
and the past tense clause in combination with the general definition of
INFORMATIVENESS in (13) that the former is more informative than the latter.
(13) A proposition <I> is more informative than a proposition qJ if and only if
1. for 'all worlds w such that <I> is true in w, 'P is true in w, and
2. it is not the case that for all worlds w* such that qt is true in w*, cI> is
true in w*.
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Thus, ell is more informative than 'P when unilaterally implying \f.
In order to prove that a present tense clause A is B is more informative than a
past tense clause A was B, one has to show that both (14-1) and (14-2) are true.?
(14) 1. For all worlds w such that A is B is true in w, A was B is true in w, and
2. It is not the case that for all worlds w* such that A was B is true in w*, A
is B is true in w*.
Here is a proof of (14-1): What we want to show is that for all worlds w such
that A is B is true in w, A was B is true in w. According to the semantics of
present tense.I suggested in (6), A is B is true if and only if there is an
environment t* of now such that A be B is true at t*. With the definition of an
environment as given in (5), this translates into the following statement: A is B is
true if and only if there is a time interval t* such that t* includes now, and a time
interval t' before now, and a time interval ttl after now, and A be B is true at t*.
Thus, there is a time interval t' such that t' is located before now and A be B is true
at t'. But if that is so, then A was B must be true, because these are precisely the
conditions under which the semantics of past tense as suggested in (4) predicts A
was B to be true.
The proof of (14-2) goes as follows: We want to show that it is not the case
that for all worlds w* such that A was B is true in w*, A is-B is true in w*. In
order to show this, it is enough to find a case where a clause A was B is true in a
world w*, but A is B is not true in w*. It is easy to find a world in which this is ,
the case. Suppose A was B from 1947 until 1991, but not after 1991. Then there
is a time interval t* such that t* is located before now and A was B at t*, namely
for instance the time interval from 1947 until 1991. Thus, the past tense clause A
was B is true. But there is no time interval t* that includes now and at which A
be B is true. Thus, the present tense clause A is B is not true in this world.
Since we have thus shown that both (14-1) and (14-2) are true, we have
sllown that the present tense clause is indeed more informative than th~ past
tense clause.
The idea is now that the relative inappropriateness of (lla) results from there
being a more appropriate way of making a statement about Gregory's n~tionality -
7 Re~all that we are looking here at individual-level predicates, Le. a special class of stative
predicates.
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namely (lIe). Viewed this way, the inappropriateness of (I1a) is explained
analogously to the inappropriateness of the sentence Some students slept in a
situation where in fact all students slept. In such a situation, the utterance All
students slept would be more informative than the utterance Some students slept.
Consequently, the utterance of Some students slept seems inappropriate.
The inappropriateness of (IIa) can be captured in terms of Grice's (1975, 45)
assumption that conversation is governed by the COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE in
(15), which guarantees that conversation is purposeful and cooperative,
(15) Make your conversational contribution such as is- required, at the stage at
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange
in which you are engaged.
and the supplementary maxims of the Cooperative Principle: subsumed under the
general Cooperative Principle, Grice distinguishes four categories of more specific
maxims: the Maxim of Quality (Be true), the Maxim of Relation (Be relevant), the
Maxim of Manner (Be perspicuous), and most important iIi connection with the
data discussed in this chapter, the MAXIM OF QUANTITY (Be as informative as is
required - not more and not less). Thus, according to Gricean maxims, utterances
should be as informative as possible, unless this is not required. The observation
that a present tense clause is more informative than a past tense clause implies a
special subcase of the Maxim of Quantity, which may be formulated as in (16).
(16) If for some A and some B both itA is Bit and "A was Bit are true, then use
the utterance "A is Bit instead of "A was B".
To summarize, I have explained why (lla) is inappropriate in a situ~tion
where Gregory is alive: it is less informative than (lIe). Strictly speaking this does
not yet account for why (lla) triggers a life-time effect. The fact that (1Ic) is
more appropriate than (IIa) in a situation where Gregory is alive might, according
to (16), justify the intuition that (lla) is less good than (lIe), but it does not
explain the life-time effect of (lla). So why is it that (lla) seems to imply that
Gregory is dead? The.next subsection aims at explaining this effect.
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2.3. A Gricean explanation: Life-time effects as implicature
In this subsection, I will argue that the life-time effect of Gregory was from
America is triggered by the observed difference between (Ita) and (lie) with
respect to informativeness. The difference with respect to informativeness is the
basis for an implicature which leads to the conclusion that an utterance conveys
that Gregory is dead.
I have argued above that the present tense clause (lIe) is more informative
than the past tense clause (lla). The Cooperative Principle governs conversation
in the sense that speakers usually obey it and that hearers usually rely on the
assumption that speakers obey it. A hearer' must very often have some
assumptions about what the speaker means to preserve the supposition that the
Cooperative Principle is being observed. Following Grice, a certain class of
propositions meant are called CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES. Hearers have
access to these conversational implicatures by assuming that the Cooperative
Principle is observed by the speaker and interpreting the utterances of the
speaker in light of this assumption. Grice assumed that conversational
implicatures can always be derived by a general argument pattern (1975, 50).
Basically, because of the fact that one assumes maximal informativeness
when confronted with utterances, one implicates with Gregory was from America
indirectly that Gregory is dead. What one implicates directly is that the property
of being from America is "over". The further implication that Gregory is dead
follows from the fact that be from America is an individual-level predicate. In
(17), a detailed justification schema is spelled out for a situation where a speaker
has uttered Gregory was from America.8
(17) Working out of the implicature of Gregory was from America:
(a) The speaker has expressed the proposition that Gregory was from
America.
(b) There is no reason to suppose that the speaker is not observing the
C.ooperative Principle and maxims, in particular the principle of
informativeness.
8 The schema presented here differs somewhat from the one presented in Grice (1975, 50).
I am leaving out some steps of the derivation that concern the transmission of information
between speaker and hearer. Moreover, I am adding steps that concern the consideration of
alternative expressions and informativity.
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(c) Thus, the hearer assumes that the speaker is maximally informative
about Gregory's being from America - in particular about the duration of
Gregory's being from America.
(d) If the speaker thought that Gregory's being from America is not over,
he would have expressed the proposition that Gregory is from America,
since that would have been a more informative alternative utterance about
the duration of Gregory's being from America.
(e) Thus, the speaker couldn't have been maximally informative about
Gregory's being from America unless he thought that Gregory's being from
America is over.
(f) "Thus, the speaker has implicated that Gregory's being from America is
over.
(g) Since being from America is a prop~rty that, if it holds of an individual
at all, it holds of that individual during all its life-time, the hearer concludes
further that, since the speaker has implicated that Gregory's being from
America is over, the speaker has implicated that Gregory is dead.
In this way, the utterance Gregory was from America triggers a life-time effect.9
2.4. Stage-level predicates and the Gricean explanation
We are now in a position to explain why stage-level predicates contrast with
individual-level predicates in that they do not trigger life-time effects. I will show
shortly why this is so. More.over, I will show that although stage-level predicates
do not trigger life-time effects, they exploit an analogous effect.
Here is a lexical entry of a stage-level predicate. Just like lexical entries for
individual-level predicates, the ones for stage-level predicates also specify life-
time presuppositions. Note that it does not differ crucially from the lexical entry
of individual-level predicates (cf. (11)).10
9 I think that Krifka et ale (1995, 79 fn.40) have a similar analysis for a certain subcase of
life-time effects in mind. They mention that The dodo was a bird clearly suggests that the
dodo is extinct and observe that "In general, when a necessary property is asserted of a
kind in past tense, we can infer that the kind does not exist anymore. It Moreover, they also
assume that this is a pragmatic effect. Their intuitions differ from mine insofar as they
observe that "the sentence the dodo is a bird is true as well, in spite of the dodo's being
extinct".
10 For my present purpose, it is not necessary to assume a systematic formal difference
(e.g., different argument structures) between individual-level predicates and stage-level
predicates.
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(18) [eat-cookies 11 = the function f: Di --7 D<e,t>,
such that, for any t E Di, f(t) = the partial function g: D ~ {a, I},
such that, for any xED, x is in the domain of g iff x is alive at t,
and for each x in the domain of g, g(x) =1 iff x eats cookies at t.
Recall the contrast between (1) and (2), here illustrated with the individual-
level clause (19) and the stage-level clause (20).
(19) Gregory was from America.
(20) Gregory was happy.
The reason why (20), in contrast to (19); does not trigger a life-time effect is
simply that being happy is usually not a property that holds of individuals during
all their life-time, but only during certain times. Thus, one would expect that in an
analogous justification schema, step (g) of (17) woulq not be performed; the
implicature triggered by the use of the past tense in (20) would be predicted to
stop at step (f) of (17), so that (20) ultimately implicates (21).
(21) Implicature of Gregory was happy:
Gregory's being happy is over.
This prediction is in fact borne out: when a stage-level clause i~ uttered out of the
blue and contains a past tense, a hearer concludes that the predication time of the
property, event or activity denoted by the main predicate is over. Thus, (22) for
instance seems to imply that Eva-Lotta's walking along the Charles River is over
at the time of utterance.
(22) Today, Eva-Lotta walked along the Charles River.
Thus, past tense triggers implicatures concerning the end of the predication
time of the main predicate with both individual-level and stage-level-predicates.
The only difference between the two types of predicates is that the conclusion
about the life-time of the subject is not performed with stage-level predicates.
This is simply due to' the fact that the stage-level predicate is known to usually
cover only a small part of the subjecfs life-time. As a consequence, the being
over of states like being happy or activities like walking along the Charles River
does not imply anything about the subject's life-time.. Thus, to put it simply:
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Gregory's not being happy anymore doesn't imply that he isn't alive anymore, but
Gregory's not being from America anymore does.
2.5. Predictions for existence-independent predicates
I now want to come back to the issue of existence-independent predicates like be
famous. Existence-independent predicates were briefly introduced with (9),
repeated here as (23).
(23) a.
b.
Utterance: "Gregory is famous." - Situation: Gregory is still alive.
Utterance: "Gregory is famous." - Situation: Gregory is dead.
The crucial property of existence-independent predicates is that they do not
impose a life~time requirement on their subjects. Thus, a sentence like Gregory is
famous can be uttered appropriately regardless of whether Gregory is dead or
alive at the time of utterance. This can be captured by assigning lexical entries
like (24) to existence-independent predicates .which do not contain a life-time
presupposition.
(24) [be-famous] =the function f: Di --7 D<e,t>,
such that, for any t E Di, xED, f(t)(x) =1 iff x is famous at t.
Th~s, be famous does not impose a restriction on how the life-time of the subject
and the predication time of be famous have to relate to each other. That is, be
famous can hold of an individual at some time and place even if the individual is
completely absent. It can hold of an individual during part of its life-time (e.g.,
Mikhail Gorbachev), after its life-time (e.g., Paul Gauguin), perhaps even before its
life-time (e.g., the baby of Boris Becker!!) or, of course, during any combination
of these possibilities (e.g., Pablo Picasso) or of non-existent individuals or fictional
characters (e.g., Snow White).!2
What does our analysis predict for existence-independent predicates as far as
the presence or absence of life-time effects is concerned? Since be famous does
11 Boris Becker is a German tennis player about whose baby German newspapers wrote
pages and pages and pages before the kid was born..
12 This last observation is due to Roger Schwarzschild (pc).
37
MUSAN: TEMPORALINrERPREfATION OFNPS - ll. INDIVIDUALS
not impose a life-time presupposition on its subject and since it can hold of an
individual during part of its life, we expect that be falnous should not trigger any
life-time effects. This prediction is borne out. (25) for example does not imply
that Boris Becker's child is dead.
(25) Boris Becker's baby was famous.
But, just as with the stage-level predicates and individual-level predicates above,
.the past tense in (25) seems to imply that the being famous of Boris Becker's baby
is over (which is actually true, I believe).
2.6. Predicates with more than one argument
Before I refine my analysis in order to be able to capture more data, let me add
some remarks about predicates that have more than on~ argument. Above, we
have looked at s~bject arguments, and we have distinguished three different
types of requirements on temporal relationships between the time of the main
predicate of a clause and the time of existence of its subject argument: the time of
existence of subjects of individual-level predicates is typically identical to the
time of the individual-level predicate; the time of a stage-level predicate typically
covers only a relatively small part of the time of existence of its subject; finally,
existence-independent predicates have subjects whose time of existence is not
restricted by the time of the predicate. What we have not looked at so far is what
happens to other arguments of predicates with respect to their temporal location.
In general, we can observe that predicates can behave differently with
respect to different arguments. 13 Here are a few examples that illustrate this:
(26) a.
b.
c.
d.
Lord Peter Wimsey talked about Miss Phelps.
Lord Peter Wimsey invited Harriet Vane for dinner.
Harriet misunderstood Lord Peter.
Harriet gave Lord Peter the manuscript of her latest novel.
13 Referring to Tichy (1985), Vlach (1993, 259f) makes a related observation. He
suggests that agent arguments and theme arguments, but perhaps not arguments aSsociated
with other thematic roles should be treated as time (and place) dependent.
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In the sentences in (26), single underlining marks noun phrases that denote
individuals who, due to the semantics of the verb of the clause, must be present at
the time and place of the event denoted by the verb. Double underlining marks
noun phrases that are not subject to such a requirement. Stretching the
terminology somewhat, one might say that talk about for instance is a verb that
behaves with respect to the temporal location of its subject argument like a stage-
level predicate and with respect to the temporal location of its object argument
like an existence-independent predicate.
Another interesting case is the verb resemble. Considering the core meaning
of resemble, it seems plausible to assume that it is a symmetric predicate:
,intuitively, A resembles B if and only if B resembles A. But a closer look at the
verb reve~ls that it is in fact asymmetric, at least as far as the tempor~llocation of
its arguments is concerned. Consider the sentence Aunt Theresa resembled my
grandmother (taken from Kratzer (1989, p44)) with two different situations, (27a)
and (27b).14
(27) a. Utterance: "Aunt Theresa .resembled my grandmother. 1I - Situation: Aunt
Theresa is dead; the grandmother is still alive.
b. # Utterance: "Aunt Theresa resembled my grandmother." - Situation: Aunt
Theresa is still alive; the grandmother is dead.
In (27b), the sentence is uttered in a situation where the subject argument of
resemble, Aunt Theresa, is still alive, whereas the object argument, the
grandmother, is dead. In this situation, tIle sentence seems unfelicitous because it
implicates - contrary to fact - that the subject argument, Aunt Theresa, is dead. If
resemble were a completely symmetric predicate, one would expect it to show a
similar effect in (27a), where the object argument, the grandmother, is still alive,
whereas the subject argument, Aunt Theresa, is dead. But (27a) shows no such
14 For a presentation and critique of Kratzer's account of the data see below, Section 4.
Note that, like Kratzer, I am here exclusively interested in the individual-level reading of
resemble. Obviously, resemble has also a stage-level reading, as can be nicely illustrated
with the following very plausible example (which is que to Arnim von Stechow, pc):
Randi used to resemble Franzis, but now she resembles Wladimir. - With the stage-
level reading, of course, there arise no life-time effects. It is admittedly not easy to draw
the two readings of resemble apart. If I understand Kratzer right, the idea of the
individual-level reading of resemble is to talk about a very fundamental resemblance.
Thus, Kratzer introduces the examples in her paper suggesting that Aunt Theresa is/was
almost a perfect clone of the grandmother.
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effect; it is perfectly acceptable and does not implicate anything about the
grandmother's life-time.
Thus, it seems that resemble behaves like an individual-level predicate with
respect to its subject argument, but like an existence-independent predicate with
respect to its object argument. I will come back to the case of resemble when
discussing Kratzer's analysis of these and other examples.
3. Contextual relativization of life-time effects
In Section 2, I have explained how the occurrence of life-time effects with past
tense individual-level clauses can be accounted for. The purpose of Section 3 is
to refine the analysis in order to account for cases like (3), repeated below as (28),
where one might expect life-time effects but where, as it turns out, they are
blocked.
3.1. The blocking of life-time effects in certain contexts
Consider again (3), repeated here as (28). It seems that implicatures of the type
derived in (17) can be deleted or blocked in certain contexts. None of the
underlined clauses in (28) triggers life-time effects, although it was precisely the
same clauses that triggered life-time effects in (1), where they appeared out of
context.
(28) a.
b.
c.
On that day, I was introduced to Gregory and Eva-Lotta. Gregory
was from America, and Eva-Lotta was from Switzerland."
I had a chance to have a closer look at him. Gregory had blue eyes.
Suddenly I realized a remarkable thing: Gregory resembled Jorg
Bieberstein.
Why does the life-time effect disappear in these contexts? At first sight, there
appear to be two plausible explanations for the blocking of life-time effects in
(28).
First, it is widely assumed that past tense is not always interpreted as past
tense, but seems to be sometimes deleted in the semantic representation when
40 I
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embedded under another occurrence of past tense. These so-called sequence-of-
tense constructions then get a simultaneous interpretation. Thus, in addition to
an interpretation roughly like (29b), (29a) can get an interpretation like (29c),
where the embedded past tense does not seem to be interpreted relative to the
evaluation time. provided by the matrix clause. This phenomenon can be
captured by saying that the embedded past tense in these cases is semantically
empty.
(29) a.
b.
c.
Gregory said that he was bored.
There is a time t* before now, such that Gregory said at t* that he
was bored at a time t** before t*.
There is a time t* before now, such that Gregory said at t* that he
was bored at t*.
In light of sequence-of-tense constructions, one might assume that the sentences
in (28) exhibit a sequence-of-tense effect across sentence boundaries. Thus, the
. past tense in const~ctions like (28) could perhaps be regarded, as .well, as only a
morphologically relevant element which for some reason is eliminated in the
semantic representation. If that were so, then it would seem plausible that past
tense in such constructions loses its ability to trigger life-time effects.
Although appealing at first sight, this approach proves to be untenable. This
is because other languages that don't show sequence-of-tense effects in general
show the same effect as the one observed in (28). As David Pesetsky pointed out
to me, Russian does not have sequence-of-tense phenomena and, therefore,
provides a possibility to test the hypothesis that the occurrence of past tense in
the second sentence is a consequence of sequence-of-tense. Maria
Babyonyshev (pc) said that the Russian translation corresponding to (28c) is
acceptable. Thus, we can conclude that sequence-of-tense phenomena don't play
a role in (28c) or similar examples.
The second analysis of the effect in (28) is based on the assumption that
constructions like (28) may be viewed as constructions where a specific temporal
context relativizes the temporal interpretation of clauses to particular times and,
consequently, neutralizes life-time effects. In (28a) for example, such a
relativizing time is explicitly given by a temporal adverbial in the preceding
sentence. In (28b, c), it seems that the event mentioned in the preceding sentence
sets a time relative to which the underlined sentences are interpreted. Before I
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explain why this leads to a blocking of the life-time effect, let me first introduce
some more background about temporal interpretation.
3.2. On temporal interpretation
All accounts of temporal interpretation have to solve the problem of how to deal
with the fact that sentences can apparently have either definite or indefinite tense
readings. INDEFINITE or QUANTIFICATIONAL TENSE READINGS are readings
that can apparently only be represented with a quantifier over times. This is the
case with the sentence Today, Eva-Lotta didn't smile, which has the reading "It is
not the case that there is a time t, such that t is today and Eva-Lotta smiles at ttl.
D.EFINITE or DEICTIC TENSE READINGS are readings which imply a
contextually salient time interval that is relevant for the representation of the
reading, as with Partee's (1973) well-known example I didn't tum off the stove.
The strongly preferred reading of this sentence is neither "It is not the case that
there is a time t such that I turned off the stove at ttl nor "There is a time t such
that it is not the case that I turned off the stove at ttl but something like fiAt the
designated time t (e.g. for the sentence here, right before I left the house) it is not
the case that I turned off the stove at til. Thus, the most salient reading of the
sentence is a definite or deictic one, in the sense that the speaker has a particular,
contextually salient time interval in mind. Based on the existence of such definite
tense readings, Partee (1973) argued that an adequate analysis .of tense must
provide the option to interpret tense as denoting specific time intervals similarly
as deictic pronouns denote specific individuals.
But neither the existence of indefinite tense readings nor the existence of so-
called definite tense readings must necessarily lead to the conclusion that tense
itself is responsible for the indefiniteness or definiteness. Thus, adopting basically
the accounts of Bauerle (1977, 1979) and Kratzer (1978), and a recent version of
these accounts by von Stechow (1992), I will assume that both aspects of tense
interpretation are provided by independent elements in LF. With von Stechow, I
will treat tense as a relation between two times or assume, equivalently, that tense
is a predicate that takes two times as arguments. For the purpose of this chapter, I
will adopt a slightly modified version of his semantics. The lexical entry for past
tense for instance is as follows.
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(30) [PAST]= the function f: Di --7 D<i, t>
such that for any t, t* E Di, f (t) (t*) = 1 iff t* < t.
Being a predicate of times, tense itself is neither definite nor indefinite. As a
consequence, any definite or indefinite aspects of tense readings have to come
from other sources, sometimes from phonetically empty elements.
The indefiniteness effect is caused by an OBLIGATORY TEMPORAL ADVERB
OF QUANTIFICATION that can be overt -like always - or phonetically empty, in
which case it gets by default an existential quantifier meaning, represented as,
"3".15
(31) [3]]= the function f: D<i, t>~ D<it, t>
such that for any p, q E D<i, t>, f (p) (q) =1
iff there is a time t* such that: p (t*) =1 and q (t*) =1.
As we will see shortly, tense functions as a restrictor of the obligatory adverb of
. quantification.
Temporal definiteness is treated as a phenomenon caused either by explicit
DEFINITE TEMPORAL ADVERBIALS (like today) or by IMPLICIT DEFINITE
TEMPORAL RESTRICTIONS of the adverb of quantifiation 3. Implicit temporal
restrictions are provided by the context and represented as a variable "C".
Technically, I will assume that these variables are elements of type <i, t> that are
interpreted by intersection with other restrictive material .in the restrictive clause
of 3.16 The interpretation of C is captured in (32). Since temporal interpretation is
thus evaluated relative to the discourse context, interpretations will henceforth be
made relative to contexts, as.marked with the superscript He".I?
15 Note that there are also empty operators with a generic or universal meaning.
16 See also von Fintel (1994) on implicit restrictions of quantifiers.
17 In a BauerlelKratzerlStechow type account, temporal definiteness is caused by 'an
obligatory definite time adverbial. This obligatory time adverbial can be overt - like today -
or phonetically empty, in which case it is represented as Uthen*". It functions as a frame
adverbial that provides a contextually relevant definite time. The main difference between
von Stechow's proposal and my version of it is that I treat implicit definite temporal
adverbials as part of the restrictive clause of the adverb of quantification that will shortly be
introduced. The motivation for the modification is that it assigns a generalized quantifier
type to the adverb of quantification. Furthermore, as Kai von Fintel pointed out to me, this
step makes it possible to treat t~mporal definiteness as a special case of implicit restrictions
of quantifiers that are commonly assumed anyway (cf. von Fintel (1994)).
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(32) [C ]] c =the function f: Di -7 Dt,
such that for any t* E Di, f (t*) =1
iff t* is a subinterval of the time the speaker in C, Se, refers to.
In order to implement the proposal on temporal interpretation I just sketched,
we will make furthermore the following assumptions:
• There are three basic semantic types: e (entities), t (truth values), and i (times).
• Time variables are made explicit and occupy positions in the syntactic
structure.
• Verbs have time arguments. Syntactically, the time arguments appear as a
sister of the verb.
• Above TP, there are (at least) the functional categories AGRs-P, and CP.
• LFs correspond, as far as temporal adverbials, adverbs of quantification, and
tense are concerned, to the unmarked surface order of sentences.
• The syntactic surface tree has noun phrase arguments in case positions. At
LF, noun phrases can occur in their base position when they are
reconstructed.
• The LF is not in general interpretable just by functional application between
daughters of any binary branching node. Instead, the following mechanism
applies: For the interpretation of any quantifier - i.e. an element of type <at
<at, t> >, where (J may be of any type - a tripartite semantic representation is
constructed, consisting of the quantifier, a restrictive clause, and a nuclear
scope. The restrictive clause and the nuclear scope get filled with any material
of the appropriate type that can be found below the next dominating node of
type t, which defines the maximal scope of the quantifier. In the sample
structure below, which contains the phonetically empty adverb of
quantification 3 this is the highest. of the TP-nodes. - The quantifier 3 is of
type <it, <it, t». Thus, it needs at least two arguments of type <i, t>, which
are to be filled into the restrictive clause and the nuclear scope, respectively.
The mapping into restrictive clause and nuclear scope proceeds as follows:
first, the lowest argument of the appropriate type is mapped into the nuclear
scope; second, all other arguments of the appropriate type are filled into the
restrictive clause and are conjoined there. Thus we have the principle of
Tripartite Structure Construction: The lowest appropriate argument gets into
the nuclear scope. All other arguments of the appropriate type get into the
restrictive clause.
• The following semantic rules apply:
Functional Application: [[ a ~]] = ITa] ([~]])or = [~] (ITa])
Predicate Abstraction: (with i index) [[i ex] g = AX IT ex ] g [x ~ i ]
A-Conversion: [[ AX a] g (i) = IT a ] g [x ~ i ]
Predicate Modification (here for predicates of times, when there are several
restricting elements in the restrictive clause of an adverb of quantification):
[ a & ~ ]] (i) = 1 iff IT ex ] (i) =1 and [[ ~ ] (i) = 1.
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Let me now briefly illustrate with an example how this proposal works.
Suppose Eva-Lotta smiled is uttered in the context given in (33a). According to
the proposal of temporal interpretation I just sketched, Eva-Lotta smiled has a
hidden structure roughly like (33b), which corresponds to the LF (33c). In order
to save space in the LF-representation, I attach A-binders directly to category
nodes. With such nodes, semantic types appear below and above the category
node. The types are the types before and after A-abstraction, respectively.
(33) a.
b.
c.
On Sunday afternoon, I met Eva-Lotta and Gregory at Harvard
Square. Eva-Lotta smiled.
:3 C Eva-Lotta smiled
<it t>
AtTP
t
TP
<it <itt 1»
QAP
3 c
<it 1>
At*YP
t
~
e <e, t>
NP yt
Eva-Lotta . ~
<l <et» I
Y i
smile t*
<i, t>
At*TENSE
t
/'----
<itt> i
r---- t*
<i <i t» i
PAST t
From this LF, the semantic representation (33d) is constructed. The adverb of
quantification takes tense and the temporal variable C as its restrictors, whereas
the rest of the clause is mapped into its nuclear scope.
(33) d. At (3 [At* (C (t*)) & At* (PAST (t)(t*))] [At* (smile (t*){Eva-Lotta))))
Because of the context provided by the first sentence in (33a), the most preferred
reading of the underlined clause is one where the implicit C in the underlined
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sentence refers to the time on last Sunday afternoon when I met Eva-Lotta and
Gregory. The lexical entries of verbs and proper names are given in (34) and (35),
respectively.
(34) [smile]c = the function f: Di -7 D<e, t>
such that for any t E Di, xED, f (t) (x) = 1 iff x smiles at t.
(35) [Eva-Lotta]C = the individual Eva-Lotta (of type e).
Suppose (33a) is uttered now. The truth conditions of Eva-Lotta smiled in (33a)
are thep. calculated as shown in (36).
(36) [3 C Eva-Lotta smiled]c (now) =1
iff [by Tripartite Structure Construction]
[At (3[ At* (C (t*)) & At* (PAST (t)(t*))]
[At* (smile (t*) (Eva-Lotta))]) ]]C (now) =1
iff [by :A.-Conversion]
[3[ At* (C (t*)) & At* (PAST (t)(t*))]
[At* (smile (t*) (Eva-Lotta))] ]] c, [t--7 now] = 1
iff [by lexical entry of 3J
there is a time t* such that
[Al* (C (t*)) & At* (pAST (t)(t*)) ]]C, [t--7 now] (t*) = 1 and
[At* (smile (t*) (Eva-Lotta)) ]] c, [t--7 now] (t*) =1
iff [by Predicate Modification applied to the restrictive clause]
there is a time t* such that
[At* (C (t*)) ]]C, [t--7 now] (t*) = 1 and
[At* (PAST (t)(t*)) ]]C, [t--7 now] (t*) = 1 and
[At* (smile (t*) (Eva-Lotta)) ]]C, [t--7 now] (t*) = 1
iff [by A-Conversion]
there is a time t* such that
[t --7 now]
[C (t*) ]]C, t* --7t* =1 and
[t --7 now]
[PAST (t)(t*) ]] c, t* --7 t* = 1 and
[t --7 now]
[smile (t*) (Eva-Lotta) ]] c, t* --7 t* =1
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iff [by lexical entries of the remaining elements, variable assignment applied
to t and t*]
there is a time t*
such that t~ is a subinterval of the time of last Sunday afternoon
when I met Eva-Lotta and Gregory, and
t* < now, and
(Eva-Lotta is alive at t*, and)
Eva-Lotta smiles at t* .
In the next subsection, I want to show how the framework of temporal
interpretation I just sketched can be used to account for the blocking of life-time
effects in certain contexts. Before I go into this, I want to add in an appendix to
this section a brief discussion of some aspects of my treatment of temporal
adverbials as restrictors of temporal adverbs of quantification. Since the material
presented therein is not crucial to the following discussion, the appendix can be
skipped.
Appendix to Section 3.2.: Definite and indefinite temporal adverbials,
quantifier restrictions, scrambling, and related issues
Definite temporal adverbials as restrictors. I adopted in Section 3.2. the view
that temporal (frame) adverbials function as restrictors of the obligatory temporal
adverb of quantification of a clause, no matter whether they are definite like on
that Monday or indefinite like on Mondays.
This is not an inevitable assumption. For example, von Stechow (1992)
assumes that definite temporal adverbials have wide scope over the adverb of
quantification, whereas indefinite temporal adverbials function as restrictors of
temporal adverbs of quantification. A consequence of his analysis is- that he has
to assume different semantic types for definite and indefinite temporal adverbials -
«it>, t»> and <i, t>, respectively - and that the temporal adverb of
quantification has a relatively complicated type, namely <i, «it>, «it>, t»>.
In my analysis, definite and indefinite temporal adverbials are of the same
type, namely simply <i, t>. And temporal adverbs of quantification are of type
«it>, «it>, t»; since this type is a generalized quantifier type analogous to the
commonly assumed type of determiner-quantifiers, this analysis seems more
desirable to me. Thus, instead of assuming two different semantic types for
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temporal adverbials and an undesirable type of adverbs of quantification, I
assume a uniform semantic type for temporal adverbials and a generalized
quantifier type for adverbs of quantification.
In the following, I want to sketch the background assumptions of my analysis
and integrate them into a more general picture of the syntax/semantics interface.
Although I cannot present a thorough investigation of the relevant ~ssues here, I
believe that it can be shown that the difference between definite and indefinite
temporal adverbials with respect to their surface position can be derived from
more general, independently motivated principles of scrambling. Basically, I want
to propose that scrambling of noun phrases and scrambling of temporal adverbials
have the same triggers. This suggests that there are significant similarities
between noun phrases and temporal adverbials. As we will see, there are also
significant differences between noun phrases and temporal adverbials - namely as
far as their mapping at LF is concerned. It seems that semantic differences
between scrambled noun phrases and scrambled temporal adverbials on the one
hand, and between unscrambled noun phrases and unscrambled temporal
adverbials· on the other hand, can also be derived from independent principles of
mapping and differences concerning the D-structural properties of the elements in
question.
If I understand von Stechow correctly, the motivation for his analysis is the
unmarked surface order of the adverbials in German clauses in connection with
the idea that the surface position of adverbials corresponds to their scope at LF.
Consider (37).
(37) a. weil Hanna [TAdef im letzten Mai] immer angeln ging
since Hanna in-the last May always fishing went
b. ? weil Hanna immer [TAdef im letzten Mai] angeln ging
since Hanna always in-the last May fishing went
c. ? weil Hanna, [TAindef wenn es regnete] immer ailgeln ging
since Hanna when it rained always fishing went
d. weil Hanna immer, [TAindef wenn es regnete] angeln ging
since Hanna always when it rained fishing went
The crucial observation is that (37a), which contains a definite temporal adverbial,
is less marked than (37b), whereas (37c), which contains an indefinite temporal
adverbial, is more marked than its counterpart (37d).
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However, what I am proposing is that definite temporal frame adverbials are
semantically always part of the restrictor of an adverb of quantification. Their
surface position does not affect their semantic function. Rather, it is the result of
syntactic movements that are associated with topic-focus structure, i.e. scrambling
and sometimes topicalization.
Temporal adverbials can be scrambled. That topicalization applies to temporal
adverbials is well-known. I.e., the English construction (38a) and the German
construction (38b) are obviously the result of topicalization movements that are
.typical for the respective language.
(38) a.
b.
On Monday, the subway broke down.
Am Montag brach die U-Bahn zusammen.
on Monday broke the subway together
{'On Monday, the subway broke down.')
The assumption that temporal adverbials in German undergo scrambling may seem
at first sight unusual. Although there is much literature on scrambling of noun
phrases in German (e.g. Btiring (1994), Jager (1995) and others), little has been
said about the surface positions of temporal adverbials. Biiring (1994) me"ntions
that ~dverbials in general do not have a completely fixed position and states that
if they are moved away from their base position they can only be raised but never
lowered, but he doesn't say what conditions are associated with the raising of
adverbials.
It seems to me that raising of temporal adverbials is associated with similar
properties similar to those associated with scrambling of noun phrases. I don't
want to go here into a detailed discussion of what the triggers for scrambling of
noun phrases are. Let me just state here that according to Biiring (1994), von
Fintel (1994), and Jager (1995), scrambling of noun phrases ~s associated with
properties like definiteness, specificity, or topicality - where definiteness and
specificity can be analyzed as a special case of topicality.
What is important here is that in some respects, the positions of temporal
adverbials and of noun phrases relative to adverbs of quantification seem to be
associated with similar properties. Both noun phrases and temporal adverbials
tend to be located to the left of adverbs of quan.tification when they are definite,
Of, when they are indefinite and specifically interpreted - where "specific" means
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that the speaker has a particular individual or time interval in mind which is
characterized by the indefinite noun phrase or the indefinite temporal adverbial,
respectively.
Thus, (39a) and (40a), where a definite noun phrase or temporal adverbial
appear to the right of the adverb of quantification immer ('always') are marked
when not combined with a particular focus articulation. I8 (39b) and (40b) on the
other hand are fine, because here the definite items appear on the left of the
adverb of quantification. In (39c, d) and (40c, d), indefinite noun phrases and
temporal adverbials appear on the right hand side and on the left hand side of the
adverb of quantification, respectively. When they appear on the right hand side,
they are preferredly unspecific, but when they appear on the left hand side, the
resulting sentences appear strange unless the items are specifically interpreted, i.e.
unless the speaker has a particular woman or a particular Sunday in mind,
respectively.
(39) a.
b.
c.
d.
(40) a.
b.
c.
d.
?? weil immer die Frau angeln ging
.since always the woman fishing went
weil die Frau immer angeln ging
since the woman always fishing went
weil immer eine Frau angeln ging [preferredly unspecific]
since always a woman fishing went
wei! eine Frau immer angeln ging [preferredly specific]
since a woman allvays fishing went
?? weil Hanna immer an diesem schrecklichen Sonntag angeln ging
since Hanna always on that terrible Sunday fishing ·went
weil Hanna an diesem schrecklichen Sonntag immer angeln ging
since Hanna on that terrible Sunday always fishing went
weil Hanna immer'an einem Sonntag angeln ging [pref. unspecific]
sil1ce Hanna always on a Sunday fishing went
weil Hanna an einem Sonntag immer angeln ging [pref. specific]
since Hanna on a Sunday always fishing went
Let us thus assum~ that temporal adverbials as well as noun phrases can be
scrambled in German and that scrambling of both items is associated with some
property in the range of topichood.
18 E.g., the noun phrase must be focused.
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Scrambling of noun phrases and temporal adverbials and mapping at LF.
The issue of base positions and scrambling positions of 'elements is related to
another issue - namely the issue of how the positions of elements affect their
mapping at LF. With respect to noun phrases, the work of Diesing (1992)
resulted in some relatively clear-cut observations: Diesing (1992) argued that in
German, indefinite noun phrases on the right of adverbs of .quantification are
mapped at LF into the nuclear scope (NS), whereas indefinite noun phrases on
the left of adverbs of quantification are mapped into the restrictive clause (RC) of
the adverb of quantification. Here is an illustration of this effect.
(41) a.
b.
weil Feuerwehrmanner immer verfiigbar sind [mapped into RC]
since firemen. always available are
ALWAYSx [fIremen (x)] [available (x)]
weil immer Feuerwehrmanner verfiigbar sind [mapped into NS]
since always firmen available are
ALWAYSt [C (t)] 3x [frreman (x) & available (x, t)]
One may ask whether there are similar observations with temporal adverbials and
how these are related to scrambling of temporal adverbials.19
Instead of going into a detailed discussion of this question, let me present
here a schematic structure that shows the relevant positions of noun phrases,
temporal adverbials, and operators, and gives some impression of what the
mapping behavior of temporal adverbials (TAs) and noun phrases (DPs) seems to
be like. Note that I assume here that the existential closure operator is to be
distinguished from the implicit temporal adverb of quantification 3.20 I assume
19 Johnston (1994) has argued that the interpretation of temporal adverbials is affected by
their position, in a similar way as the interpretation of noun phrases.
20 This claim may be in need of a thorough further investigation. Evidence for the
distinction between the existential closure operator an~ adverbs of quantification may be
that the existential closure operator is unrestrictive, whereas adverbs of quantification are
restrictive. Furthermore, existential closure can obviously occur when an overt adverb of
quantification is .present, as we have seen with Diesing's example above.
Thus, I think it is not possible to identify the implicit existential temporal adverb of
quantification with the existential closure operator that is commonly assumed to close the
VP existentially (cf. Heim (1982), Diesing (1992) and others). I adopt here the view of
Beck (1994, 25f) according to whom the existential closure operator is of a completely
different nature than quantifiers in a narrower sense. The existential closure operator is not
part of LF as a syntactic object; it is rather "part of the process of interpreting the LF, that
is, one of the general rules that can be used in deriving the interpretation of a logical form",
Beck argues and concludes that the existential closure operator lacks the tripartite structure
characteristic of quantification in the narrow sense.
51
MUSAN: TEMPORAL INTERPRETAnON OFNPS - .li lNDI\'IDUALS
that both the existential closure operator and the temporal adverb of
quantification are obligatory elements in the structure.
(42)
positions for
scrambled
DPs
position for
scrambled
TAs
oblig.
QAP
~b •.
overt ase posItIon 3-closure
QAor3 ofTAs
VP
base positions
ofDPs
Another assumption I am making here is that temporal adverbials are base-
generated as complements of adverbs of quantification; thus, adverbs of
quantification relate to temporal adverbials just as determiners relate to NPs.21
Here are some crucial hypotheses and predictions related to the structure in (42):
Note here that the obligatory temporal adverb of quantification should also not be assumed
to be an operator that can replace the generic operator that is responsible for the generic
quantificational force of some indefinite noun phrases. This can be concluded from the fact
that generic noun phrases can appear in a clause with existential quantification over (truth-)
time intervals:
(A) a. In 1943, farmers didn't smile.
b. =For farmers in general there is no subinterval of 1943, such that any
farmer smiles.
To summarize, the existential quantifier needed for temporal interpretation in the absence
of overt adverbs of quantification and the operators needed for noun phrase interpretation
are crucially distinct.
21 This assumption is also open to further debate. Evidence in favor of it is that in V-2
clauses in German, adverbs of quantification and temporal adverbials can be topicalized
together:
(A) a. weil Hanna immer am Montag angeln geht
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(43) Noun phrases and temporal adverbials appear in a scrambled position when they are
topical (and perhaps sometimes for other reasons).
(44) When a noun phrase appears to the right of the adverb of quantification, it is
presumably not a good candidate for restricting the adverb of quantification. This is
because a noun phrase in this position is in the scope of the existential closu~e
operator that captures unbound variables within the noun phrase.
(45) When a temporal "adverbial appears to the right of the adverb of quantification, it is
not in the scope of the existential closure operator. Since there is no other operator
around that could capture unbound variables introduced by an temporal adverbial,
temporal adverbials always serve as restrictors of the adverb of quantification.
(46) I assume that temporal adverbials can give rise to readings as follows:
a. well Hans mich immer am Montag besucht hat
b. definite interpretation: On the contextually salient Monday, Hans visited me
all the time. '
ALWAYSt [t is a time of the contextually salient Monday]
[Hans visited "me at t]
c. indefinite interpretation, where the TA restricts an overt adverb of
quantification: Hans visited me on every Monday.
ALWAYSt [t is a Monday] [Hans visited me at t]
d. indefinite interpretation, where the TA restricts a second, silent, existential
quantifier22: Whenever Hans visited me, it was MONDAY.
ALWAYSt [Hans visited me at t]
[3t* [t* is a time on a Monday] [t is part of t*] ]
Whether these ideas are on the right track is an empirical question which I have
to leave to future research.
since Hanna always on Mond!ly fishing goes
b. Immer am Montag geht Hanna angeln.
always on Monday goes Hanna fishing
22 This is very similar to what Johnston (1994) suggests. There is some indication that
this structure is adequate: as observed by Bauerle (1979), there are constructions where
two adverbs of quantification can appear explicitly.
(A) a. weil Hans mich in Schaltjahren immer zweimal besucht hat
since Hans me in leap-years always twice visited has
b. In all leap-years, Hans visited me twice.
ALWAYSt [t is a leap-year & t is before now]
[TWICEt* [t* is part of t] [Hans visits me at t*]]
Thus, one can treat the implicit existential quantifier in (46d) as a special case of a second
adverb of quantification as in (A). - Note·that in iterative constructions of adverbs of
quantification, the tense of the clause is apparently always mapped into the outermost
restrictive clause.
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3.3. Informativity in temporally specific contexts
With the semantics sketched in Subsection 3.2., we have almost gained a tool for
explaining the neutralization of life-time effects in sentences like the ones in (3) or
(28). What these sentences have in common is that they appear in temporally
specific contexts, and I will propose in this subsection that the temporal
specifications serve as implicit restrictors of 3. and thus give sentences in
temporally specific contexts a semantic representation that differs from that of
sentences that are uttered out of the blue. When informativity requirements
apply to the context-restricted structures, life-time effects are pred~cted to be
neutralized.
Consider again the sentences in (28). According to our refined semantics,
these sentences have implicit temporal adverbials which get a value from the
context assigned - in this case a value that is provided by the preceding linguistic
context. In (47) the contextually provided temporal restriction is represented as
the expression in square brackets.23
(47) a.
b.
c.
On that day, I was introduced to Gregory and Eva-Lotta.
[when I was introduced to Gregory and Eva-Lotta on that day]
Gregory was from America, ...
I had a chance to have a closer look at him.
[when I looked at him] Gregory had blue eyes.
Sud"denly I realized a remarkable thing:
[when I looked at him] Gregory resembled Jorg Bieberstein.
In Section 2, I presented an account of life-time effects that was based on the
assumption that life-time effects with past tense clauses are triggered by a lack of
informativity of past tense individual-level clauses in situations where a present
tense clause is also true. Specifically, I observed that the relevant aspect of
informativeness concerns the duration of the time during which the main
predicate can be truly predicated of its subject.
Since the sentences where life-time effects are blocked have in common that
they appear in temporally specific contexts, the minimal hypothesis about these
sentences is that the temporal specifications change the conclusions drawn from
considerations of informativity. Let us see how this helps to explain the blocking
23 The choice of values is a bit arbitrary here and only one of several possibilities.
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of life-time effects in (47). The truth conditions of Gregory was from America in
the temporally specific context (47a), repeated here as (48a), can be stated as in
(48b).
(48) a.
b.
On that day, I was introduced to Gregory and Eva-Lotta. [when I
was introduced to Gregory and Eva-Lotta on that day] Gregory
was from America, ...
[3 [when I was introduced to Gregory and Eva-Lotta on that day]
Gregory was from America]c (now) = 1
iff there is a time t*
such that t* is a subinterval of the time when I was introduced to
Gregory and Eva-Lotta on that day, and
t* < now, and
(Gregory is alive at t*, and)
Gregory is from America at t* .
The fact that (48a) does not trigger a life-time effect can now be derived as
shown in (49).
(49) Derivation of the lack of the life-time implicature of (48a):
(a) The speaker has expressed the proposition that there is a time t* such
that t* is a subinterval of the time when I was introduced to Gregory and
Eva-Lotta on that day, and t* < now, and Gregory is from America at t*.
Since the day denoted by that day is over at the time of utterance of (48a),
the time during wJ1ich Gregory is from America that is located within that
day is over at the time of utterance of (48a) anyway.
Consequently, the speaker does not have any alternatives of expressing
anything about the duration of Gregory's being from America - i.e., the
choice of the use of present tense does not exist, because the time interval
of that day is not an environment of now.
Because of the impossibility of combining present tense with a restriction to that
day, there is no way of expressing a more informative proposition about the
duration of Gregory's being from America. Thus, informativity considerations
cannot take place with (48a). As a consequence, (48a) does not implicate
anything about the duration of Gregory's being from America, and hence it does
not implicate anything about Gregory's life-time being over now. Thus, the
analysis predicts the blocking of life-time effects with temporally specific
sentences like (48a).
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3.4. Il)formativity and life-time effects in out-of-the-blue sentences:
the fmal analysis
Let's go back to the sentences where the life-time effects are not neutralized by
temporally specific contexts, e.g. (1). In order to treat these cases adequately in
our. refined semantics, we have to develop a hypothesis of what happens to C
when there is no explicit contextually salient time interval provided.
I propose that in temporally unspecific contexts, when there is no better
candidate for assigning values around, elements whose denotation does not
directly provide a time interval are able to supply values for C. In particular, I
want to argue that noun phrases are able to supply values for C in such cases.
Specifically, they provide the time of existence of the individual they denote as a
value for C. Thus, let us assume that Gregory provides the value for C in Gregory
was from America when uttered in a temporally unspecific context. The truth
conditions of this sentence can then be stated as in (SOc).
(50) a.
b.
c.
:3 [Gregory's time of existence] Gregory was from America.
At (3 [At* ([Gregory's time of existence] (t*)) & At* (PRET (t)(t*))]
[At* (be-from-America (t*)(Gregory))])
[3 [Gregory's time of existence] Gregory was from America] C (now) = 1
iff there is a time t*
such that t* is a subinterval of Gregory's time of existence, and
t* < now, and
(Gregory is alive at t*, and)
Gregory is from America at t*.
The fact that (50a) triggers a life-time effect can now be derived with the
pragmatic ju~tification schema (51) that differs only minimally from (17).
(51) Working out of the implicature of (50a):
(a) The speaker has expressed the proposition that there is a time t* such
that t* is a subinterval of Gregory's time of existence, and t* < now, and
Gregory is from America at t*.
(b) There is no reason to suppose that the speaker is not observing the
Cooperative Principle and maxims, in particular the principle of
informativeness.
(c) Thus, the hearer assumes that the speaker is maximally informative
about Gregory's being from America - in particular about the duration of
Gregory's being from America.
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(d) If the speaker thought that Gregory's being from America is not over,
he would have expressed the proposition that Gregory is from America,
since that would have been a more informative alternative utterance about
the duration of Gregory's being from America.
(e) Thus, the speaker couldn't have been maximally informative about
Gregory's being from America unless he thought that Gregory's being from
America is over.
(f) Thus, the speaker has implicated that Gregory's being from America is
over.
(g) Since being from America is a property that, if it holds of an individual
at all, holds of that individual during all its life-time, the hearer concludes
further that, since the speaker has implicated that Gregory's being from
America is over, the speaker has implicated that Gregory is dead.
The crucial difference between (48a) and (50a) is thus that (48a) cannot implicate
anything about whether the duration of Gregory's being from America reaches
into the present, because the specific temporal restriction restricts the perspective
on Gregory's being from America exclusively to the past. With (50a), no such
restriction applies.
There is of course another question to be asked: why is it the subject noun
phrase whose denotation provides a value for C? So far I have just stipulated that
Gregory is the relevant noun phrase in our example. But at first sight it seems just
as plausible to assume that America may serve as the relevant provider of a
temporal value. If that were the case, then no serious problem would arise
because the time of existence of America includes in fact the time of existence of
Gregory.
But consider the sentence (52) in a situation where Gregor is still alive. The
USSR doesn't exist anymore.
(52) Gregor was from the USSR.
. There is a very clear intuition that in this situation, Gregor was from the USSR still
triggers a life-time effect. If the USSR could serve as the provider of the value for
C in this example, this would be unexpected. ~ince the time of existence of the
USSR is over now, the life-ti~e effect should disappear. But it does not.
Thus, to come back to our earlier example, there must be at least some strong
preference for taking Gregory instead of America as the value providing noun
phrase. I want to propose here that this effect is due to a preference to take
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topical noun phrases as providers of values for C. Since subject noun phrases are
default topics, it follows automatically that in our example Gregory is the strongly
preferred value provider.24 The preference for topical elements as value providers
is actually not very surprising. Topical elements are in general contextually
especially salient and particularly good providers of restrictive material for
quantifiers (see von Fintel (1994)).
Note that at first sight, there is another possibility conceivable for the
treatment of Gregory was from America when uttered out of the blue - namely
that C simply does not get a value assigned from the context and thus simply
does not provide a restrictor for 3, as in (53a). Let's assume that this gives us the
truth conditions in (53b).
(53) a.
b.
3 Gregory was from America.
[3 Gregory was from America] C (now) =1
iff there is a time t*
such that t* < now, and
(Gregory is alive at t*, and)
Gregory is from America at t*.
With this reading, considerations similar to (51) apply, and it" seems that (53)
provides a possible, and simpler, approach to the fact that the utterance of
Gregory was from America in a temporally unspecified context triggers life-time
effects. The approach would be simpler, because reference to implicit temporal
restrictions would be unnecessary. But would this approach really be able to
treat all phenomena in connection with life-time effects adequately?
There is in fact evidence that the approach just sketched is insufficient. Thus,
it is unable to explain a shifting of life-time effects that occurs under certain
circumstances with predicates that have more than one argument. Consider (54)
24 This observation can probably be productively related to another observation: Declerck
(1991, 344f) discusses briefly the pair of sentences
(A) Einstein has visited Princeton.
(B) Princeton has been visited by Einstein.
that illustrates a related phenomenon with present perfect. Here, (A) suggests (wrongly)
that Einstein is still alive, whereas (B) suggests that Princeton still exists. This observation.
goes apparently back to work by Curme and Jespersen in the thirties: G. o. Curme (1931):
Syntax. Boston: D. C. Heath. O.Jespersen (1931): A Modern English Grammar on
Historical Principles, part 4: Syntax (vo1.3). London: Allen & Unwin; Copenhagen:
Ejnar Munksgaard.
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(
in contrast to the English sentence Aunt Theresa resembled my grandmother,
which was introduced in (27), and its German equivalent Tante Theresa iihnelte
meiner Groj3mutter: here the sequencing of the noun phrases is changed. The
dative object meiner Groj3mutter is topicalized into the preverbal position.25
(54) Meiner GroBmutter ahnelte Tante Theresa.
[OB] my grandmother] resembled [SUB] Aunt Theresa]
(IAunt Theresa resembled my grandmother.')
The interesting observation about (54) is that compared to (27), the life-time
effect has shifted. Recall that with (27), repeated here as (55), we observed a life-
time effect concerning Aunt Theresa; in order for the sentence to be appropriate
when uttered out of the blue, Aunt Theresa had to be dead. The grandmother
being dead with Aunt Theresa being alive did not save the sentence.
(55) Aunt Theresa resembled my grandmother.
But with (54) it seems that the state of being dead of either one of Aunt Theresa
and the grandmother is sufficient to make th~ sentence fully acceptable. With the
simplified approach of (53), the contrast between (54) and (27) remains a mystery.
With the approach based on implicit temporal restrictions provided by topical
elements on the other hand, the shift of the life-time effect in (54) can be easily
explained. Let's assume that the topicalization of meiner Groj3mutter leads to a
situation where this noun phrase is preferredly understood as the topic of the
sentence.26 Thus, for (54) we predict the truth conditions in (56).
(56) [3 [my grandmother's time of existence]
meiner GroBmutter ahnelte Tante Theresa] C (now) =1
iff there is a time t*
such that t* is a subinterval of my grandmother's time of existence, and
t* < now, and
(Aunt Theresa is alive at t*, and)
Aunt Theresa resembled my grandmother at t*.
25 The possessive pronoun meiner ('myl) is added in this example to make clear that the
noun phrase in topicalized position is the dative object.
26 Things are in fact not that simple. It seems that topicaiization in German can lead either
. to a preferredly topical or to a preferredly focal nature of the topicalized element. But since
the life-time effect in (53) can apparently concern either the grandmother or Aunt Theresa,
this is no problem for my approach.
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Thus, because of the temporal restriction provided. by the topical noun phrase
meiner Groj3mutter,
(57) Working out of the implicature of (56):
(a) The speaker has expressed the proposition that ihere is a time t* such
that t* is a subinterval of the grandmother's time of existence, and t* <
now, and Aunt Theresa resembled the grandmother at t*.
(b) There is no reason to suppose that the speaker is not observing the
Cooperative Principle and maxims, in particular the principle of
informativeness.
(c) Thus, the hearer assumes that the speaker is maximally informative
about Aunt Theresa's resembling the grandmother during a subinterval of
the grandmother's exist~nce - in particular about the duration of Aunt
Theresa's resembling the grandmother during a maximally long subinterval
of the grandmother's existence.27
(d) If the speaker thought that Aunt Theresa's resembling the grandmother
during a maximally long subinterval of the grandmother's existence is not
over, he would have expressed the proposition that Aunt Theresa
resembles the grandmother, since that would have been a more informative
alternative utterance about the duration of Aunt Theresa's resembling the
grandmother.
(e) Thus, the speaker couldn't have been maximally informative about Aunt
Theresa's resembling the grandmother unless he thought that Aunt
Theresa's resembling the grandmother is over.
(f) Thus, the speaker has implicated that Aunt Theresa's resembling the
grandmother is over.
(g) Aunt Theresa's resembling the grandmother during a maximally long
subinterval of the grandmother's existence can be over if and only if
either Aunt Theresa is dead (since resembling my grandmother is a
property that, if it holds of an individual at all, holds of that individual
during all its life-time) ,
or the grandmother is dead.
Thus, the hearer concludes further that, since the speaker has implicated
that Aunt Theresa's resembling my grandmother during a maximally long
subinterval of my grandmother's existence is over, the speaker has
implicated that either Aunt Theresa or the grandmother is dead.
27 The reference to a maximaJly long interval is necessary in order to guarantee maximal
informativity about the duration.
60
MUSAN: TErvtPORALINTERPRETATION OFNPS - II. INDMDUALS
3.5. Overt temporal adverbials and individual-level predicates
So far one phenomenon remains unexplained in my account, namely the
inappropriateness of overt temporal adverbials with individual-level predicates:
The underlined sentence in (58) is at least strange if not ungrammatical.
(58) # [On that day, I was introduced to Gregory and Eva-Lotta.] When I was
introduced to them, Gregory was from America.
Since an implicit element with a meaning similar to the one of when I was
introduced to them was able to provide a value for C in (48a), it seems
unexpected that the underlined sentence in (58) is so strange. The reason why
(58) is strange seems to depend onl~ on the fact that (58) is an individual-level
clause; there seems to be some kind of incompatibility between temporal
adverbials and individual-level predicates involved.
Kai von Fintel pointed out to me that the inappropriateness may be explained
under the assumption that the temporal adverbial when I was introduced to them
functions as a contrastive topic. Explicit topics in English have in general a
tendency to function as contrastive topics. Implicit topics on the other hand can
crucially not function as contrastive topics.
Under the assumption that when I was introduced to them functions as a
contrastive topic, (58) would imply that Gregory was from America on that day
but not on another day. Whichever other day we consider, we will run into
tro~ble with this· implication. Consider first a day during which Gregory isn't
alive anymore. In this case, being from America can't be predicated of Gregory
because, according to our assumptions about lexical properties of predicates,
Gregory wouldn't be in the domain of be from America for that time. Thus, for
such a day, the implication that Gregory was not from America is odd for reasons
of presupposition failure. But if we consider a day during which Gregory is still
alive, the implication is plainly false: being from America is an individual-level
property that holds of Gregory for all his life, and thus it holds of Gregory in
particular for that day.
Under the contrastive-topic-hypothesis, a sentence like (59) would also
correctly be predicted to be at least inappropriate: Let us assume that Gregory
Smith was born in 1876, died in 1950, and was from America.
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(59) # From 1876 until 1950, Gregory Smith was from America.
Under the assu~ption that the temporal adverbial provides a contrastive topic,
(59) implies that Gregory Smith was not from America at a time other than
between 1876 and 1950. But since all other times reach beyond the life-time of
Gregory Smith and the lexical entry of be from America contains a
presupposition requiring Gregory Smith to be alive at a time during which he is
asserted to be from America (or not from America), any other contrastive
alternative is ruled out by presupposition failure. Thus, (59) is predicted to be
inappropriate:28
4. A comparison with Kratzer's (1988) proposal
4.1. Kratzer',s treatment of life-time effects
In her paper on "Stage-Level and Individual-Level Predicates tl (1988, 42-45),
Kratzer proposes that tense is a predicate that relates in general to external
arguments. When combined with Kratzer's analysis of the difference between
stage-level predicates and individual-level predicates, the proposal that tense
always relates to the external argument makes interesting predictions. Kratzer
argues that stage-level predicates and individual-level predicates ·differ in what
their underlying external arguments are. Stage-level predicates always have a
DAVIDSONIAN ARGUMENT or LOCATION ARGUMENT denoting a spatio-
temporal location as external argument. Individual-level predicates have an
external argument denoting an individual (if they are unergative); furthermore,
they do not have any location argument analogous to the location argument of
stage-level predicates. Roughly speaking, the individual denoting external
28 Alternatively, the unacceptability of (57) may also be due to the argument structure of
individual-level predicates. Suppose that although both individual-level clauses and stage-
level clauses can have an implicit restriction C of the quantificational adverb 3, individual-
level predicates do not have a location argument, as was suggested by Kratzer (1988). If
overt temporal adverbials are only licensed with predicates that provide a slot for location
arguments, the unacceptability of (52) would then be predicted.
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arguments of individual-level predicates are usually syntactically realized as noun
phras.es, whereas the external location arguments of stage-level predicates are
often phonetically empty, although they can be made explicit by overt location
arguments.
The generalization predicts that in stage-level clauses, tense is applied to a
location argument. For individual-level clauses, the generalization predicts that
tense is applied to a noun phrase argument, implying (in contrast to a proposal of
En~ (1981)) that, at least in some cases, tense plays an important role for the
temporal interpretation of noun phrases. Thus, in Kratzer's account, a stage-level
clause like (60a), Gregory was available, has the logical form (6Gb), ·where the
external location argument of the stage-level predicate available is represented
by the variable L, and past tense is represented by the predicate before now that
applies to the location argument.
(60) a.
b.
Gregory was available.
[before now (L)] & [available (Gregory, L)]29
Because of the fact that individual-level predicates do not have a location
argument, tense cannot combine with a location argument as it does in stage-level
clauses. But, since individual-level clauses contain tenses just as stage-level
clauses do, tense must combine with some other element in logical form. Kratzer
suggests that tense in general combines with the external argument of the main
predicate of its clause.
(61) Kratzer's generalization on tense and external arguments (original version)
The tense predicate always relates to the external argument of the main
predicate.
Thus, an individual-level clause like (62a) has the logical form (62b).
29 Note that (60b) contains free occurrences of L. Kratzer assumes that free occurrences
of the location variable L can get bound by quantifiers if they appear as part of a more
complex construction, or else they may be supplied with a value by the context of use (p6).
Thus, L in (60b) is a kind of deictic temporal pronoun, suggesting an account of tense
reference in terms of Partee's (1973) proposal that tense can' denote a particular,
contextually determined time interval (see also Section 3.2. above). Although there are
problems with the assumption of free occurrences of L (cf. Bauerle (1977,1979)) and the
tense semantics I exploited above differs somewhat from Kratzer's approach, I will keep
my discussion in this section as close to Kratzer's assumptions as possible.
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Gregory was intelligent.
[before now (Gregory3)] & [intelligent (he3)]
.Kratzer argues that - much as past tense in (60) ultimately locates the
contextually relevant event of Gregory's being available in the past - so past
tense in (62) locates the individual Gregory in the past. Kratzer's comments
suggest that the denotation of the tense predicate before now applied to the
denotation of a proper name, i.e. applied to an individual, yields a proposition that
is true if and only if the individual in question is totally located in the past, that is,
the individual existed in the past but not in the present.3D 11ExistenceII of a person
means that person's being alive. Thus, locating an individual temporally in the
past means nothing else but locating that individual's existence or life-time totally
in the past. E.g., before now (Gregory) is true if and only if Gregory lived in the
past and is dead now. This prediction is in accordance with intuitions - as we
have seen in Section 1, individual-level clauses with past tense exhibit life-time
effects.
To summarize, Kratzer accounts for the occurrence of life-time effects with
past tense individual-level clauses by proposing that in these constructions, tense
relates to the subject argument of the main predicate. The motivation. for this
proposal lies in the assumptions that tense aiways relates to the external argument
of the main predicate of its clause and that individual-level predicates have
individuals as externl arguments.
This proposal gains even more support from the behavior of the predicate
resemble. Recall my brief discussion of resemble in Section 2.6. The surprising
observation with resemble was that it is an asymmetric predicate as far as the
temporal location of its arguments is concerned, although its core meaning seems
to be symmetric. The relevant sentences and descriptions of situations are
repeated here as (63) [= (27) above].
30 Note that this assumption in itself implies an asymmetry between the application of tense
to individuals and to location arguments: whereas before now (Gregory) locates Gregory
totally in the past, before now (L) typically does not locate the whole event associated with
L in the past. We have seen an example of this in Section 2.4.: Today, Eva-Lotta walked
along the C.harles River.
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(63) a. Utterance: HAunt Theresa resembled my grandmother. II - Situation: Aunt
Theresa is dead; the grandmother is still alive.
b. # Utterance: "Aunt Theresa resembled my grandmother." - Situation: Aunt
Theresa is still alive; the grandmother is dead.
(63) suggests that the past tense imposes a life-time effect on the subject
argument (as can be concluded from the oddness of (63b)) but not on the object
argument (as can be concluded from the acceptability of (63a)). Within Kratzer's
account, this is strong support for her claim that tense locates the external
argument temporally. Under the assumption that resemble is a symmetric
predicate, the asymmetry can only be caused by the different status of the
arguments as external or internal argument.
Kratzer suggests that the tense predicate can also relate to an external noun
phrase argument by relating to the Davidson-argument of the noun in a
quantificatioQal noun phrase. This is illustrated with the quantificational noun
phrase all applicants in (64).
(64) a.
b.
All applicants were from America.
allx [applicant (x, L) & before now (L)] [from America (x)]
1It
(64) clearly shows that the relevant notion of "external argument" IS a
syntactic one as suggested by Williams (1981), and not a semantic one - i.e.
Kratzer's generalization captures the intuition that tense relates to that argument
of the main predicate which is generated VP-externally. For individual-level
predicates, this argument is usually realized as a noun phrase. As we can see with
(64b), relating tense to a noun phrase is associated with the possibility that tense
can, for instance, relate to the location argument of the nominal predicate if it is a
stage-level predicate. Thus, "rel~te to a noun phrase" is supposed to mean "relate
to some semantic part of the noun phrase". The syntactic notion of "external
argument" contrasts with a semantic notion, according to which the external
argument of a predicate can be. described as that argument which is taken as the
last argument of the predicate in question, i.e. eventually saturates the predicate.
If the generalization were supposed to refer to semantic external arguments, then
tense in (64) could only relate to the individual variable x, which represents the
semantic external argument of the predicate be from America.
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The claim that tense 'always relates to the external argument of a clause is
connected to Diesing's (1988, 1992) proposal, according to which material within
the YP is mapped into the nuclear scope in logical form, whereas material in IP is
mapped into the restrictive clause in logical form. At S-strllcture, tense is realized
by INFL. Hence tense is realized outside of VP. and - according to Diesing's
mapping hypothesis - has to appear in the restrictive clause at logical form. Thus,
we can reformulate and specify, (61) in the spirit of Kratzer's work as follows:
(65) Kratzer's generalization on tense and external arguments (explicit version)
The tense predicate always applies to some part of the syntactic external
argument of the main predicate and appears at LF in the restrictive clause.
As Kratzer mentions, her proposal can be considered under two different
perspectives: tense might either be interpreted as part of the truth-conditional
meaning of its clause or as part of the clause's presuppositions.
In the remainder of this section, I will pursue the generalization (65). I will
argue that it runs into a number of problems. First, the proposal cannot account
in a uniform way for all cases where life-time effects occur. ·This is because there
are predicates that trigger life-time effects, although they arguably have an
argument structure where .this is, within the assumptions of Kratzer's theory,
,unexpected. Second, other predicates that, according to grammatical criteria, are
classified as individual-level pre'dicates, do not trigger life-time effects. Third, the
proposal leaves open the question of what happens in ergative individual-level
predicate constructions; i.e., it is not clear what tense relates to in constructions
that do not provide a D-structure external argument. Finally, it seems to be
impossible to represent certain scope readings of sentences that contain adverbs
of quantification and quantificational noun phrases. I will conclude that the
problems mentioned provide strong arguments against Kratzer's generalization,
which should thus be abandoned.
4.2. Wrong predictions with existence-independent predicates and ergative verbs
The first problem with Kratzer's account is that, with existence-independent
predicates, tense applied to an individual can refer to times that reach beyond the
life-time of that individual, even if the predicate behaves with respect to
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grammatical tests like an individual-level predicate. (66a) for example is a
completely acceptable sentence, although beriihmt sein ('be famous') seems to be
an individual-level predicate, as suggested by the unacceptability of (66b) in
connection with Kratzer's criteria for individual-level predicates versus stage-level
predicates; thus, according to Kratzer's assumptions, the external argument of
beriihmt sein is an individual, and furthermore, according to her generalization,
tense should apply to this individual. Moreover, the tense of (66a) is present
tense and would thus locate Picasso's life-time in the present, if tense located life-
times in the way suggested by Kratzer: but Picasso is dead now. .
(66) a. Picasso ist beriihmt
Picasso is famous
b. * Keine Philosophen sind beriihmt.
no philosophers are famous
A further problem is that the effect of individual location Kratzer observes
with external arguments also shows up with syntactically non-external arguments
- namely in cases where this is predicted by pragmatic reasoning. For instance,
the effect arises with the surface subject of some ergative individual-level
predicates. Surface subjects of ergative verbs are supposed to be syntactically
underlyingly VP-internal arguments. Perlmutter and Postal (1984, pp98f) list
ergative verbs. Among those are several that give rise to life-time effects: exist,
happen, occur, and predicates describing sizes, shapes, weights, and colors.
Without an appropriate context narrowing down the relevant time, the following
examples are only acceptable in case Gregory is dead and Isolde is sunk or
destroyed or something like that, respectively.
(67) Gregory existed.
(68) Isolde [a boat] was almost oval.
Thus, life-time effects can also occur with non-external arguments. This does not,
of course, show that Kratzer's generalization is inadequate. But it shows that
there are at least some cases of life-time effects that have to be explained
independently of her generalization. There must be some mechanism or principle
responsible for the life-time effects in those cases which cannot be captured by
this generalization. We need to assume the existence of an appropriate device
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anyway. Thus, the question arises of whether this device may also be able to
explain the cases that were supposed to be captured by Kratzer's generalization.
If this is so, then Kratzer's explanation will lose much of its explanatory value.
The temporal location of individuals is obviously sometimes independent of tense.
This raises the question of whether the temporal location of individuals has
anything directly to do with the application of tense to them or just with
predicate semantics.
4.3. "Relating to the external argument"
In this subsection, I just want to point out a startling point about Kratzer's
generalization. I mentioned above that Kratzer suggests that the tense predicate
can also relate to an external noun phrase argument by relating to the Davidson-
argument of the noun in a quantificational noun phrase as shown in (64),
repeated here as (69).
(69) a.
b.
All applicants were from America.
allx [applicant (x, L) & before now (L)] [from America (x)]
Obviously, Kratzer exploits a syntactic notion of "external argument"; thus, tense
is claimed to be able to relate to the syntactic external argument of the main
predicate - in the case of (unergative) individual-level predicates, to a noun
phrase. The syntactic notion of "external argument" contrasts w.ith a semantic
notion, according to which the external argument of a predicate can ·be described
as that argument which is taken as the last argument of the predicate in question.
If the generalization were supposed to refer to semantic external arguments, then
tense in (69) could only relate to the individual variable x, which represents the
semantic external argument of the predicate be from America.
Note though that there is no motivation for why another possibility should
be excluded, namely that tense relates to the variable x within the restrictor of the
quantifier - thus giving rise to the hypothetical LF (69c).
(69) c. allx [applicant (x, L) & before now (x)] [from America (x)]
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But such an LF must be excluded, for it predicts the availability of a reading for
(69a) that is clearly not available: "For all x such that x was an applicant and x is
dead now, x was from America." - Thus, if (69c) were a possible LF for (69a), then
the sentence should be able to be judged true in a situation where there have
been five applicants A, B, C, D, and E for acertain position last year, one of which
died meanwhile. The one who died was A; A was from America. The other four
applicants, B, C, D, and E, are from France and still alive. It is clear that (69a) in
such a situation would not be judged true. Thus, (69c) must be excluded as an
LF for (69a); tense never functions as (part of) a restrictor for nominal determiner
quantifiers. Within Kratzer's framework, it is not obvious how to account for this
fact.
4.4. Problems with the interaction of tense and adverbs of quantification
In this subsection, I will finally argue that the interaction of adverbs of
quantification and determiner-quantifiers raises serious problems for Kratzer's
approach: it is not at all clear how certain readings that arise in clauses with
adverbs of quantification and determiner-quantifiers can be represented.
When adverbs of quantification and determiner-quantifiers cooccur in a
clause, they display scope ambiguities. Thus, there are readings where the adverb
of quantification has wide scope over the determiner-quantifier, and readings
where the determiner-quantifier has wide scope over the adverb of quantification.
In this subsection, we will be concerned ·with certain cases of readings of the
former type. In German, scope readings of adverbs of quantification and
determiner-quantifiers are in general strongly determined by the surface ordering
of these operators.
Consider the individual-level clause in (70a). For (70a), only the wide scope
reading of the adverb of quantification in (70b) is available.
(70) a.
b.
weil meistens die meisten Professoren intelligent waren
since mostly the most professors intelligent were
('since mostly most professors were intelligent')
For most times t* such that t* is before now, for most x such that x
is a professor at t*, x is intelligent.
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How can this reading be representend in accordance with Kratzer's
generalization, her assumptions on LF, and their consequences?
Since intelligent sein is an individual-level predicate, tense should apply to
the external argument of intelligent sein, i.e. to the noun phrase die meisten
Professoren. Thus, tense should appear as part of the restrictive clause of the
determiner-quantifier, and the account would thus generate the tripartite structure
(70c) as part of the LF-representation of (70b).
(70) c. ... MOSTx [RC professor (x, L) & before now (L)] ms intelligent (x)]
But if tense appears in the restrictive clause of the determiner-quantifier, then it
cannot simultaneously appear in the restrictive clause of the adverb of
quantification. This consequence is certainly unwanted: first, intuitions are very
clear about the fact that tense serves as the restrictor of the adverb of
quantification in reading (70b), and second, if tense cannot appear in the
restrictive clause of the adverb of quantification, then the resulting LF will be
illformed because the adverb of quantification does not bind a variable in its
restrictive clause, as shown in (70d).
(70) d. * MOSTLYt [RC I _] [NS I MOSTx [RC professor (x, L) &
before now (L)] [NS intelligent (x)] ]
Thus, it is not at all obvious how reading (70b) can be represented within
Kratzer's framework. This is a serious problem for Kratzer's generalization on the
application of tense.
5. Conclusion
In this chapter, I adopted an account of temporal interpretat~on where obligatory,
possibly phonetically empty definite temporal adverbials and adverbs of
quantification take care of definite and quantificational aspects of tense readings,
respectively. The definite temporal adverbials provide topic times which can
crucially also ~e restricted by various elements of the clause which serve as
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topics, or at least as part of the background of the clause. I argued that noun
phrases can determine the value of implicit temporal adverbials. This opens up
the possibility for noun phrases to play an important role in the temporal
interpretation of clauses.
As part of the lexical entries of stage-level and individual-level predicates, but
not of existence-independent predicates, I introduced minimal temporal
presuppositions that require for individuals to be alive in order to serve as
arguments for these predicates. The temporal presuppositions explain why the
application of stage-level predicates or individual-level predicates to dead.
individuals leads to inappropriate clauses.
The inappropriateness of applying individual-level predicates in connection
with a past tense to individuals who are still alive and who provide the only topic
time restrictor for the clause is explained by pragmatic considerations involving
the Gricean maxim of informativeness.
The temporal location of individuals is in no case directly determined by
tense. Rather, effects of temporal location of individuals are directly caused by
lexical properties of the predicates that are involved. This holds for subjects as
well as objects and for internal arguments as well as external arguments. Given
this mechanism, tense is predicted to play an indirect role by virtue of its
determining the temporal interpretation of the main predicate of a clause.
rwant to add here that the effects that predicates can have on individuals by
virtue of their life-time presuppositions have a wider range of application than
explained in this chapter. What I investigated in this chapter were life-time
presuppositions that main predicates of clauses have on their arguments. It is
important to note that quite in general, all classes of semantic predicates have the
ability to impose life-time presuppositions on their arguments. For example, a
noun like student, which is semantically a predicate, imposes a life-time
presupposition on its external argument, just as a verb like sneeze does.
Consequently, for a sentence like (71a), which has a simplified semantic
represention as in (71 b), two life-time presuppositions apply to different
occurrences of the variable x as indicated by the arrows.
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A student sneezed.
There is an x such that [student (x) & sneezed (x)]
b. I • I •
Thus, the value of x under any particular variable assignment ultimately has to
fulfill two life-time presuppositions.
I have also presented Kratzer's account of life-time effects with past tense
individual-level clauses, and I have shown that the proposal runs into many
problems which can be avoided under my proposal. Thus, my own proposal
seems to b.e more adequate for dealing with the phenomena that were discussed
in this chapter.
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CHAPTER III.
TEMPORAL LOCATION OF\JPREDICATION TIMES
1. Introduction
Just as verbs in finite sentences refer to actions, events, states, or properties that
can truly be predicated of individuals at certain times, nouns refer to actions,
events, states, or properties that can also truly be predicated of individuals at
certain times. That is, He hid behind the curtain is true if and only if the
individual referred to by he hid behind the curtain at a time in the past. Similarly,
the noun murderer can be truly predicated of an individual x just in case x
commits a murder at some time.! I will call the time interval during which a
1 David Pesetsky (pc) informs me that Beth Levin has noted that professional titles do - in
contrast to the noun murderer for instance - not entail actual practice of a profession. E.g. a
soldier might not yet have acted as a soldier; he can be called a soldier as soon as he was
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predicate can truly be predicated of an indi\,idllal the 'PREDIC~J\TIONTIME of the
predicate relative to that individual.
While the time of predication of "erbs is usually located by the tense of the
clause in which the verb occurs (Ia) as illdicated in (1 b), the time of predication of
a noun is apparently not explicitly located; (1 a) contains the noun murderer.
Intuitively, an individual is a murderer from tl1e time on at which he/she committed
his or her first murder. After committing his or her fIrst murder, the individual in
question remains a murderer for the rest of his or her life. (Ie) captures the
intuition that the individual mentioned in (la) can commit his or her first murder at
any time in the past, present, or future, in order to be truly described by the noun
phrase the Inurderer.
(1) a.
b.
c.
The murderer hid behind the curtain.
If (a) is true, then the hiding talked about took place at some time in
the past. We know that, because the tense of the clause tells us so.
We do not know when exactly in the past the hiding took place.
If (a) is true, then th~ individual that is talked about commits a
nlurder at some time in the pastJpresentlfuture.2, 3 There is nothing
contained in the sentence that tells us when, besides the noun
"murderer".
Given the tense in a clause, one has relatively little freedom to locate the
denotation of the verb temporally, i.e. past tense for instance locates the
denotation of the verb in the past. But with nouns, we apparently have much
more freedom. (2a), for example, can be intuitively judged to be true with each of
the three situations described in (2b-d):
(2) a.
b.
John's murderer hid behind the curtain.
John was murdered on May 15th 1992. At some time in the past,
the man who murdered John (which was that manl s fITst murder) hid
behind the curtain.
declared being one. However, in my opinion, this does not show that these nouns work
fundamentally differently. Rather what seems to me crucial is a variety of criteria for
predicating predicates truthfully of individuals. Thus, in order to be truthfully called to be a
murderer, one has to act at some point like a murderer, i.e. kill someone. But in order to be
truthfully called a soldier, one doesn't have to do anything else but be declared a soldier or
sign a statement about joining the army or something like that.
2 Another example that shows this even better was suggested to me by David Pesetsky:
The murderer was a little baby when he lost his teddy bear.
3 The same holds in case the sentence is false.
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c. John is being murdered just while (2a) is uttered. At some time in
the past, the man who is murdering John (which is that man's .first
murder) hid behind the curtain.
d. It is known that a certain man plans to murder John. According to
what we know about that man (whatever he plans, he does it), we
know that he will commit the murder. At some time in the past, the
man who will murder John (which will be that man's first murder)
hid behind the curtain.
In (2b), the individual in question starts being a murderer on May 15th 1992.
Thus, at the moment of his hiding - which happens a short while after the murder -
he is a murderer. In (2c), he or she is not yet a murderer when hiding, nor at any
other time in the past, but starts to be a murderer only at the time of utterance of
(2a). In (2d), the individual has not yet committed a murder at the time of
utterance of (2a), but in the situatioD. described, we can nonetheless refer to him
as the murderer. In fact, if the context is sufficiently clear, it is possible to utter a
sentence like (3a) or (3b) appropriately:4
(3) a.
b.
John's murderer is not yet a murderer.
As he hid behind the curtain, John's murderer wasn't yet a murderer.
Thus it seems that the temporal interpretation of noun phrases is very free and
determined only by additional contextual information, but not by the temporal
interpretation- of the rest of their cl~use - I will call this a TEMPORALLY
INDEPENDENT NOUN PHRASE INTERPRETATION.
Recall from Chapter I that this impression led En9 (1981) to the claim that the
temporal interpretation of noun phrases is not at. all dependent on the temporal
intepretation of the rest of their clause: according to En9'S view, by getting some
kind of time index that denotes some contextually salient time interval, noun
phrases are temporally determined only by the context of utterance.
But other data contradict this generalization. There are noun phrases that
obligatorily get a TEMPORALLY DEPENDENT INTERPRETATION. Consider, for
instance, the underlined noun phrases in (4):
(4) a.
b.
In the forties, professors were young.
Last year, some congressmen came to the party.
4 These sentences are due to Roger Schwarzschild and Colin Phillips, respectively.
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(4a) does not have a reading "Individuals who are now professors were typically
young in the forties". And (4b) can hardly mean "Some of those individuals who
are now congressmen came to the party last year" (although this reading is
available when some is stressed; for an explanation see below).
Note that the temporally dependent readings in (4) cannot plausibly be
explained as being contextually the only possible readings of the sentences in
question. Evidence for this is provided by slight changes of the noun phrase that
do not seem to change the meaning significantly, but suddenly make temporally
independent interpretations possible. Thus, (4a') can easily be understood as
talking about present professors who were young in the forties (because they
were kids then). And with (4b'), it is entirely possible to talk about a situation
where the party last year was congressmen-free, but since then a certain group of
people became congressmen, and some of the people involved are remembered to
have shown up at the party.
(4) a'.
b'.
In the forties, all professors were young.
Last year, some of the congressmen came to the party.
To summarize, at this point we 'can conclude that En~'s (1981) account
overgeneralizes. Although it is obvious that there are indeed cases of merely
contextual determination of predication times with noun phrases (as,' In (1)-(3)),
the temporal interpretation of noun phrases is at least in some cases dependent on
the temporal interpretation of the rest of the clause.
Thus, two questions must be raised: First, what syntactic a~d/or semantic
mechanisms cause temporally dependent interpretations? Second, why do the
crucial mechanisms apply to some noun phrases but not to others? In order to
answer these questions, it is important to investigate what the precise distribution
of temporally dependent and temporally independent noun phrases is.
Obviously, their distribution probably follows from the nature of the mechanisms.
Thus, their distribution will allow us to draw conclusions about the underlying
mechanisms. In the remainder of this chapter, I will try to answer the questions
raised above.
I will begin the discussion by looking at a limited range of data, namely
subjects of various predicates that contain an overt determiner. Thus, I will
mostly ignore bare plurals until Section 8.5 Furthermore, (as throughout all of this
5 Proper names will of course be ignored anyway, because they don't contain nouns.
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chapter) I will only consider noun phrases that do not contain any temporal
modifiers.
In Section 2, I will show that the distribution of temporally dependent and
temporally independent noun phrases correlates largely, but not in all cases, with
the distinction between cardinal and presuppositional noun phrases6: in most
cases, a subject noun phrase can be temporally independent if and only if it is
presuppositional. As I will show, this generalization holds for stage-level
predicates and individual-level predicates. It does not hold for existence-
independent predicates though.
Assuming that cardinal and presuppositional noun phrases are associated
with different structural positions at LF (Diesing (1992)), the generalization for
cardinal and presuppositional noun phrases suggests that the occurrence of
temporally dependent interpretations may be due to the binding of time
arguments of nouns by a temporal operator at LF. According to this hypothesis,
which will be explored in Section 3, temporally dependent interpretations of
noun phrases would be due to their position at LF and the scope of temporal
operators. But the proposal fails because of scope paradoxes that arise with
certain readings of clauses containing adverbs of quantification: Presuppositional
noun phrases in the scope of the operator that would presumably be responsible
for the binding of time arguments can be temporally independent. Thus, it seems
most likely that the occurrence of temporally dependent interpretations is not due
to scope, but hinges on noun phrase internal properties in combination with the .
way in which predicates relate to their arguments.
In Section 4, I argue that a semantics of quantification based on a stage-
ontology is able to explain the occurrence of temporally dependent noun phrase
interpretations. In particular, I propose that determiner-quantifiers quantify over
stages of individuals rather than individuais in their maximal temporal'
extendedness. Furthermore, I will present an account of the semantics of
determiners according to which determiners of cardinal noun phrases receive
basically the same interpretation as determiners of presuppositional noun phrases.
6 For the moment, I will be using the terms "cardinal noun phrase" and t1presuppositional
noun phrase" in order to refer to weak noun phrases in their "weak readings" on the one
hand and weak noun phrases in their "strong readings" or strong noun phrases on the other
hand, respectively. In Section 4.2.3., where I will sketch the semantics of these two kinds
of noun phrases, I will introduce the terms t1unrestrictive noun phrase" and "restrictive
noun phrase", which capture the essence of the difference between the two kinds of noun
phrases much better..
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Semantic differences between presuppositional and cardinal noun phrases are in
general caused by the mapping of the noun: a noun that appears as part of a DP
can be mapped either into the restrictive clause or into the nuclear scope of the
determiner. Nouns that appear as part of a presuppositional noun phrase are
mapped into the restrictive clause, whereas nouns that appear as part of a cardinal
noun phrase are mapped into the nuclear scope. This difference will then be used
to explain the distribution of temporal dependence with most DPs. The semantics
I will develop is conceptually very simple, although its formalization may seem
somewhat complicated.
As I show in Section 5 and Section 6, this proposal can also deal adequately
with the constructions that were problematic for the ~cope-approach.
Section 7 explains the behavior of generic noun phrases. Section 8 deals
with temporally independent interpretations of noun phrases. The main goal of
this section is to describe the felicity constraints that temporally independent
noun phrases are subject to. Section 9 draws together the results of the
preceding sections of the chapter. Finally, Section 10 tackles some additional
questions that arise under a stage-account; these questions concern the ways in
which stages can be determined and counted and the ways in which stages can
be merged.
2. The distribution of temporal dependence with noun phrases
In this section, I want to show what the distribution of temporally dependent and
temporally independent noun phrases is. Basically, what we will see is that
subjects of stage-level predicates and individual-level predicates can have
temporally independent interpretations only if they are presuppositional.
Additionally, subjects of existence-independent predicates and certain object
noun phrases can have temporally independent interpretations even if· they are
not presuppositional but cardinal.
The underlined noun phrases in (5) differ insofar as some of them easily allow
temporally independent interpreations ("i"), whereas other noun phrases only
allow temporally dependent interpretations ("d"). Thus, (Sa, b, d, f) can easily get
interpr~tations where the professors mentioned are individuals who are professors
now but were not professors in the sixties. (5a) for instance can mean l1Most of
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the individuals who are now professors were happy in the sixties". On the other
hand, (5c, e) can only be understood as talking about individuals who were
professors in the sixties. Thus, (5c) can only mean "Some of the individuals who
were professors in the sixties were happy in the sixties", but it cannot mean
"Some of the individuals who are now professors were happy in the sixties".
(5) a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Die meisten Professoren waren in den sechziger Jahren glilcklich. (i)
the most professors were in the sixties happy
CMost profssors were happy in the sixties.')
EINIGE Professoren waren in den sechziger Jahren glilcklich. (i)
some professors l-vere in the sixties happy
('Some professors were happy in the sixties.)
Einige PROFESSOREN waren in den sechziger Jahren gliicklich. (d)
some professors were in the sixties happy
('Sm professors were happy in the sixties.')
Einige von den Professoren waren in den sechziger Jahren gli.icklich.(i)
some of the professors were in the sixties happy
.('Some of the professors were happy in the sixties.')
In den sechziger Jahren warenja doch Professoren glilcklich. (d)
in the sixties l-vere (indeed) professors happy
('In the sixties, [some] professors were (indeed) happy.l)
Professoren warenja doch in den sechziger Jahren gllicklich. (i)
professors were (indeed) in the sixties happy
('Professors [in general] were (indeed) happy in the sixties.')
/
.&L·,
The underlined noun phrases in (5) differ not only with respect to their ability to
exploit temporally independent readings, but also with respect to whether they
are cardinal or presuppositional.
The distinction between cardinal and presuppositional noun phrases
concerns the occurrence of existence presuppositions with noun phrases:
presnppositional noun phrases presuppose the existence of individuals that have
the property denoted by their noun, whereas cardinal noun phrases do not. The
distinction is based on Milsark's (1974) distinction between weak and strong
determiners. Noun phrases with strong determiners such as all, every, each,
most,... are always presuppositional. The same holds for partitive noun phrases
like some of the Ns. Noun phrases with weak determiners such as many, some,
a,... are ambiguous between a cardinal and a presuppositional reading. Diesing
(1992) argues that noun phrases with weak determiners are preferentially
interpreted as cardinal or presuppositional, depending on their syntactic position.
Thus, noun phrases with weak. determiners are preferentially interpreted
presuppositional when they are located outside VP - in German: to the left of the
particle ja doch. Weak noun phrases which are located within VP - in German: to
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the right of the particle ja doch - are preferentially interpreted cardinal.
Furthermore, stress also plays a role in whether a nOUI} phrase gets a cardinal or a
presuppositional reading: when the determiner is stressed, the noun phrase is
preferredly presuppositional; when the noun is stressed, it has a strong preference
towards a cardinal reading.
Thus, (Sa, b, d, f) conta~n presuppositional noun phrases, whereas (Sc, e)
contain cardinal noun phrases. In particular, the underlined noun phrase in (5a) is
presuppositional, because it contains a strong determiner; with (5b), the stress on
the determiner triggers the presuppositional reading of the weak noun phrase; the
noun phrase· in (5d) is presuppositional because partitive; and the one in (6f) is
presuppositional, because it is. a bare plural located on the left of the particle ja
doch. With the noun phrase in (5c), stress on the noun of the weak noun phrase
triggers the cardinal reading; and the noun phrase in (5e) is cardinal, because it is
a bare plural on the right of the particle ja doch.
Relating the distribution of presuppositional and cardinal noun phrases to the
distribution of temporally dependent and temporally independent noun phrase
interpretations, there is an obvious correlation: cardinal noun phrases can only
receive temporally dependent readings, whereas presuppositional noun phrases
can receive temporally independent readings. This generalization seems to be
fairly consistent, althougp. sometimes intuitions are less clear than one might wish.
Other examples that illustrate the same point are the ones in (6) and (7), which
show again the particularly clear contrast between simple quantificational noun
phrases where a cardinal reading is triggered (a) and partitive noun phrases (b).
(6) a.
b.
(7) a.
b.
Es ist noch kein Meister vom Himmel gefallen.
it is yet no master from-the sky fallen
(INa master fell from the sky.' = 'Rome wasn't built in a day.')
Es ist noch keiner von den Meistern vom Himmel gefallen.
it is yet noone of the masters from-the sky fallen
(INoone of the masters fell from the sky.')
Heute waren viele Kranke da.
today were many sick-people there
('Today, many sick people have been here.')
Heute waren viele von den Kranken da.
today were many of the sick-people there
('Today, many of the sick people have been here.')
The clearly preferred reading of the noun phrase in (6a) suggests that one is
talking about people that fall as masters from the sky. This is not the case with
80
MUSAN: TEMPORAL INTERPREfAnON OF NPs - ill. PREDICATION TIMES
the partitive construction in (6b). (6b) can easily be understood as talking about
individuals that are a master at some arbitrary time. Similarly, under its preferred
reading, (7a) is true if and only if many people were there (= at some designated
place) today who were there at the time of their being sick. (7b) can easily be
understood to be true in a situation where many people were there today who
belong to some group of people which have been sick at some time in the past
but are healthy now.
An analogous effect can be observed in (8). (8a) contains an English there-
construction. This construction triggers a cardinal reading for the underlined
noun phrase. The noun phrase here can only have a temporally dependent
reading, i.e., the homeless people have to be homeless people at the time of the
rally. The partitive noun phrase in (8b) can talk about people who are homeless
people now but who weren't homeless at the time of the rally.
(8) a.
b.
There were many homeless people at the rally.
Many of the homeless people were at the rally.
Furthermore, predicate nominals, which are a special case of obligatorily
cardinal noun phrases, are unable to display temporally independent readings: (9)
contains the predicate nominal a student of French literature. Unlike being a
murderer, being a student of French literature is a property individuals acquire
temporarily; once they finished their studies, they are not students of French
literature anymore. Thus, the fact that (9) cannot be understood as "Anne is a
former student of French literature" shows that the predicate nominal cannot get
a reading that is temporally independent of the tense of the clause.
(9) Anne is a student of French literature.
To summarize, so far it seems that presuppositional noun phrases can have
temporally independent readings, whereas cardinal noun 'phrases can only have
temporally dependent interpretations. That is, at this point we can state the
descriptive generalization (10):
(10) Distribution of temporally (in)dependent noun phrases (to be revise~):
A noun phrase can be temporally independent if and only if it is
presuppositional.
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But there is at least one type of noun phrase whose behavior is not
adequately captured by (10): in contrast to subjects of stage-level predicates and
. subjects of individual-level predicates, subjects of existence-independent
predicates can get temporally independent interpretations even if they are
cardinal.
In Chapter II, I introduced the notion of existence-independent predicates.
Recall that existence-independent predicates like famous are predicates that can
be predicated of an individual at times when the individual no longer exists - i.e.,
.in this sense they are independent of the individual's existence. An example of
this type of predicate is shown in (lla). In this respect, existence-independent
predicates di.ffer from stage-level predicates like available (lIb) and individual-
level predicates like intelligent (IIc).
(11) a. Frege is famous.
b. # Frege is (un-)available.
c. # Frege is intelligent.
What is important here is that existence-independent predicates can have cardinal
subject noun phrases that can be temporally independently interpreted. Compare
(12a) to (I2b). The noun phr~se lauter Studenten ('many students!) is cardinal in
both sentences; this is guaranteed by the fact that lauter (!many') is a determiner
that can probably only have cardinal readings,? and it is further supported by the
VP-internal position of the noun phrase. Suppose now we have just been talking
about the people that were members of the MIT linguistics department at around
1980 - people who were students then as well as people who Were professors
then. Imagine that the sentences in (12) are uttered in this context.
(12) a.
b.
Es sind heutzutage lauter Studenten krank.
it are today 1nan)' students sick
('Today, many students are sick.')
Es sind heutzutage lauter Studenten beriihmt.
it are today lnany students famous
(1Today, many students are famous.!)
The crucial observation with (12) is that the cardinal noun phrase in (12a) cannot,
as predicted by generalization (10), get a temporally independent interpretation,
7 This was pointed out to me by Irene Heim (pc). Roger Schwarzschild suggested that
evidence for this point may be provided by the fact that Lauter does not allow for partitive
constructions, i.e. *lauter von den Studenten ('many of the students').
82
MUSAN: TEMPORAL INTERPRETATION OF NPS - ill. PREDICATION TIMES
whereas the cardinal noun phrase in (12b) can.8 Thus, (12a) can only have a
reading where the time of being sick intersects with the time of being a student.
Consequently, (12a) cannot be used in order to make a statement about the
present state of health of students of 1980. Rather, (12a) can only be understood
as a statement about present students. This is illustrated in (13a).
*student (x) XiS being sickstudenl (x)
But (12b) can have a reading where the time of being famous is located at the
time of utterance and does not intersect with the time of being a student.
Consequently, this sentence can be used to say something about the fame of the
students in 19.80, as is illustrated in (13b).
student (x)
Thus, the behavior of subject noun phrases of existence-independent predicates
is not captured by the generalization (10).
Thus, we have to revise the generalization in (10), in order to capture the
behavior of subjects of existence-independent predicates on a descriptive leve~.
(14) Distribution of temporally (in)dependent noun phrases:
A subject noun phrase of a stage-level predicate or of an individual-level
predicate can be temporally independent iff it is presuppositional.
A subject noun phrase of an existence-independent predicate can be
temporally independent.
Based on the descriptive generalization (14), I will develop in the remainder of
this chapter a proposal that explains the distribution of temporally dependent and
temporally independent noun phrases.
8 I observed that some informants don't get the contrast immediately or get it only weakly
at first. The contrast gets apparently stronger after a while. I think this is due to the
contextual salience of present students. For a description of relevant effects of contextual
salience, see Section 8.
83
MUSAN: TEMPORAL INTERPRETATION OF NPS - ill. PREDICATION TIMES
3. A scope-approach based on the cardinal/presuppositional
distinction
We observed in Section 2 that the distribution of temporally dependent and
temporally independent noun phrase interpretations corresponds largely to the
distinction between cardinal and presuppositional noun phrases. This section
investigates the adequacy of an approach that is based on the cardinalI
presuppositional distinction. According to Diesing (1988, 1992), cardinal and
presuppositional noun phrases are associated with different structural positions at
LF. In particular, cardinal noun phrases seem to be associated with lower
positions than presuppositional noun phrases. This suggests that the occurrence
of temporally dependent interpretations may be due to scope configurations at
LF. Thus, the approach explpred in this section tries to derive the distribution of
temporally dependent and temporally independent noun phrases from the scope
they take at LF. At first sight, the approach appears ,rery appealing, because it is
based on an independently motivated proposal by Diesing (1988, 1992). It seems
to be able to capture most, if not all, of the data presented in Section 2 without
additional stipulations. I will argue though that the success of the scope-
approach is rather limited, because it is not at all obvious how it could deal with
certain constructions that involve adverbs of quantification: with these
constructions, the approach runs into a scope paradox.
3.1. The general idea
The proposal of Diesing (1988, 1992) states a general asymmetry between
presuppositional noun phrases and cardinal noun phrases with respect to their
behavior at LF. According to Diesing, presuppositional noun phrases undergo
Quantifier Raising at LF, adjoin to IP, and open tripartite structures if they have
implicit quantificational force. If they do not have quantificational force of their
own (as indefinites), they move into the restrictive clause of a quantifier - usually
into the restrictive clause of an adverb of quantification. Cardinal noun phrases
do not undergo Quantifier Raising and do not open tripartite structures; they are
interpreted as part of the nuclear scope (of an adverb of quantification), and the
84
MUSAN: TEMPORAL INTERPRETAnON OF NPS - ID. PREDICAnON TIMES
variables they introduce get 'bound by existential closure. (15) illustrates the LFs
for readings that can thus arise for an indefinite noun phrase.
(15) a.
b.
c.
I always write up a witty story about Millard Fillmore.
Quantificational/presuppositional reading of the indefinite:
Whenever I hear a witty story about Millard Fillmore, I always write
it up.
LF: ALWAYSx [x is a story about Millard Fillmore] [I write up x]
Existential/cardinal reading of the indefinite: First thing in the
morning, I always write up a witty story about Millard Fillmore.
(The restrictor is here contextually supplied.) .
LF: ALWAYSt [t is in the morning] 3x [x is a witty story about
Millard Fillmore & I write up x at t]
Since presuppositional and cardinal subjects of stage-level predicates and
individual-level predicates differ with respect to their temporal interpretation (as
we have established in Section 2), and since Diesing's approach states a basic
asymmetry between presuppositional anq cardinal noun phrases with respect to
their location at LF, it is plausible to assume that there is some connection
between Diesing's account and the observations concerning temporal
interpretation. Thus, some extension of Diesing's approach might be used to
account for the distribution of temporally dependent and independent readings
of noun phrases. The obvious hypothesis is that when presuppositional noun
phrases are moved by Quantifier Raising, they are thereby raised out of the scope
of an operator that determines their temporal interpretation by binding a time
variable they introduce.
l
What kind of operator might, in such an approach, be responsible for the
binding of time variables of nouns of course highly depends on the theory of
temporal interpretation entertained. Since temporally dependent noun phrases
are by definition temporally "bound" (in a pre-theoretical sense) to the event time
of the main predicate of their clause, the crucial operator must be an operator that
alsC? binds the event time of the main predicate. Depending on the general
framework of temporal interpretation entertained, the operator in question might
be tense itself (if tense is represented as a quantifier), or it might be some other
operator. In the framework I am exploiting in this thesis the (obligatory and
possibly implicit) adverb of quantification that takes tense as its restrictor is
certainly the most promising candidate for an operator that binds the event time
of the main predicate. In order to avoid confusion, I will refer to this adverb of
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quantification in the following as THE TEMPORAL ADVERB OF
QUANTIFICATION (TAQ).
Thus, let us assume that noun phrases in general have time arguments9 and
investigate the hypothesis that cardinal noun phrases (with the exception of
cardinal subjects of existence-independent predicates, which I will ignore for the
moment) are in the scope of the TAQ at LF. The TAQ obligatorily binds their time
variable. Because of this, they get obligatorily temporally dependent
interpretations. Moreover, presuppositional noun phrases are moved to a
position outside the scope of the TAQ where their time variable escapes from
being bound.
As indicated abo,:e, the relevant LFs used by Diesing have the basic form
(16), where "QA" stands for an adverb of quantification.
(16) QA [RC presuppositional NP] [NS cardinal NP]
In order to have the time arguments of noun phrases in the nuclear scope bound
by the TAQ, but not' noun phrases in the restrictive clause, the TAQ must be
located directly in front of the nuclear scope. Thus, let us assume that LFs are of
the basic form (17).
(17) QA [RC presuppositional NP] TAQ ENs cardinal NP]
According to (17), cardinal noun phrases, which stay in the nuclear scope, are in
the scope of the TAQ, whereas presuppositional noun phrases, which are raised
into the restrictive clause, are outside the scope of the TAQ. Thus, the TAQ can
bind the time arguments of cardinal noun phrases, but not time arguments of
presnppositional noun phrases.
Note that any approach of this type gives us the desired result only under the
assumption that TAQ binds nominal time arguments in its scope obligatorily. If it
bound time arguments in its scope only optionally, then one would expect always
to have the option of having noun phrases with temporally free readings. in the
nuclear scope. But this expectation is not borne out.
To summarize, according to the scope-approach, the LF-position of a noun
phrase determines its temporal interpretation. Semantic partitioning maps cardinal
9 Note that there is a fundamental question of whether nouns do have time arguments (cf.
some remarks by Wilkinson (1991, 30)). If it turns out that nouns don't have time
arguments, then the whole account can of course not work simply for that reason.
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noun phrases into the nuclear scope where they are in the scope of the TAQ,
which binds their time variable obligatorily. Presuppositional noun phrases are
mapped into the restrictive clause where they escape out of the scope of the TAQ
and are consequently temporally independent. Since so far the account does not
introduce any additional stipulations but integrates the relevant data into a
system that is independently motivated, it sounds very desirable at first sight.
Moreover, as I will show in the next subsection, it seems that the account is also
able to cope with the behavior of subjects of existence-independent predicates.
However, the approach fails because it makes wrong predictions with certain
constructions that involve both overt adverbs of quantification and
quantificational noun phrases. This is shown in Subsection 3.3.
3.2. Cardinal subjects of existence-independent predicates
We llave seen in Section 2 that there is an exception to the correlation of the
distinction between temporally dependent and temporally independent noun
phrases on the one hand and the distinction between cardinal and
presuppositional noun phrases on the other hand. This exception is found with
cardinal subjects of existence-independent predicates: contrary to expectations,
such noun phrases are able to exploit temporally independent readings. Thus, the
question must be raised in which way the scope-approach might be able to deal
with these cases.
There is an obvious way to account for these cases without assuming
stipulative additions to· the theory: this is to claim that for some reason, subjects of
existence-independent predicates are base-generated in a position that maps them
ol:ltside the scope of the TAQ at LF.I0 Let us thus pursue this possibility and see
whether it works.
As far as I can see, the claim that subjects of existence-independent
predicates are base-generated in a position that maps them outside the scope of
the TAQ at LF predicts basically that these noun phrases should behave like
subjects of individual-level predicates as described in Kratzer (1988). As we have
seen above, subjects of existence-independent predicates are able to have
cardinal subject noun phrases. At least in this respect, they differ from the
10 Since the alternative possibility to assume that cardinal subjects of existence-independent
predicates are raised at LF runs against the basic ideas of the Diesing-approach, I don't
want to pursue this possibility at all.
87
MUSAN: TEMPORAL INTERPRETAnON OF NPS - ID. PREDICATION TIMES
commonly acknowledged behavior of individual-level predicates (cf. Carlson
(1977), Kratzer (1988)). Thus, I will assume that although they are not a subcase
of individual-level predicates, their behavior may in some respects be analogous.
Kratzer describes a number of grammatical phenomena with respect to which
individual-level predicates differ crucially from stage-level predicates. Here is a
list of the relevant constructions that also contains a brief investigation of the
behavior of existence-independent predicates. The (a)-sentences show the
behavior of a typical stage-level predicate, the (b)-sentences the behavior of a
typical individual-level predicate, and the (c)-sentences the behavior of an
existence-independent predicate. At least with the (c)-sentences, judgements are
unfortunately not \rer clear in all cases. I I
(18) tllere- construction:
a. There are firemen available.
b. * There are firemen altruistic.
c. * There are firemen famous.
(19) rDistribution of existential/generic readings with bare plurals:
a. Firemen are available. (can be understood existentially)
b. Firemen are altruistic. (only generic reading)
c. Firemen are famous. (perhaps only generic reading)
(20) Absolute constructions:
a. Standing on a chair, John can touch the ceiling.
=If John stands on a chair, he can touch the ceiling.
b. Having unusually long arms, John can touch the ceiling.
*' If John has unusually long arms, he can touch the ceiling.
c. Being famous, John can give horrible lectures without people
getting angry.
-:f. If John is famous, he can give horrible lectures without people
getting angry.
(21) Quantifier split in German:
a. weil uns viele Lehrer geholfen haben
sil1ce us many teachers helped have
('since many teachers helped us l )
al. Lehrer haben nns viele geholfen
b. weil das viele Lehrer wissen
since that many teachers know
('since many teachers know that')
b'. ? Lehrer wissen das viele
11 The (a)- and (b)-sentences are taken from Kratzer (1988).
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c. weil damals viele Lehrer beriihmt waren
since then many teachers famous were .
('since many teachers w~re famous then')
ct. (?) Lehrer waren damals viele beriihmt
(22) Negative quantifiers i.~ German
a. weil keine Arzte verfiigbar sind
since no physicians available are
('since no doc~9rs are available')
b. ? weil keine Arzte altruistisch sind
since no physicians altruistic are
('since no doctors are altruistic')
c. (?) weil keine Arzte beriihmt sind
since no physicians famous are
('since no doctors are famous')
(23) Relative clause extraction
a. weil zwei Kinder hier waren, mit denen niemand spielen wollte
since two children here were, with who nobody play wanted
. ('since two children were here who nobody wanted to play with')
b. ? weil zwei BUcher teuer waren, die niemand lesen wollte
since two books expensive were, who nobody read wanted
('since two books were expensive which nobody wanted to buy')
c. (7) weil vier Semantiker beriihmt sind, die nicht Softball spielen
since four semanticists famous are who not softball play
wollten
wanted
('since four semanticists are famous who didn't want to play
softball')
To ~ummarize, it seems that existence-independent predicates behave at least in
some respects very much like individual-level predicates. Thus, it seems likely
that a Diesing-approach can somehow. cope with the fact that cardinal s:ubjects of
existence-independent predicates can get temporally independent interpretations.
Note that the approach I have 'sketched implies that if subjects of individual-
level predicates are base-generated in a position that maps them at LF to a
position outside the scope of the TAQ, then subjects of individual-level predicates
should also in general be able to get temporally independent interpretations even
when being cardinal. As far as I can see, this prediction is irrelevant for the
present purpose because it is probably not testable anyway: if individual-level
predicates denote life-time properties of their subjects, then it won't be possible to
see whether the subject noun phrase is temporally dependent or independent;
because of the life-time duration of the property of the main predicate, the
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predication time of the property denoted by the noun will always intersect with
the predication time of the individual-level main predicate.
3.3. A problem: constructions with adverbs of quantification
According to what we said in Subsection 3.1.,' the operator that is reponsible for
the occurrence of temporally dependent noun phrases should have the following
properties:
• it must be located in an LF-position that includes cardinal noun phrases in its
scope but excludes presuppositional noun phrases;
• it must not only be able to bind time arguments of nouns, but it must moreover
be able to co-bind the time argument of the noun and the time argument of the
main predicate;
• the binding of time arguments of noun phrases should happen obligatorily.
Since the second property can only be achieved by the TAQ in our framework of
temporal in!erpretation, we have identified the operator that is responsible for the
occurrence of temporally dependent noun phrases with this quantifier. Recall
that, by the demands of the temporal interpretation of main predicates in
combination with tenses, temporal adverbials, and implicit temporal restrictions,
the TAQ crucially has the following property:
• it is restricted by the tense, temporal adverbials, and implicit temporal
restrictions of its clause.
In this subsection, I will show that the TAQ cannot possibly always fulfill all these
demands. In particular, there are cases which show that, if the TAQ is responsible
for the occurrence of temporally dependent noun phrases, then it cannot always
be a binder of tense and temporal adverbials. This is because tense and temporal
adverbials can be shown to sometimes occur outside the scope of the operator
that is responsible for the occurrence of temporally dependent noun phrases.
Thus, a contradiction arises that shows that the ~cope-approach cannot work as
sketched above. The argument goes as follows.
Sentence (24a) contains a presuppositional quantificational noun phrase and
an adverb of quantification. It can have the reading (24b), where the adverb of
quantification has wide scope over the quantificational noun phrase. In
particular, reading (24b) is possible in the version of (24c), where the noun
Professoren has a temporally independent interpretation.
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In den sechziger Jahren spielten meistens aIle Professoren, deren
in the sixties played mostly all professors whose
Eltern gerade in Urlaub waren~ Federball.
parents just in vacation were badminton
('In the forties, most often all professors whose parents were just
then on vacation, played badminton.')
For most times t, such that t is in the past and in the sixties, all x such
that x is a professor and x's parents were on vacation at t, x played
badminton at t.
For most times t, such that t is in the past and in the sixties, all x such
that"x is now a professor and XiS parents were on vacation at t, x
played badminton at t.
In both (24b) and (24c), tense and the temporal adverbial are predicates of times
that serve as restrictors of the adverb of quantification. Thus, the adverb of
quantification functions here as the TAQ, and tense and the temporal adverbial
(TA) appear in the restrictive clause of the TAQ as shown in (25).
(25) TAQ rncTENSE&TA ... ] ~s •••VP...]
As we have seen, the presuppositional noun phrase in (24a) under the reading
(24c) is in the scope of the TAQ. Thus, (24c) has an LF roughly of the ..form (26),
where the TAQ has wide scope over the quantificational noun phrase.
(26) TAQ[RCTENSE&TA ... ] ~sQ-DETrncN...] ~s •••VP...]]
As we have seen with the availability of reading (24c), the quantificational noun
phrase can have a temporally independent interpretation, although it appears in
the scope of the TAQ. Considering that we were forced to assume that the TAQ
must bind time arguments of nouns in its scope obligatorily, if it is to b.e held
responsible for the occurrence of obligatorily temporally dependent noun phrases
at all, this is rather unexpected. Thus, I conclude that the TAQ cannot be
responsible for the occurrence of obligatorily temporally dependent noun
phrases.
Note that one cannot get around this conclusion by stipulating that the TAQ
binds only time arguments that are introduced in its restrictive clause (framed in
(27)), but not time arguments that are introduced in its nuclear scope.
(27) TAQ I[RC TENSE & TA .. ·]1 fNs Q-DEf fficN...] ~s ...VP...]]
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This stipulation would predict falsely that cardinal noun phrases should be able to
.be temporally free in a construction (28a) with reading (28b). But reading (28b)
seems impossible when the cardinal reading is triggered by stressing the noun.
(28) a.
b.
In den vierziger Jahren spielten meistens viele PROFESSOREN,
in the forties played nostly many professors
deren Eltern gerade in Ferien waren, Federball.
whose parents just in vacatiol1 were badminton
('In the forties, most often many professors whose parents were just
then on vacation were playing badminton.')
For most times t, such that t is in the forties, many x such that x is a
professor and XIS parents were on vacation at t, x played badminton
at t.
Thus, we have arrived at the conclusion that the TAQ cannot be responsible
for the occurrence of obligatorily temporally dependent noun phrases. But since
the TAQ ultimately binds the event time of the main predicate and temporally .
dependent noun phrases and the event time of the main predicate must be co-
bound, the TAQ seems to be the only operator that could be responsible for the
occurrence of temporally dependent noun phrases. Thus, we must conclude at
this point that the whole approach is misled, because it leads to a contradiction
that cannot be eliminated.
Of course, one could avoid the contradiction by assuming a stipulation like
~'The TAQ binds time arguments of cardinal noun phrases in its scope obligatorily
but not time arguments of presuppositional noun phrases in its scope". But if one
adopts this stipulation, then one reaches a point where the ~istribution of
temporally dependent and temporally independent noun phrase interpretations is
attributed to some internal property of cardinal and presuppositional noun
phrases and doesn't depend crucially on scope anymore.
To summarize, we have seen that the scope-approach fails because of scope
paradoxes that arise with certain readings of clauses containing adverbs of
quantification: noun phrases in the scope of the crucial operator can be
temporally independent if they are presuppositional. In light of this result, it
seems likely that the occurrence of temporally dependent interpretations is not
due to scope, but hinges on noun phrase i~ternal properties.
Thus, at this point, we don't have an explanation for the occurrence and
distribution of temporally dependent noun phrases. Temporally dependent noun
phrase interpretations do .not seem to be due to the noun phrase's position at LF
but to some inherent property of cardinal noun phrases. Furthermore, we have
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seen that'there are certain cases where cardinal noun phrases can be temporally
independent. The occurrence of these cases is dependent on the nature of the
main predicate the noun phrase is an argument of. In particular, it seems' to be
crucial that the p.redicate is existence-independent. Thus, we can conclude that"it
is not only noun phrase internal properties that decide about the occurrence of
temporally dependent or temporally independent interpretations, but also the way
in which the main predicate relates to the argument.
In the next sections, I will argue that a semantics of quantification based on a
stage-ontology is not only able to explain the occurrence of temporally
dependent noun phrase interpretations, but is also able to deal adequately with
the constructions that are problematic for the scope-approach.
. 4. Stages
Somehow it seems that not only the properties of the noun phrase playa role but
also the way in which the main predicate relates to the noun phrase - or, to be
more precise, the subject of the noun.
In this section, I suggest an alternative approach that is based on the
assumption that determiner-quantifiers quaI1tify over stages of individuals rather
than individuals in their maximal temporal extendedness. Furthermore, I argue
that determiners of cardinal noun phrases and determin~rs of presuppositional
noun phrases receive (in principle) exactly the same interpretation. Differences
between them are in general caused by the mapping of the noun: a noun that
appears as part of a DP can be mapped either into the restrictive clause or into the
nuclear scope of the determiner. Nouns that appear as part of a presuppositional
noun phrase are mapped into the restrictive clause, whereas nouns that appear as
part of a cardinal noun phrase are mapped into the nuclear scope. This difference
is also responsible for the fact that presuppositional noun phrases can receive
temporally independent interpretations, whereas cardinal noun phrases (with the
exception of arguments of existence-independent predicates) cannot.
I show that the data that proved problematic for the approaches in Section 3
follow from this account in combination with the semantics of existence-
independent predicates I suggested in Chapter II.
93
MUSAN: TEMPORAL INTERPRETATION OFNPS - ID. PREDICATION TIMES
4.1. The basic idea
At this point, there are still two questions to be answered: First, what syntactic
and/or semantic mechanisms cause temporally dependent interpretations of noun
phrases? Second, why do the crucial mechanisms apply to some noun phrases but
not to others? In this section, I argue that the occurrence of temporally dependent
noun phrase interpretations is due to an ontology that contains stages of
individuals as primitive elements. In particular, I argue that determiner
quantification is not quantification over individuals in their whole temporal
extendedness but quantification over STAGES OF INDIVIDUALS. With regard to
the extendedness of the stages a· particular quantifier quantifies over, I will
assume that the temporal length of a stage (st) is determined by the predication
time(s) introduced by the restricting predicates of the determiner. Based on this
assumption, I then argue that the distribution of temporally dependent and
temporally independent noun phrase interpretations results from the interaction
of general, mostly independently motivated principles of quantification and the
lexical semantics of predicates.
A common assumption about determiner quantification is that it is
quantification over whole individuals in the sense of individuals in their entire
temporal extendedness. Semantic representations like (29a) and (29b)12 may be
interpreted as (29c) and (29d), respectively.
(29) a.
b.
c.
d.
professor (x, t)
professor (x)
x (in its entire temporal extendedness) is a professor at t
x (in its entire temporal extendedness) is a professor at some time
The counterpart of this idea with the interpretation of main. predicates is that a
main predicate like was sick is basically interpreted like (30b).13
(30) a.
b.
was sick (x, t*)
x is sick at t* and t* is before now
12 (29a) exploits the idea that (stage-level) nouns have time arguments, whereas (29b)
exploits the idea that nouns do not have time arguments.
13 I assume here that there is no doubt about the presence of time arguments with (stage-
level, non-nominal) predicates and furthermore, for ease of presentation, I make use of a
very simple representation of past tense. At this point, nothing hinges on this.
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Putting together these two parts, a sentence like There was a professor sick (31 a)
gets roughly a representation like (31b), which can be paraphrased as (31c).
(31) a.
b.
c.
There was a professor sick.
3x 3t 3t*[professor (x, t) & was sick (x, t*)]
There is an individual x and a time t and a time t*, such that x is a
professor at t and x is sick at t* and t* is before now.
In principle, this representation allows for the predicates professor and the
predicate sick to be predicated of x at entirely distinct times (as long as these
times are included in the life-time of x). This can be illustrated as in (32).
x's life-time
As we have seen, this En9-type prediction is wrong; the predication times of sick
and of professor have to intersect. Obviously, we need some mechanism for
explaining the occurrence of temporally dependent interpretations.
Contrasting with the general approach I just sketched, the basic idea of my
proposal is that determiner-quantifiers do not quantify over whole individuals but
over stages of individuals. Thus, the entities predicates are predicated of are not
whole individuals but temporal parts of individuals. Consequently, There was a
professor sick will now have a representation like (33b) and be interpreted like
(33c).The subscript-notation is used here to indicate that Xst is a variable that
ranges over stages of individuals. Here and below, I will talk about stages Xst
that are temporal parts of their I1host individualfl x.
(33) a.
b.
c.
There was a professor sick.
3x-st 3t 3t*[professor (xst, t) & was sick (xst, t*)] 14
There is a stage Xst and a time t and a time t*, such that Xst is a
professor at t and Xst is sick at t* and t* is before now.
14 Note that at this point there' are several possibilities conceivable how to interpret an
expression like 3Xst 3t professor (Xst, t). One may assume that the time of t must be
included in the time covered by Xst. Alternatively, one my assume that t must cover the
whole temporal extendedness of Xst. At this point, I don't want to go into a discussion of
these possibilities and their consequences.
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If the stage Xst is not extended beyond the whole individual's time of being a
professor, it follows that at least part of the host individual's time of being sick
must be included in its time of being a professor. This is illustrated in (34).
Xl s life-time
This approach predicts that if the stages determiner-quantifiers quantify over
never extended beyond the predication time of the noun, then all quantificational
noun phrases should always have temporally dependent interpretations. We
have seen above that this is not so; presuppositional noun phrases in general and
certain cardinal noun phrases are able to get temporally independent
interpretations. I will argue below that the distribution of temporally dependent
and temporally independent noun phrase interpretations is due to independently
motivated principles of how quantification works and independently motivated
principles concerning life-time presuppositions of predicates (see Chapter II).
Roughly speaking, presuppositional noun phrases can introduce larger stages
than cardinal ~oun phrases, because their noun is part of the restriction of the
quantifier involved; this is one of the mechanisms that lead to temporally
independent interpretations. And stages introduced by cardinal noun phrases
that are existence-independent arguments of the main predicate are independent
of the event-time of the main predicate, because the main predicate does not
impose life-time presuppositions on them; this is the· other mechanism leading to
temporally independent noun phrase-interpretations.
The observation that a stage-ontology under certain circumstances predicts
the occurrence of temporally dependent NP-interpretations is not entirely new.
Schubert and Pelletier (1987, 424f) mention possible effects that point in this
direction. They view these possible effects as problematic and argue that it poses
difficulties for approaches that are based on a stage-ontology. Contrary to this
view, I am making use of these effects and show that a stage-ontology gives us
exactly the right results with regard to the temporal interpretation of noun
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phrases, if it is embedded into the appropriate framework.IS, 16 Also, Carlson
(1982, 174) observes a temporal dependency effect implied by the set-up of his
stage framework: he notes that if a predicate P is true of a stage u at a time t, and a
predicate Q is true of stage u at a time t', then t =t'. This is a temporal dependency
effect like the one I sketched above, but just viewed from another standpoint -
Carlson main purpose is to point out problems concerning the identity or
nonidentity of stages, whereas I am aiming at explaining intersections of
predication times.
In the next subsection, I explain and motivate. the assumptions on which my
proposal is based; these remarks concern the ontology, the theory of quantifier
restrictions, and the semantics of cardinal and presuppositional noun phrases,
4.2. On the semantics of quantification
4.2.1. The ontology
I will make use of an ontology whose domain of entities consists not only of
individuals in their whole temporal extendedness, but also of "stages". STAGES
are temporal parts or slices of individuals. One may probably take stages to be
spatio-temporal parts of individuals, but since I am not going to discuss matters of
their possible spatial dimension, I will refer to them just as temporal parts of
individuals.
Both individuals in their whole temporal extendedness and stages are
elements of the domain of entities, i.e., of type e. The domain of entities has to be
somehow sorted, so that it is possible to distinguish individuals in their whole
temporal extendedness from stages - although I assume "whole individuals" to be
a special case of stages. Thus, within the domain of entities, "whole individuals"
have to be somehow designated.
When a particular stage ast is a part of the individual ex, I will refer to a as the
HOST INDIVIDUAL of ast. For the purpose of this section, I will assume that any
15 The framework I will be exploiting here exploits the same basic idea as my (1993)
proposal on the temporal interpretation of noun phrases, but differs quite crucially as far as
details of the surrounding semantics are concerned.
16 Paul (1994) exploits a stage-semantics for proper names in order to explain certain
phenomena concerning the spatia-temporal modification of proper names. As far as I can
see, he makes more use of the ability of stages to distinguish between predicates being·
predicated of individuals at different times or places, rather than of the ability of stages to
restrict the temporal-spatial regions which predicates are predicated of.
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stage in the domain of entities has exactly Olle host individual. In Section 10, I
will suggest a modification of this assll.mptioIl though~ in order to be able to treat
more phenomena in natural language adeq\lately. "rh\lS~ for the moment we can
assume that the host individual of a particular stage is in principle always
recoverable.
In principle, a stage can be of any length that is included in its host
individual's time of existence. And an individ.ual in its whole temporal
extendedness, as any of its stages, consists of infinitely nlany stages that can
overlap each other. Below, I will be concerlled with the question of how long
they are in concrete occurrences in semantic representations. Here it is only
important to note that they don't need to be of minimal length or instantaneous.1?
Like Carlson (1977, e.g. 455) and Paul (1994, 275), I take stages belonging to
the same host individual as entitites that can be merged or fused together such
that the resulting entity will again be a stage of that host individual. Stages that
belong to different host individuals cannot be merged, since the resulting stage
would then have more than one host individual - which would contradict the
respective assumption made above.
Note that if my argument in the remainder of this chapter is on the right track,
then my work provides interesting evidence in favor of the claim that natural
language exploits an ontology that is crucially based on stages of individuals·.
17 Since stages have frequently been exploited in semantics, and the term "stage" is used in
the literature with various meanings, a few terminological comments are in order: Carlson's
(1977a, 1977b, 1979) notion of stages is similar to my notion of stages; for him, stages are
spatia-temporal realizations of individuals that are "tied together" by being stages of the
same individual. Carlson is not very clear about the details of his ontology, but he classifies
stages, like objects, as of type e. Lewis (1976), on the other hand, takes stages to be
"more or less momentary"; this contrasts with Carlson's concept, who takes stages to be
potentially of considerable length. Perhaps inspired by Goodman (1951, cf. e.g. 127ff),
Quine (19~O, 52, 172f) considers the possibility that noun denotations are sets of stages or
parts of whole enduring individuals. I am not sure about the specific characteristics he
attributes to stages, but I think neither he nor Goodman have a restriction of temporal parts
to ins~antaneous parts in mind. Kratzer's (1988) ontology does not contain stages as parts
,of individuals. For her, stages as such are merely spatio-temporal entities, but not spatio-
temporal parts of individuals. .
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4.2.2. Quantification with resource domain variables
It is well-known that quantifiers are in general not interpreted with respect to the
whole universe, but only to a contextually relevant set. For example, when
talking about the party of last Friday, a sentence like
(35) Everyone had a great time.
is most likely not intended to say something about all people in the universe, but
only about the people that were present at the party. Thus, the quantifier
everyone is implicitly restricted by the context. Restriction of quantifiers by the
context is a very common process. Moreover, it can be shown that contextual
restriction does not happen clause-wide but" is a local process - i.e., the following
example suggests that each quantificational noun phrase can have its own
contextual restriction: 18
(36) Everybody is asleep and is being monitored by a research assistant.
Let us assume that (36) is uttered in the context of a lab, and that in this context,
everybody quantifies over the subjects in the lab. The DP a research assistant
shows that the contexts relative to which quantifiers are interpreted are not
defined for whole sentences. Rather, contexts must be able to change within a
sentence, namely when the next DP appears.
In order to account for the locality of the context-dependency of
quantificational noun phrases, von Fintel (1994) assumes that the context-
dependency is located in the determiner. He implements the context dependency
by indexing determiners with a variable C. As with variables in general, the
resource domain variable can get a value assigned in various ways - deictically,
anaphorically, or by a process of binding. When the resource domain variable is
free, the value must be provided by the context, i.e., it will then denote a
contextually supplied set of individuals, the resource domain. As proposed by
Westerstahl (1984, 52), the RESOURCE DOMAIN VARIABLE is interpreted as
demonstrateq in (37), i.e. by intersection with the common noun argument.
(37) [everyc n(A, B) = [[every n(enA, B)
18 This example is taken from Soames (1986).
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Following (37), (36) is, in the context sketched above, true if and only if for every
x such that x is a subject in the lab and x is a person, x is being monitored by 'a
research assista~t. - In the following, I will adopt von Fintel's account of
quantifier restriction.
It is important to note that all determiners are able to provide a resource
domain variable for the interpretation of the noun phrase they are part of - i.e.,
determiners of presuppositional noun phrases as well as determiners of ca!dinal
noun phrases. For presuppositional noun phrases, this was shown above. Here is
some evidence showing that cardinal noun phrases can have a contextual
restriction: Because of the use of the there-construction in (38), one can safely
assume that the underlined noun phrases are cardinal. Imagine a context where
we have just been talking about people belonging to the linguistics department
of MIT. Talking then with (38a) about where people had lunch today, the "noun
phrase no professors in (38a) is contextually restricted to professors belonging to
the MIT linguistics department. Thus, provided that none of the linguistics
professors from MIT had a truck lunch today, (38a) will be judged true" even if
there were seven biology professors eating at the trucks today. Furthermore, in
the context of a conversation about how many people belonging to the MIT
linguistics department went to a talk at Harvard today, (38b) may be judged true
even if all Harvard professors attended the talk. 19
(38) a.
b.
There were no professors eating at the trucks today.
There were few professors at Harvard today.
(38) shows that contextual restriction with cardinal noun phrases is also locally
provided, just as with the presuppositional noun phrases above.
4.2.3. On the semantics of cardinal and presuppositional DPs
4.2.3.1. The interpretation of cardinal DPs
Some people have favoured an analysis of the determiners of cardinal noun
phrases as cardinal predicates (Milsark (1974), Higginbotham (1987, 48), Diesing
(1992, 61)). Within such an account, a sentence like (39a) might have an LF like
19 These sentences are based on suggestions of David Pesetsky and Kai von Fintel,
respectively.
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(39b), where many appears as a cardinal predicate over sets, and the truth
conditions in (39c).20, 21
(39) a.
b.
c.
There were many students here.
3X [many (X) & students (X) & were-here (X)]
IT (39a) ] = 1 iff there is a set X, such that X has many members and
all members of X are students and were here.
With (39b), (39a) is predicted to be true if and only if there is a set X, such that X
has many members and all members of X are students and were here.
A serious problem with this proposal is that it fails with determiners that are
neither leftward monotone increasing nor rightward monotone increasing.22
Thus, for (40), the approach predicts truth conditions that are intuitively
completely inappropriate: According to the LF in (40b), for There were few
students here in order to be true, there should be a set of individual that are
students, and'this set should have few members. This situation is of course given,
whenever There were many students here is true, since a set of many students has
subsets of few students.
(40) a.
b.
c.
There were few students here.
3X [few (X) & students (X) & were-here (X)]
IT(40a) ] =1 iff there is a set X, such that X has few members and all
members of X are students and were here.
Here, the wrong prediction co.uld perhaps be overruled by Gricean principles. I.e.,
in a situation where there were many students here, it might be ruled out to say
that there were few students here, because it would be more informative to say
that many students were there - just as in a situations where all students were
here, it would be true but not optimally informative to s~y that some students
were here
But there are determiners where it is not clear how their treatment in the
cardinal-predicate-account could be saved by a Gricean explanation. These are
determiners like exactly two and at most two.
20 I assume that these are the LFs intended (cf. Higginbotham (1987, 48)). I don't want to
go into details of plural semantics here, because the approach is probably not tenable
anyway, as I will argue shortly.
21 I am using the there-construction in order to make sure that the noun phrasemany
stude.nts appears with its cardinal interpretation. .
22 This was already observed by von Stechow (1980) and Heim (1987, 40 fn. 3).
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There were exactly two students here.
3X [exactly two (X) & students (X) & were-here (X)]
[(41a)] = 1 iff there is a set X, such that X has exactly two members
and all members of X are students and were here.
Suppose there were eight students here. In this situation, (41a) is predicted to be
true because there is a set X, such that X has exactly two members and all
members of X are students and were here. But in fact (41a) is judged plainly false.
Thus, the account is unable to predict the intuitive truth conditions of (41a). The
analogous problem occurs with (42a).
(42) a.
b.
c.
There were at most two students here.
3X [at most two (X) & students (X) & were-here (X)]
IT (42a) ] =1 iff there is a set X, such that X has at most two members
and all members of X are students and were here.
Like (41a), (42a) is also falsely predicted to be true in a situation where eight
students were llere, because there is a set X, such that X has at most two members
and all members of X are students and were here.
Finally, the predictions of the cardinal-predicate-account for the determiner
no are definitely at least unintuitive. For example, the predicted truth conditions
of There were no students here are quite strange:
(43) a.
b.
c.
There were no students here.
3X [no (X) & students (X) & were-here (X)]
[(43a) ] = 1 iff there is a set X, such that X has no members and all
members of X are students and were here. .
According to (43b), (43a) is true if and only if there is a set X, such that X has no
members and all members of X are students and were here. I am not sure what
this means, but if [[ student n(X) is true if and only if all members of X are
students, then [[student n(X) is true for the empty set. The same holds for [[ were-
here] (X). Thus, whenever one can make out an empty set - which is always the
case - There were no students llere is predicted to be true. If that is so, then there
is literally no situation that could make the sentence false. This is of course a false
prediction.
Thus, the cardinal-predicate-account seems inadequate. An alternative
approach for interpreting the determiners of cardinal noun phrases is to say that
they are quantifiers, but - considering the evidence we have so far (but see
below) - unrestrictive ones. Then, the LFs for the examples above would be like
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demonstrated in (39' - 43' b) with the truth conditions in (39' - 43' c),where for the
. moment, I will ignore my proposal to quantify over stages of individuals instead
of over individuals in their whole temporal extendedness.
(39') a. There were many students here.
b. MANYx [students (x) & were-here (x)]
c. [(39'a)] =1 iff for many x, x is a student and x was here.
(40') a. There were few students here.
b. FEWx [students (x) & were-here (x)]
c. [(40'a) ] =1 iff for few x, x is a student and x was here.
(41') a. There were exactly two students here.
b. EXACTLY TWOx [students (x) & were-here (x)]
c. IT(41 'a) ] =1 iff for exactly two x, x is a student and x was here.
(42') a. There were at most two students here.
b. .AT MOST TWOx [students (x) & were-here (x)]
c. IT(42'a) ]] =1 iff for at most two x, x is a student and x was here.
(43') a. There were no students here.
b. NOx [students (x) & were-here (x)]
c. [(43'a)] =1 iff for no x, x is ~ student and x was here.
Thus, depending on whether they occur in a presuppositional or in a cardinal
\
noun phrase, nouns are restrictively or unrestrictively interpreted, respectively23:
whereas the noun of a presuppositional noun phrase serves as an overt restrictor
of the determiner, the noun of a cardinal noun phrase appears at LF as part of the
nuclear scope of the determiner and is consequently intersectively interpreted.
In the next subection, I will argue that this does not mean that determiners of
cardinal noun phrases have an unrestrictive semantics; in fact, there is evidence
that determiners of cardinal noun phrases are actually not unrestrictive-quantifiers
but restrictive ones: they differ from determiners of presuppositional noun phrases
inso.far as they have only implicit restrictors but not overt ·ones. In particular, I
will argue that the resource domain variable of cardinal noun phrases is
restrictively interpreted.
23 Note that in this respect my proposal to analyze determiners of cardinal NPs as
unrestrictive determiners does not differ from approaches that analyze them as cardinal
predicates.
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4.2.3.2. The interpretation of resource domain variables
In this subsection, I argue that resource domain variables in general get a
restrictive interpretation, regardless of whether they appear in presuppositional or
in cardinal noun phrases. I take it that with presuppositional noun phrases, this
claim doesn't need any additional motivation, since it is a commonly accepted
assumption. But with cardinal noun phrases, things are less obvious. Thus, I will
provide in the following evidence for the claim that the resource domain variable
of cardinal noun phrases is restrictively interpreted. Evidence for this claim comes
from an observation of Herburger (1993).
Herburger (1993) observes that there are weak noun phrases that don't have
a -symmetric interpretation but one that seems to be proportional. Thus, tpe
underlined common nouns and relative clauses in (44) are apparently not
intersectively interpreted - if they were, (44a) and (44b) should have the same
truth conditions. As is shown by the fact that (44a) is judged true but (44b) false,
this is not the case.
(44) a.
b.
There are many speakers of Basque who are Spanish. (true)
There are many Spanish people who speak Basque. (false)
Herburger argues that the class of weak quantifiers that can have asymmetric
interpretations is the class of quantifiers that can have focus-affected readings.
(45a) shows an effect related to (44); it can have a reading like (45b).
(45) a.
b.
Few INCOMPETENT cooks applied.
Possible reading: Few of the cooks who applied were incompetent.
I.e., here it seems that few has a restrictor that contains cooks and applied and
has inColnpetent in the nuclear scope. Irene Heim (pc) points out that the data
can be explained in a framework that makes use of an independently motivated
focus semantics as proposed by Roath (1985, 1992) and von Fintel's (1994)
approach to quantifier restriction. The explanation is only applicable if
determiners of cardinal noun phrases, i.e., quantifiers that appear to be
unrestrictive at first sight, have a restrictively interpreted resource domain
variable.
In particular, (45a) has an LF (46). The operator "-" introduces the focus
anaphor C. The denotation of C must be a subset of the focus value of the other
argument of the operator, i.e., a subset of the focus value of a.
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(46) FE
[incompetent]p cooks applied
The normal semantic value of ex is, roughly speaking, the set of individuals {x:
incompetent (x) & cook (x) & applied (x)}. The focus value of a is the set of
alternatives to the expression, where the focussed element is substituted by a
yariable. Thus, it is the set of sets of individuals, or the set of properties, {P: 3Q [P
= {x: Q (x) & cook (x) & applied (x)}]}. According to what I said above, the
denotation of C must be a subset of the set of properties {P: 3Q [P ={x: Q (x) &
cook (x) & applied (x)}]}. The resource domain variable of the quantifier few is
supplied by the same anaphor C (or the resource domain variable provides a
licensing antecedent for the focus anaphor). But since the set {P: 3Q [P = {x: Q
(x) & cook (x) & applied (x)}]} is a set of sets of individuals and few is a
quantifier over individuals, the restrictor of the quantifier must make use of th~ set
union of {P: jQ [P = {x: Q (x) & cook (x) & applied (x)}]} in order to have a
restrictor of the right type.
Provided that the resource domain variable of few is restrictively interpreted,
(45a) has thus the truth conditjons (47).
(47) [Few INCOMPETENT cooks applied] =1
iff [[few] [c u {P: 3Q [P ={x: Q(x) & cook (x) & applied (x)}] } ]
[NS {x: incompetent (x) & cook (x) & applied (x) }]
iff for few x, such that there is a Q, such that Q (x), and x is a cook and x
applied, x is incompetent and x is a cook and x applied
iff [by simplification, i.e. elimination of the redundant parts of the nuclear
scope]
for few x, such that there is a Q, such that Q (x), and x is a cook and x
applied, x is incompetent.
iff [by taking, for example, the property of being a cook as a value for Q]
for few x, such that x is a cook and x is a cook and x applied, x is
incompetent.
iff [by simplification, i.e. elimination of the redundant part in the restrictive
clause]
for few x, such that x is a cook and x applied, x is incompetent.
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This represents precisely the truth conditions which (45a) has, according to
intuitions.24 .
Note that an unrestrictive interpretation of the resource domain variable does
not give us the desired result. Specifically, if it were intersectively interpreted,
th~n (45a) would be predicted to be true if and only if for few x, x is a cook and x
applied and x is incompetent. These truth conditions do not reflect the
asymmetric effect the focus has in (45a).
If this analysis is on the right track, then "unrestrictive quantifiers" are in fact
also restrictive. The difference to "restrictive quantifiers" is that restrictive
quantifiers are restricted by their nominal complement and by their resource
domain variables, whereas the unrestrictive quantifiers are only restricted by their
resource domain variables.
To summarize, according to my proposal, all determiners - i.e., weak ones as
well as strong ones - are raised at LF and all determiners are associated with a
resource domain variable C, wh~ch can get a value supplied by the context.
Cardinal or weak DPs and presuppositional or strong DPs differ with respect to
the presence of the restrictive clause: strong DPs have a restrictive clause at LF,
whereas weak ones don't. Accordingly, nouns are interpreted differently
depending on whether they occur in a weak or in a strong DP. A noun that
occurs as the complement of a strong DP is raised into the restrictive clause,
whereas a noun that occurs as the complement of a weak DP remains in the
nuclear scope.
Thus, we have two types of LFs for determiner-quantifiers, (48) and (49).
(48) is the quantificational structure of a cardinal DP, whereas (49) is the
quantificational structure of a presuppositional DP. In the former case, the
common noun phrase is part of the nuclear scope of the determiner-quantifier. In
the latter case, it is part of the restrictive clause of the determiner-quantifier.
(48) cardinal DP: DETC ~s ••. NP... ]
(49) presuppositional DP: DET C ffic.·. NP... ] ~s ... ]
Moreover, I argued that the resource domain variable of any determiner is
restrictively interpreted. Thus, according to this proposal, all DPs provide at LF a
nuclear scope as well as restrictively interpreted material. With presuppositional
24 For a different approach to focus-affected readings, see Bliring (1995).
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DPs, the restrictively interpreted material consists of the resource domain variable
and the overt restrictive clause, whereas with cardinal DPs, it consists only of the
resour~e domain variable. Since in my proposal, the mapping of the NP-material
into the nuclear scope or into the restrictive clause is the crucial difference
between cardinal and presuppositional DPs, I will call them henceforth
UNRESTRICTIVE and RESTRICTIVE DPs, respectively. It should be kept in mind
though that this terminology reflects the interpretation of the NP-material and not
the semantics of the determiner: as I just pointed out, determiners of both
restric~iveDPs and unrestrictive DPs are associated with restrictively interpreted
material.
4.2.3.3. The interpretation of resource domain variables with restrictive
nouns
After proposing how to interpret the resource domain variable of unrestrictive
DPs, I want to turn in this subsection to the question of how the combination of
resource domain variables and overt restrictive material is to be calculated. In
contrast to the preceding subsections, this subsection returns to my proposal in
Subsection 4.1., namely to adopt a stage-semantics. The point I want to show is
that, given the stage-semantics I sketched, the resource domain variable and the
overt nominal restrictor of restrictive noun phrases cannot be intersectively
interPreted (as was suggested by von Fintel (1994)), but must be interpreted with
a non-Boolean "and". In order to establish this point, let me first introduce some
more details concerning the semantics of quantification and stages.
I proposed above that determiner quantifiers quantify over stages of
individuals. I will mark variables ranging over stages with a subscript "st". Thus,
Xst is a variable ranging over stages, whereas x is a variable ranging over whole
individuals.
Let me briefly sketch how nouns are interpreted. For ease of representation, I
will henceforth assume that stage-level nouns do not have a location argument.
Thus, stage-level nouns and individual-level nouns get the same kind of lexical
entry - here illustrated with professor:
(50) [professor] =f: De ---7 D t
For any X5t E De, f (X5t) = 1
iff for all stages y5t, such that y5t is a part of X5h
Y5t is professor.
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time ofx
(51)-~~
[professor]] (Yst) = 0 [professor]] (xst) = 1
According to this lexical entry, a noun can be truly predicated of a stage if the
property denoted by the noun holds of the stage during its whole temporal
extendedness. In principle, the same condition holds for other - i.e. verbal or
adjectival - stage-level predicates and individual-level predicates.
Recall here from Chapter II that stage-level predicates - like professor and
sick - and invididual-Ievel predicates - like cat and intelligent can only be
predicated of individuals - or stages of individuals - during their time of existence.
Thus, for instance predicating professor or sick of a stage Xst presupposes that
sick holds of Xst during Xst'S time of existence. This establishes a temporal
dependence between the predication times of stage-level predicates or individual-
level predicates and the individual or stage of which they are predicated.
As we learned in Chapter II, this does not hold for existence-independent
predicates like famous or forgotten. These predicates do not impose life-time
pr~suppositions on their subjects. We will not be concerned with this fact here,
but it will become crucial below in Section 5.
In the remainder of this subsection, I will explain step by step how determiner
quantifiers have to be interpreted, given the framework of a stage-semantics and
lexical entries for nouns as sketch~d above. I have argued above that
determiners of unrestrictive noun phrases as well as determiners of restrictive
noun phrases are restrictive. One of the leading ideas throughout is that
determiners of unrestrictive noun phrases and determiners of restrictive noun
phrases receive in principle exactly the same. interpretation. Differences between
them are solely derived from whether the noun is mapped into the restrictive
clause or into the nuclear scope. In particular, differences concerning the
temporal interpretation of noun phrases are derived from this difference. In the
following, I will first focus on determiners in restrictive noun phrases and develop
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an analysis step by step. When I have established the semantics of these
determiners, I will consider the semantics of determiners in unrestrictive noun
phrases. Note that in what follows, I will simplify the temporal interpretation of
main predicates of clauses in order to be able to focus on the questions at issue
here.25
1.. The first version of a lexical entry for quantifiers. The determiner quantifier
together with the resq.urce domain variable is represented below as a constituent;
many C corresponds to what is usually assumed to be the quantificational
determiner insofar as it is an expressio.n of type <et, <et, t». The lexical entry for
many itself is something like the following, where k is the characteristic function
of the resource domain.
(52) [TO BE REVISED]
[many] = f: D<et> --7 D~et, <et, t»
For any k, h, j E D<et>, f (k) (h) U) = 1
iff for many Xst E De, such that k(xst) = 1 and h(xst) =1,
j(Xst)= 1.
2. Maximality. This lexical entry has to be revised, because it leads to wrong
predictions: Consider the sentence (without any specifics concerning k here)
(53) a.
b.
Many students cooked for parties
[many students cooked for parties] = 1
iff for many Xst E De, such that k(xst) = 1 and Xst is a student,
Xst cooked for parties.
According to the truth conditions stated, the sentence is predicted to be true, if
and only if many student-stages are such that they cooked for parties.
Unfortunately, since stages can be arbitrarily long stages of individuals, whenever
there is a single student who cooked for parties, the sentence is thus predicted to
be true, because the single student can provide many, even infinitely many, stages
that satisfy the LF.
25 E.g., I will omit time arguments, implicit temporal restrictions and implicit quantifiers
over times.
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x is student
(54)
r-. ~I)l·
......
.......
::-::
Even though this problem may only be a conceptual but not "real" problem with
proportional quantifiers, it turns out to be a serious problem with cardinal
quantifiers, i.e. unrestrictive DPs.
In order to avoid this problem, I introduce a notion of maximality:
Quantification is over IImaximal" stages that satisfy the restriction; this guarantees
that with a noun phrase like most students, one "counts" per person only one
stage as the person's student-stage. In Section 10, I will consider a revision of this
assumption, in order to be able to deal with other phenomena of natural language.
But for the purpose of this section, this assumption seems desirable. Thus, we get
the revised lexical entry
(55) [TO BE REVISED]
[most] = f: D<et> ---7 D<et, <et, t»
For any k, h, j E D<et>, f (k) (h) G) = 1
iff for m'ost maximal Xst E De,
such that k(xst) =1 and h(xst) =1,
j(xst) '= 1.
3. Against intersective interpretation of resource domain variaple and overt
restrictive material. According to von Fintel (1994), the resource domain and the
overt restrictor of the quantifier are intersectively interpreted. I.e., the bold-face
printed "and" marks an intersective interpretation. I will argue that what we need
(at least within my approach that makes use of stages and the interpretation
schemata suggested above) is in fact a different interpretation.
With (50) above, I introduced interpretation schemata for predicates that
state that a predicate can be truly predicated of a stage if the property denoted by
the predicate holds of the stage during the whole time interval which the stage
covers. Thus, for example, when a stage is tired during the whole stretch of time
covered. by the stage, one can truly predicate tired of the stage. But when a
stage extends beyond its time of being tired, one cannot truly predicate tired of
. the stage.
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Now imagine we have a conversation about the people that were in my class
when I went to school. Thinking about what these people are doing today,' I
state (56a). Obviously, in that context, the sentence must have an LF that is
schematically constructed like (56b).26
(56) a.
b.
Most scientists are unmarried.
MOSTx-st C[in my class] [scientist] [unmarried]
Given my assumptions about stages and interpretation schemata, a problem arises
with this LF: If we interpret the restrictor by intersection, we will probably not be
able to find a single individual that satisfies the restrictor of the LF. This is,
because with an intersective interpretation, the restrictor is satisfied for a stage Xst
if and only if [[in my class] (xst) = 1 and [[scientist] (xst) = 1.
(56) c. [NOT THE INTERPRETATION WE WANT, TO BE REVISED]
. [MOSTx-st C[in my class] [scientist] [unmarried] ] = 1
iff for most maximal XSh
such that [[in my class] (xst) = 1 and [scientistn(xst) = 1,
. ITunmarried]] (xst) = 1. A
Since my interpretation schema prohibits for Xst to be larger than the predication
time of in my class in order to make [[in my class 11 (xstJ true, and it also prohibits
for Xst to be larger than the predication time of scientist in order to make [[
scientist Jl (xst) true, Xst can only satisfy the restriction if the individual it belongs
to was at some time both in my class and a scientist. Since none of the people I
went to school with was a scientist while we went to school,
in-roy-class (x-st) scientist (y-st)
(57)~~---&fft8-+
there is not a single individual that satisfies the restriction. This does not
correspond to intuitions of course; rather, we want to be able to use a sentence
like Most scientists are unmarried in a context as the one described above to be
able to say something about people who were in my class then and are scientists
now. (In general, an analogous problem arises of course when one considers the
26 In the following, I will often exploit schematic LFs whose purpose is mainly to indicate
which linguistic material is mapped into the restrictive clause and which is mapped into the
nuclear scope of a quantificational structure.
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nuclear scope in addition to the restrictive clause; for the moment, I want to
ignore this; coming back to this point is exactly what I am aiming at.)
The problem can be avoided if we do not interpret the restriction of
quantifiers strictly intersectively but adopt a-nan-Boolean meaning for the "and"
in the lexical entry of most. Although the non-Boolean "and" I want to argue for
is a meta-language operator, I want to illustrate the use and usefulness of the non-
Boolean "and" with an object-language example which I find quite illuminating.
Krifka (1989) discusses the necessity of assuming a non-Boolean and as a
lexical item of natural language. With predicates of type <et>, the necessity of
such an interpretation in addition to intersective interpretations can be shown
with examples like
(58) a.
b.
c.
The flag is g:een and white.
=/:- The flag is green and the flag is white.
= The flag has a green part and a white part.
Krifka makes use of an analysis of Link (1983), according to which non-Boolean_
and is analyzed in terms of a (mereological) sum operation "(f)" on individuals,
which is a function from pairs of individuals into individuals - i.e., a function that
takes two individuals and yields another individual. For the non-Boolean
conjunction in The flag is green alld white, one can make use of the sum
operation "<d1" as shown with the denotation of green and white:
(59) [green and white] = f: De -7 Dt
For any Xli E De, f (X") =1
iff there is an x E De and an Xl E De,
such that x" = x ~ Xl and [green]] (x) = 1 and [[white]] (x') =1.
In other words, green and white can be truly predicated of an individual if and
only if that individual consists of a green. part and a white part and nothing else.
Having thus illustrated the use of a non-Boolean object-language and, let me
show how it can be applied to the understanding of the meta-language "and" in
the lexical entry of most. It can be used to avoid the problem with Most
scientists are unmarried that arose in the context of talking about people in my
former highschool-class. Basically, I want an interpretation based on the use of
11~" to replace the intersection of predicates at least in some cases. Of course, the
questions in which cases this non-Boolean interpretation of "and" applies and
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why the distribution of the two versions of "and" is as it is should be raised at
some point.27
In order to avoid the problem with (56), I want to give the bold-face printed
"and" in the lexical entry for most above a meaning that is not strictly intersective.
I.e., the lexical entry has to be rewritten:
(60) [TO BE REVISED]
[most]] = f: D<et> --7 D<et, <et, t»
Foi any k, h, j E D<et>, f (k) (h) (j) = 1
iff for most maximal Xst E De,
such that there is an X'st E De and an X"st E De,
such that Xst = X'st E9 X"st
and k ( X'st ) = 1
and h (x"st) = 1,
j(xst) = 1.
4. Discontinuous stages. Note that the construction of sums by "61 ft will lead in
many cases to discontinuous stages. Although this may appear strange, it is not
an unwanted consequence. Thus, I claim that quantification can be over
discontinuous entities. The. part of the lexical entry though makes sure that these
discontinuous cannot "spread over more than one individual", where "individual"
is to be understood in the traditional sense. - With this lexical entry for most, we
get the following interpretation for Most scientists are unmarried:
(56) c. [NOT YET THE INTERPRETATION WE WANT, TO BE REVISED]
[MOSTx-st C[in my class] [scientist] [unmarried] ] =1
iff for most maximal Xst E De,
such that there is an X'st E De and an X"st E De,
such that Xst = X'st (j7 X"st and
[in my class] (x'st) = 1 and
[scientist] (x1lst) = 1,
ITunmarried] (xst) = 1.
27 One may have to discuss the question of whether the sum operation really captures the
full meaning of the non-Boolean "and". Certain examples suggest that we don't really need
the sum operation but something weaker like liZ has a part x such that P and z has a part y
such that Q" leaving the possibility of x Ee y being not the whole z but only part of it. This
was pointed out to me by a member of the audience when I presented this material in
Tilbingen. If this is so, then we are not forced to introduce non-continuant stages. - Note
that there are interesting restrictions on whether constructions as the one in (a) get a non-
Boolean interpretation. I.e., # Theflag is green and tom when the flag is partly blue and
partly untorn. Also # The flag is tom and repaired (examples due to David Pesetsky).
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x-st
in-my-class (x'-st)
(61)-~
scientist (xlt-st)
~
5. Inclusion of the stage that makes· the nuclear scope true in the stage introduced
by the restrictive material. It seems that the revision of the lexical entry solved
the problem with this example. But the revision is not yet good enough. Note
thatj(xstJ can only be true if Xst is j during all the time covered by Xst. Since we
want to be able to ascribe short term properties to individuals - as in (62):
(62) Most scientists sneezed at the meeting.
x-st
in-my-class (xf-st)
(63)----]~~~~----i~~~r--.
the meeting
we have to revise the lexical entry again:28
28 It would be interesting to compare this lexical entry with von Fintel's (1994) entry for
adverbs of quantification.
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(64) [most] =f: D<et> --7 D<et, <et, t»
For any k, h, j 'E D<et>, f (k) (h) G) = 1
iff for most maximal Xst E De,
such that there is an X'st E De and an X"st E De,
such that Xst = X'st e> X"st
and k ( X'st ) = 1
and h (x"st) = 1,
there is a Yst E De,
such that Yst is part of Xst E De
andj(Yst) = 1.29
With this revision, we can now interpret the sentence Most scientists sneezed at
the meeting, uttered in the same context as Most scientist are unmarried above,
as follows:
(65) a.
b.
c.
Most scientists sneezed at the meeting.
MOSTx-st C[in my class] [scientist] [sneezed-at-the-meeting]
·[MOSTx-st C[in my class] [scientist] [sneezed-at-the-meeting] ]] = 1
iff for most maximal Xst E De,
such that there is an X'st E De and an X"st E De,
such that Xst = X'st E9 X"st and
[in my class] (x'st) = 1 and
[scientist] (x"st) = 1,
there is a Yst E De,
such that Yst is part of Xst E De
and [[sneezed-at-the-meeting] (Yst) = 1.
To conclude, note that as the element introducing a stage, the restrictor of a
determiner plays a special role for the determination of the stage. In particular, it
determines the temporal extendedness of the stage, i.e., the length of the time
interval the stage covers. The predication time(s) supplied by the resource
domain variable and the noun provide the maximal temporal extension of the
stage introduced by the restrictive noun phrase. This has the following
consequences: Since the noun of restrictive noun phrases is part of the
determiner's restrictive clause, restrictive noun phrases provide predication times
via the noun AND via modifications of the resource domain variable. The noun
of unrestrictive noun phrases is not part of the determiner's restrictive clause.
29 Irene Heim points out that an alternative to introducing the part y-st with the nuclear
scope would be to repeat the restriction as part of the nuclear scope, so that the
interpretation follows the schema [[Most As are B]] = 1 iff most As are A and B. This
would amount to stating for the nuclear scope that x-stage equals the sum of three stages,
x'-st and x"-st as before, and in addition Xlll~st where j(x"'-st) =1.
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. Thus, only the predication time supplied by the resource domain variable provi~e
the maximal temporal extension of the stage introduced by the unrestrictive noun
phrase.
4.3. Temporally dependent and temporally independent noun phrase
interpretations
4.3.1. Temporal restrictions and temporal adverbials modify resource
domain variables
In Chapter II, I adopted a temporal framework that is based on the assumption
that all clauses contain a (possibly implicit) adverb of quantification that
quantifies over times (TAQ). It takes tense, overt temporal adverbials (TAs), and
implicit temporal restrictions (C) as restrictive material. Thus, LFs are of the
general form (66).
(66) TAQ [}(cTENSE & TA &'C] INs ... ]
In this subsection, I want to argue that definite temporal adverbials and implicit
temporal restrictions are able to modify the resource domain variables of
quantificational noun phrases. The resulting temporal modifications of the
resource domain variable can extend the stages over which a quantifier quantifies
and ultimately explain the occurrence and distribution of temporally independent
noun phrase interpretations.
Suppose we talk about present professors. In that context, (67a) may have
an LF basically like (67b), where I simplify the temporal interpretation for a
moment:
(67) a.
b.
Most present professors were young in the forties.
MOSTx-st en [present professor] [young-in-the-forties]
Intuitively, we want to be able to use the sentence to say something about
(
individuals who are now professors but were possibly not professors in the forties
- specifically, we want to be able to say about those i~dividuals whether most of
them were young in the forties.
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present professor!
(68)--
time of utterance
But with the semantics we have at this point, the LF in (67b) is true if and only if
for most maximal Xst such that there is an X'st E De and an X"st E De, such that Xst
= X'st <11 X"st and [C] (x'st) =1 and [[present professor] (x"st) =1, there is a Yst
E De, such that Yst is part of·xst and [[young in the forties]] (Yst) =1. Thus, the
sentence can only be true for a particular Xst if the Xst contains a part that is
located in the forties (and was young then). For professor 1 in (68), this is
guaranteed by the fact that his or her time of being a professor reaches into the
forties. But since, for professor 2, the time of being a professor does not reach
into the forties, for him or her this can only be provided by an appropriate value
for the resource domain variable - a value that reaches into the forties. If Xst under
a particular variable assignment was not yet a professor in the forties, then Xst
would be unable to satisfy the restriction of the quantifier if the resource domain
variable didn't provide an appropriate stage. Since (67a) can clearly be
understood as a statement about present professors regardless of whether they
were professors in the forties, we must find a way of providing systematically
stages that are big enough to make such an interpretation possible.
My claim is that we can get the desired interpretation when definite temporal
adverbials and temporal restrictions modify the resource domain variable of most.
There is a simple and straightforward way how to motivate the claim that these
items are able to modify the resource domain variable:
Because of their definite nature and their givenness in the context, definite
temporal adverbials and implicit temporal restrictions are topical elements and
provide topic times for the interpretation of their clause. These topic times are,
because of their topical nature, able to modify the resource domain. Since von
Fintel (1994) argues anyway that topics can modify resource domains in the
context, this is a well-motivated assumption.3D Thus, exploiting at this point again
a more detailed representation of the temporal semantics of main predicates of
clauses, we get an LF-representation like (69).
30 The term Iltopic time" is in fact used by Wolfgang Klein (1991).
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(69) At (3 [RC At* (in the forties (t*)) & At* (PAST (t)(t*))]
[NS At* (MOST C[in the forties] [RC present professor (xst)]
[NS young (t*) (xst)])])
Once the definite temporal adverbial modifies the resource domain variable
modifier of the determiner-quantifier, we have to make sure that it is able to
modify the resource domain in such a way that the stages quantified over are
temporally extended. I will assume here that the value indicated as "in the forties"
in (69) is a predicate of type <e, t>. Thus, it can apply to individuals or stages of
individuals. In particular, I will assume the following definition:
(70) [in the forties n= f: De --7 Dt
For any Xst E De, f (xst) = 1
iff for all stages Ysh such that Yst is a part of Xsh
Yst is located in the forties.
With the LF (69), the definition in (70), our present semantics, and (for ease of
presentation) omitting details of temporal interpretation, (67a) is predicted to be
true if and only if: for most maximal XSh such that Xst consists of a part X'st that is
now a professor and a part X"st such that X"st is located in the forties, Xst has a part
Yst such that Yst is young in the forties.
Thus, the modification of C by "in the forties II leads to a temporal extension of
Xst, so that it includes the forties, even if the stage Xst was then not a professor.
4.3.2. The difference between restrictive (presuppositional) noun phrases and
unrestrictive (cardinal) noun phrases
We are now in a position to explain why restrictive noun phrases can have
temporally independent interpretations whereas unrestrictive noun phrases (with
the exception of subjec~s of existence-independent predicates) can't. In fact, this
distribution of temporally dependent and temporally independent interpretations
t·
is exactly what is predicted by the semantics I developed in this chapter.
The crucial point is that I argued that determiners of both cardinal
(unrestrictive) and presuppositional (restrictive) noun phrases are restrictive, but
that the two types of noun phrases differ insofar as the noun of cardinal noun
phrases is mapped into the nuclear scope of the determiner, whereas the noun of
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the presuppositional noun phrase is mapped into the restrictive clause of the
determiner. Suppose that cardinal and presuppositional noun phrases get
analogous interpretations, as I proposed above. Roughly speaking, I argued that
presuppositional quantificational structures are interpreted as follows: The clause
is judged true if and only if the stage introduced by the restrictor is such that the .
predicate in the nuclear scope applied to a part of this stage is true. I claim that
the same holds for cardinal quantificational structures. I also claim that the
resource domain variables of both cardinal and presuppositional noun phrases
can be modified by definite temporal adverbials. The crucial difference arises only
because of the noun's role at LF: when it is part of the restrictive clause, the
restrictor as awhole introduces a stage that is - because of the non-Boolean
"and" - built up out of parts for~which the resource domain holds and parts for
which the noun holds. But when the noun is part of the nuclear scope, the
restrictor introduces a stage that is only introduced by the resource domain
variable.
In order to see how this leads to the difference with respect to temporal
interpretation, compare (71) and (72). The truth conditions are here for ease of
presentation slightly simplified. As proposed above, restrictor internal
combinations of predicates are interpreted by use of the non-Boolean IIand" ,
whereas nuclear scope internal combinations of predicates are intersectively
interpreted.
(71) a.
b.
c.
(72) a.
b.
c.
Most students were sick.
MOSTX-st C [student] [sick]
For most maximal stages Xst
such that ::Jysh Zst such that Xst = Yst 6' Zsb
and [[C]] (Yst) = 1 and [[student] (zst) =1,
Xst has a part vsh .
such that [sick]] (vst) =1.
There were few students sick.
FEWX-st C [student & sick]
For few maximal stages X5t
such that [C]] (xst) =1 ,
Xst has a part v5t
such that [[student]] (vst) =1 and [[sick]] (vst) =1.
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Suppose now that the resource domain for both sentences is provided by a silent
temporal r.estriction to 1993. Then we get truth conditions (71d) and (72d) with
the pictures (71e) and (72e), respe.ctively.31
(71) d. For most stages Xst
such that 3ysh Zst such that Xst = Yst ~ Zsh
and Yst is located within 1993,
and [[student]] (Zst) = 1,
Xst has a part vsh
such that [sick] (vst) =1.
x-st
1993 (y-st) student (z-st)
(71e) --ll~:~;~~·~~f~:~~~;;.:~~~.;~~;~~;~~:~;~;~';'~~~~~{~:;~~~;'''''-::1 ----~I:~~·~~::.~;~~·:;:~~~~;~,:::;;:::~~:::;~·.·~,~~~~·:::t-----".IIIIP
sick (v-st)
(72) d. For few stages Xst
such that Xst is located within 1993,
Xst has a part vst
such that [student] (vst) = 1 and [[sick] (vst) = 1.
student (v-st) & sick (v-st)
1993 (x-st)
As a consequence, the predication time of the predicate !;student must intersect
with the time interval of 1993 in (72), but need not intersect with it in (71). Thus,
the restrictive noun phrase can have a temporally independent interpretation,
whereas the unrestrictive noun phrase can only have a temporally dependent
interpretation because of the intersective interpretation in the nuclear s~ope.
31 The vertical dotted line in the picture is supposed to indicate the range of possible
locations of Vst within the stage Xst,
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Appendix to Section 4.3.: Modifications of resource domain variables by
temporal adverbials are.mediated by the context: scope interactions of
temporal adverbials and DPs
Introductory remarks. I assumed in Section 4.3.1. that by modifying resource
domain variables, temporal adverbials can extend the stages the noun phrases
quantify over and lead, in the case of restrictive noun phrases, to temporally
independent noun phrase interpretations. I have not yet presented arguments
that make clear what the status of this interaction is. So far, I have just assumed
that the interaction is not due to a direct effect but mediated by the context.
Note that there are cases of quantifiers where resource domain variables have
arguably a more complex structure and involve binding as von Fintel (1994, 31)
shows: In Only one class was so bad that no student passed the exam, the
resource domain variable is in fact a variable complex j2(vl). The Vj is bound by
the higher quantifier only one class.32 But the functionf2 remains free. Hence
the context must supply a value for this function variable. It supplies a value
such that 12 is a function that takes classes as its argument and yields the
students in that class.
(73) [only one class]} was so bad that [nof2Cv}) student13 passed the exam.
Of course, since a relation of binding is involved, the modification of the resource
domain variable must here be part of the semantic representation. That is, as far as
binding is involved, the value assignment of the resource domain variable cannot
be only due to requirements on the discourse context, and the context cannot
supply the value. It is conceivable that an analogous mechanism might be at
work when temporal adverbials modify resource domain variables of determiner-
quantifiers.
In this appendix, I will present a strong argument that shows that an
approach with binding into the resource domain variable cannot be exploited for
the modification by temporal adverbials. I will conclude that the view that the
modification is mediated by the context is inevitable.
The argument explores how scope interactions of temporal adverbials and
quantificational noun phrases correlate with the possibility of temporally
independent noun phrase interpretations. The idea is basically to force the
32 The original source of the example is Heim (1991).
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temporal adverbial into an LF-position where it must have narrower scope than a
certain quantificational noun phrase; this can be achieved by placing a pronoun
into the temporal adverbial that must be bound by the quantificational noun
phrase. We will see then that the binding noun phrase is perfectly able to exhibit
a temporally independent interpretation. According to standard assumptions, the
,temporal adverbial can not be in an LF-position where it c-commands the
temporally independent noun phrase. Thus, the occurrence of the temporally
independent reading cannot hinge on the ability of the temporal adverbial to c-
command the noun phrase at LF. I conclude from this that in my proposal, the
apparent modifying effect temporal adverbials have on noun phrases - or, to be
precise, on their resource domain variables - cannot be a direct one, but must be
mediated by the context. Since the modification of resource domains is often
mediated by the context, this is not a very surprising result.
What functionally interpreted temporal adverbials and temporally
independent noun phrases reveal about the role of the context. There are some
interactions of temporal and noun phrase interpretation where scope is crucial:
FUNCTIONALLY INTERPRETED TEMPORAL ADVERBIALS contain a bound
variable pronoun. Consequently, at LF the adverbial will be required to have
narrower scope than the item which binds the variable.33
Functional readings can occur with explicit temporal adverbials as well as
with implicit temporal restrictions (indicated as C); (74) illustrates the former case,
(75) the latter. In both examples, the values of the temporal adverbial or the
restriction can vary with the choice of managers. This type of reading arises
when the subjeGt noun phrase binds a variabie that is contained in the temporal
adverbial or restriction as demonstrated.
(74) Viele Manager spielten in ihrem Studium FuBball.
many managers played in their studies soccer
('Many Managers played soccer when they studied.)
= [Viele ManagerJi spielten in ihremi Studium FuBball.
(75) [Most managers were more adventurous when they studied than today...]
... Viele Manager spielten C FuBball.
many managers played soccer
= [Viele ManagerJi spielten (in ihremi Studium) FuBball.
33 Functional readings of temporal adverbials have frequently been observed in the
literature. See for instance Vlach (1993).
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Thus, (74) and (75) show that sentences can have LFs with quantificational
noun phrases that have wider scope than definite temporal adverbials.34
Moreover, (74) and (75) show that functionally interpreted temporal
adverbials are able to modify the resource domain variable of the quantificational
34 Note that if we assume that definite temporal adverbials are adjoined to TP, then it
follows that quantificational NPs are at LF in a position at least as high as adjoined to TP.
This view is compatible with assuming adjunction of QRed DPs to TP, AGRsP, ·or CPt
Thus, LFs can exploit a hierarchy as shown in structure (A). However structures like (B)
are also possible.
(A) {CP, AGRsP, TP}
QRedDP
TP
temporal TP
adverbial
(B)
temporal ~
adverbial QRed DP
Narrow scope as in (B) can be demonstrated with readings of quantificational temporal
adverbials where they have narrower scope than a quantificational noun phrase, as reading
(Cb) of (Ca). However, at least with quantificational temporal frame adverbials it is also
possible for temporal adverbials to have wider scope than quantificational noun phrases, as
shown with reading (Cc) of (Ca). With this reading, the busdrivers vary with the weeks.
C.
b.
a.(C) [Injeder Woche im Marz] haIfen [mindestens zwei Busfahrer]
in every week in March helped at least two busdrivers
einem Fahrgast mit schweren Taschen.
a passenger with heavy bags
('Every week in March, at least two busdrivers helped "a passenger
with heavy bags. l )
possible reading: There are at least two busdrivers x such that for every t
such that t is a week in in March, x helped a passenger with heavy bags at t.
possible reading: For every t such that t is a week in March, there are at least
two busdrivers x, such that x helped a passenger with heavy bags at t.
In German, the wide scope reading of temporal adverbials is possible with various surface
orderings of the noun phrase and the temporal adverbial (as is narrow scope reading):
(0) a.
b.
c.
[Mindestens zwei Busfahrer] halfen [in jeder Woche im Man] einem
Fahrgast mit schweren Taschen.
weil [mindestens zwei Busfahrer] [injeder Woche im Man] einem Fahrgast
mit schweren Taschen halfen
weil [in jeder Woche im Marz] [mindestens zwei Busfahrer] einem Fahrgast
mit schweren Taschen haIfen
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noun phrase which binds their variable. Within the framework I have developed
in this chapter, this can be concluded from the fact that the quantificational noun
phrases in (74) and (75) exploit temporally independent readings: the managers
mentioned in (74) and (75) became managers only after they were students.
Thus, their time of being managers and their relevant times of playing soccer don't
coincide. I.e., the noun phrase is temporally independently interpreted..
Note that if the modification of resource domain variables by definite
temporal adverbials were achieved by binding, we ~ould have reached a scope
paradox at this point: the definite temporal adverbial would be required to be at
LF both lower than the quantificational noun phrase (in order to have the
variable contained in it properly bound by the noun phrase) and higher than the
noun phrase (in order to be able to bind into the resource domain variable
complex). Thus, (74) and (75) show that temporal adverbials do not modify
resource domain variables directly but via the context.
The interpretation of functional temporal adverbials. Now ~ want to present
an LF and calculations of truth conditions for an example sentence in order to
show how functional temporal adverbials can be interpreted. For this purpose, I
won't exploit rpy stage-semantics and pretend that quantification is over whole
individuals. After carrying out the calculations, I will present the truth conditions
of the example under the assunlption of the stage-semantics.
I take the possessive pronoun to be composed of two elements. One is a
genitive/possessive element that denotes a function from individuals into
functions from properties of individuals into individuals. The other is an
individual denoting variable 3.PL. Here are lexical entries for GENIPOSS and in.
(76) [GENIPOSS] C = f: De --7 D«e, t>, e> such that,
for any x E De, h E D<e, t>,
f (x) (h) =the unique y E De, such that h (y) = 1 and y stands in the
contextually relevant relation of "belonging to" to x.
If there is no unique y of that kind, then the denotation of
GENIPOSS is undefined.
(J7) [in] C = f: De --7 D<i, t> such that, for any x E De, t* E Di, f (x) (t*) =1
iff t* is located within the time (of existence) of x.
I will now go into the calculation of the truth conditions of a version of sentence
(74), namely the verb-final version (78).
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(78) [viele Manager] 1 [in ihreml Siudium] FuBball spielten
many managers in their studies soccer played
('Many managers played soccer while they studied.')
As I mentioned above, I will ignore for now my stage-semantics. Note, however,
that it would be simple to implement the stage-semantics in order to obtain the
temporally independent reading in the way proposed in this chapter. For that
purpose, we would use something like "period of studying" as the value of the
resource domain variable of viele (tmany'). Similarly to in the forties in Section
4.3.2., this predicate would be interpreted as shown in (79).
(/9) [period of studying ]] C = f: De~ Dt such that,
for any Xst E De, f (Xst) =1
iff for all stages Yst such that Yst is a part of Xst,
Yst is located within a period of studying of Xst.
The LF-representation of (78) follows in (80).
(80)
<it>
AtTP
t
<it>
At*TENSE
t
r-----
<it> i
r---- t*
<i <it» i
PAST t
~
..~
l
«et> t>
. DP
viele
Manager
<e <it»p
in
e
DP
~
<<e, t>, e> <e, t>
DET NP
ihrem1 Studium
~
3 PL 1 <e «et> e»
· GENIPOSS
<et>
1, TP
t
<it <it, t»
QAP
3
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~
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t
~
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Below is the calculation of truth conditions of the sentence under the assumption
of an LF as shown above and the framework of temporal interpretation presented
in Chapter II. I am disregarding my stage-semantics at this point. The time of
utterance of the sentence is indicated as tu.
(81)
[viele Manager1 in ihreml Studium 3 t1 FuBbal1 spielten ]] c, g (tu) = 1
iff [by entry of translations and Tripartite Structure Construction]
[At [viele Manager 1(3[At* (in ihreml Studium (t*)) & At* (PAST (t)(t*)]
[At* (FuBball-spielen (t*)(tl))])] ]]c, g (tu) = 1
iff [by A-Conversion]
[viele Manager 1(3[At* (in ihreml Studium (t*)) & At* (PAST (t)(t*)]
[At* (FuBball-spielen (t*)(tl))]) ]]c, g [t-7tu] =1
iff [by 2x Functional Application, lexical entries of viele and Manager]
for many x such that x is a manager, [[ 1(3[At* (in ihreml Studium (t*)) &
At* (PAST (t)(t*)] [At* (FuBball-spielen (t*)(tl))]) ]]c, g [t-7tu] (x) =1
iff [by Predicate Abstraction]
for many x such that x is a manager, [[ 3 [At* (in ihreml Studium (t*)) &
[t -7 tU]
At* (PAST (t)(t*)] [At* (FuBball-spielen (t*)(tl))] ]]c, g 1-7X = 1
iff [by lexical entry of 3.l
for many x such that x is a manager, there is a time t* such that
[t -7 tU]
[At* (in ihreml Studium (t*)) & At* (PAST (t)(t*) ]]c, g 1-7X (t*) = 1 and
. [t -7 tU]
[ At* (FuBball-spielen (t*)(tl)) ]] c, g 1-7 X (t*) =1
iff [by Predicate" Modification applied to the restrictive clause]
for many x such that x is a manager, there is a time t* such that
[t -7 tU]
[At* (inihreml Studium(t*))]]c,g 1-7X (t*) = 1 and
[t -7 tU]
[At* (PAST (t)(t*) TIc, g 1-7X (t*) = 1 and
[t -7 tU]
[ At* (FuBball-spielen (t*)(t})) ]] c, g 1-7 X (t*) = 1
iff [by A-Conversion]
for many x such that x is a ma[n:;:th]ere is a time t* such that
[in ihreml Studium (t*)]]c, g t* -7 t* =1 and
[ ~~~ ][PAST(t)(t*)]]C, g t* -7 t* = 1 and
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. [ t --7 tu ]1 --7 x
[IfuBball-spielen(t*)(q)]] c. g t* ~ t* =1
iff [by 3x Functional Application, unessential variable assignments left out]
for many x such that x is a manager, the[re/:~uti]me t* such that
1--7X
[in ]]c( [GENIPOSS ]C( [3.PLl]] c, g t* ~ t* ) ([Studium ] C))
[
t -7 tu ]
1--7X
( [t*]] c, g t* ~ t* ) =1 and
[
t --7 tu ]
1 --7 x
[PAST (t)(t*) ]]c. g t* ~ t* = 1 and
[
t --7 tu ]
1--7X
[ FuBball-spielen (t*)(tI) ]] c. g t* ~ t* =1
iff [by lexical·entries of the remaining elements, variable assigment applied to t, 1,
and t*]
for many x such that x is a manager, there is a time t* such that
t* is a subinterval of the unique study of x, and
t* < tu, and
x plays soccer at t* .
Let me now add a more precise definition of the truth condition of the sentence,
i.e. a definition of its truth conditions as gained using my stage-semantics.
(82) [viele Manager! in ihreml Studium 3 t1 FuBball spielten ]] c, g (tu) =1
iff for many maximal stages Xst
such that 3ysf, Zst such that Xst = Yst (f) Zsh
and for all stages Wst such that Wst is a part of Yst,
Wst is located within a period of studying of
Yst·
and Zst is a manager,
Xst has a part Vsh such that
there is a time t* such that
t* is a subinterval of the unique study of Xsh and
t* < tu, and
vst plays soccer at t* .
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5. Unrestrictive noun phrases that get temporally independent
interpretations: an explanation under the stage-approach
I showed above that certain unrestrictive noun phrases can get temporally
independent interpretations, namely subjects of existence-independent
predicates. I will show here that the effects are not a problem under my account,
but are in fact predicted by the stage-semantics I suggested in this chapter in
combination with my account of life-time effects in Chapter II.
Recall from Chapter II that I distinguished stage-level predicates and
individual-level predicates on the one hand from existence-independent
p~edicates on the other hand. The crucial difference between the predicates is
that stage-level predicates (e.g. available or sick) and individual-level predicates
(e.g. altruistic or intelligent) impose life-time presuppositions on their subjects,
but existence-independent predicates (e.g. famous or forgotten) don't.
Thus, Frege is intelligent is inappropriate for reasons of presupposition
failure: we can't predicate irltelligent of Frege, because predicating intelligent of
an individual presupposes that the individual is alive - and Frege is dead.
Similarly, Frege is sick is inappropriate because Frege is dead and thus, the life-
time presupposition of sick is not fulfilled.
But Frege is falnous does not suffer from presupposition failure and is thus
appropriate. Moreover, the sentence is judged true at present, because Frege is
presently famous. Since falnous can be predicated of people when they are dead,
one can see thatfamous does not impose a life-time presupposition on its subject.
For Frege is famous, the present tense of the clause locates the being famous at
the time of utterance. The predicate famous denotes a relation between the
individual Frege and some temporal (and perhaps spatial) location. This relation
is independent of Frege's life-time, so that we can use the sentence appropriately
and truthfully to describe a situation like (83).
(83)
Frege's life-time Frege's being famous
I:;~!=~!i~~!~;~
Having established this point with the proper name Frege and the individual
Frege in his whole temporal extendedness, I want to show now that it makes
sense to predict an analogous effect with stages that are introduced by
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quantificational noun phrases. The analogous effect we expect with stages and
quantificational noun phrases is that quantificational subject noun phrases of
existence-independent. predicates should always be able to be temporally
independent, even when being unrestrictive.
For quantificational noun phrases, one would expect that one should be able
to predicate famous of a stage introduced by the subject noun phrase no matter
whether the stage exists at the time when famous is asserted to hold of the stage -
just .as one can predicate famous of Frege at the present time, although Frege
do.esn't exist anymore.
Consequently, one should be able to utter Many STUDENTS are famous
(where stress on the noun triggers the unrestrictive interpretation) in order to
describe the situation in (84).
student (x-st)
(84)
It should not matter whether the noun phrase many stlldents is unrestrictive or
restrictive. Thus, existence-independent predicates like famous should be able to
be predicated of student-stages during non-student-times in constructions where
the noun phrase is weak. This prediction is borne out with examples like (12b),
repeated here as (85).
(85) Es sind heutzutage lauter Studenten beriihmt.
it are today many students famous
('Today, many students are famous.')
Thus, the data that seemed surprising above can be easily explained and provide
in fact additional evidence for the stage-approach, becau~e the stage-approach
predicts the phenomenon.
To summarize, the stage-account predicts that any noun phrase argument
with respect to which the main predicate is existence-independent should not get
an obligatorily temporally dependent interpretation - not even when the noun
phrase is unrestrictive. This is, because the stage introduced by such a noun
phrase argument is not bound to the event time of the main predicate, since the
main predicate does not impose life-time presuppositions on the argument.
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6. Constructions with adverbs of quantification
A construction that turned out to be a problem for the scope-approach was the
construction in (24a), repeated here as (86a). The observation that remained
unexplaine.d under the scope-approach was that (86a) can have a reading
roughly like (86b). With this reading, aIle Professoren gets a temporally
independent interpretation. This was problematic for the scope-approach,
because the scope configuration indicated in (86b) is such that, under the scope-
approach, one would expect the noun phrase to be obligatorily temporally
dependent.
(86) a.
b.
In den sechziger Jahren spielten meistens aIle Professoren, deren
in the sixties .. played mostly all professors whose
Eltern gerade in Urlaub waren, Federball.
parents just in vacation were badminton
('In the forties, most often all professors whose parents were just
then on vacation, played badminton. l )
For most times t, such that t is in the past and in the sixties, all x such
that x is now a professor ·and x's parents were on vacation at t, x
played badminton at t.
Under the stage-approach, (86) is not problematic. In fact, the stage-approach
predicts that the noun phrase aIle Professoren should be able to be temporally
independent. According my proposal, the temporal adverbial in den sechziger .
Jahren is able to modify the resource domain variable of aIle Professoren. Thus,
(83a) is predicted to be able to have the truth conditions in (86c).
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For most times t, such that t is in the past and in the sixties,
all maximal stages Xst
such that 3Ysb Zst such that Xst = Yst ffi ZSh
and Yst has a part that is located within the sixties
and a part that is now a professor
and a part at which YstlS parents were on
vacation,35
and [[professor]] (zst) = 1,
Xst has a part vs1,
such that [[play badminton] (VSh t) =1.
Thus, the approach can easily explain the occurrence of temporally independent
readings of restrictive noun phrases regardless of their position at LF.
Noanima1s
wereharmrlinthewritingofthis tlrsis.
7. Generic noun phrases
In this section, I want to come back to an observation made in connection with
(4a), repeated here as (87). The underlined noun phrase in (87), read generically,
is obligatorily temporally dependent.
(87) In the forties, professors were young.
Given that generic noun phrases are standardly considered to be a special case of
restrictive noun phrases (cf. Diesing (1992) and others), this is surprising.
Generally speaking, it seems that generic noun phrases are particularly
strongly affected by temporal adverbials. Whereas determiner-quantified noun
phrases can easily have a temporally independent reading when they occur to the
35 Note that Yst is itself here a complex, discontinuous stage. This is, because the resource
domain variable in this example is crucially modified by three predicates. One is caused by
our talking about present professors, another comes into play by the time interval provided
by the temporal adverbial, and the third is provided by the relative clause. Note also that the
interpretation of the relative clause makes it crucially necessary to interpret relative clause
and noun non-intersectively.
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right of a temporal adverbial, generic noun phrases in this position cannot get a
temporally independent reading at all with most speak.ers.. This is illustrated by
the contrast between the generic bare plural in (88a) and the universally
quantified DP in (88b). The latter can ea5ily get a temporaJly free reading.
(88) a.
b.
In den vierziger Jahren waren Professoren ja doch jung.
(weil) in den vierziger Jahren Professoren ja doch jung waren.
('In the forties, professors were young.')
possible reading: "For typical professor of the forties, they were
young in the forties. 11
impossible reading: "For typical present professors, they were
young in the forties"
In den vierziger Jahren waren aIle Professoren ja doch jung.
(weil) in den vierziger Jahrenja doch aIle Professorenjung waren.
('In the forties, all professors were young.')
possible reading: "For all x, such that x is now a professor, x was
young in the forties.
Note, though, that generic bare plurals do not always get temporally dependent
readings. This js demonstrated with (89a), whose possible readings (89c) shows
that generic bare plurals can get temporally independent readings.
(89) a.
b.
c.
Professors were young (once too).
possible reading: All typical past-professors were young.
possible reading: All typical now-professors had a time in the past
where they were young.
Note that (89c) is only one of several examples of temporally independent
interpretations of (89a). (89a) does not contain a temporal adverbial. Thus, (89)
may suggest at first sight that it is the presence of the temporal adverbial in (88a)
that leads to the obligatorily temporally dependent interpretation of the noun
phrase.
But a closer look shows that generic bare plurals do not always get
temporally dependent readings when a temporal adverbial is present. Thus, in
(90a), where the temporal adverbial occurs to the right of the generic noun
phrase, the noun phrase can have a temporally independent reading.
(90) a.
b.
c.
Professors were young in the forties.
possible reading: All typical professors of the forties were young in
the forties.
possible reading: All typical now-professors were young in the
forties.
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Furthermore, as Kai von Fintel has pointed out to me, when narrow scope of the
temporal adverbial is forced by a bound variable pronoun inside the adverbial
that must be bound by the generic noun phrase, it is very easy to get a free
reading, even if the tempor(,ll adverbial appears in the same position as in (88a):
(91) In ihreri Jugend sind/waren Politikeri meistens schiichtern.
in their youth are/were politicians mostly shy
('In their youth, politicians are/were mostly shy.')
To summarize, the crucial observation is that the position of the temporal
adverbial, and specifically - as (91) suggests - its position at LF, determines
whether a generic noun phrase gets a temporally dependent or temporally
independent interpretation.
I will assume in what follows that the topicalized surface position of a
temporal adverbial strongly suggests that the temporal adverbial is mapped at LF
into a position where it obligatorily determines the temporal interpretation of a
generic noun phrase. This effect can be overcome if the presence of a variable -
as in (91) - requires reconstruction of the" temporal adverbial into a lower position.
In (91), the bound variable pronoun requires the temporal adverbial to be
reconstructed into a position that is lower than the generically interpreted noun
phrase Politiker ('politicians'). But when the temporal adverbial appears in
another, lower, position at surface structure, it is preferredly mapped into a
position at LF where it does not determine the temporal interpretation of the
generic noun phrase obligatorily.
In recent approaches to genericity, it is commonly assumed that generic
readings are caused by an implicit generic quantifier. This has been argued for
and pursued, used, or presupposed by Wilkinson (1991), Krifka (1987), Carlson
(1988, 1989), Kratzer (1988), Diesing (1990, 1992) and others. As far as the type
of quantifier involved is concerned, the common assumption is that the generic
quantifier is a kind of non-overt adverb of quantification with a meaning like
"mostly" or "usually". I will adopt this general approach to genericity. Moreover,
I will assume with von Fintel (1994) that adverbs of quantification quantify over
situations.
Note that temporal adverbials can plausibly be viewed as suitable predicates
of situations. When predicated of a situation, they locate the situation temporally.
As a consequence, temporal adverbials are able to function as restrictors in the
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restrictive clause of a generic quantifier. Thus, omitting again details of temporal.
interpretation of the main predicate as well as a detailed account of quantificatio·n
over situations36, (88a), repeated here as (92a), can have an LF roughly like (92b).
It cannot have an interpretation like (92c), though.
(92) a. In the forties, professors were young.
b. GENs [RC professor (s) & in the forties (s)] [NS were young (8)]
c. *. GENs [RC professor (s)] ~s were young in the forties (s)]
(93a) on the other hand, can exhibit both reading (93b) and reading (93c).
(93) a.
b.
c.
Professors were young in the forties. .
GENs [RC professor (8) & in the forties (8)] ·~S were young (s)]
GENs [RC professor (s)] ~s were young in the forties (s)]
Given the approach to genericity I sketched above, I want to show in the
remainder of this section that the strong tendency of topicalized temporal
adverbials to determine the temporal interpretation of generic noun phrases is not
at all surprising: it comes out as a special case of the generally acknowledged
mapping behavior of temporal adverbials.
It has been noted repeatedly that when-clause constructions exhibit two
. different readings when the when-clause is in a sentence-final position, but not
when it is in sentence-initial position (Roath (1985), Johnston (1994, 17f)).
Consider (94) and (95). In (94), the when-clause is in sentence-final position.
(94a) can have the two readings (94b) and (94c). As observed by Roath, each
of these readings is strongly supported by a certain focus structure as indicated in
the schematic LF-representations below.37
(94) a.
b.
c.
Marcia always writes a letter when she is at the cafe.
ALWAYSs [she is at the cafe (s)] [Marcia writes a LETTER (8)]
For all situations where Marcia writes a letter, she is at the cafe.
ALWAYSs [Marcia writes a letter (s)] [she is at the CAFE (s)]
For all situations where she is at the cafe, Marcia writes a letter.
In contrast to (94a), (9Sa) exhibits only the reading corresponding to (94b), but
not the reading corresponding to (94c).
36 For a detailed proposal, see von Fintel (1994).
37 The sentences aretaken from Johnston (1994, 17f).
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(95) a. When she is at the cafe, Marcia always writes a letter.
b. ALWAYSs [she is at the cafe (8)] [Marcia writes a LETTER(s)]
For all situations where Marcia writes a letter, she is at the cafe.
c. * ALWAYSs [Marcia writes a letter (s)] [she is at the CAFE (s)]
For all situations where she is at the cafe, Marcia writes a letter.
Thus, the sentence-final when-clause in (94a) can be mapped into the nuclear
scope of the adverb of quantification always, while the sentence-initial when-
clause in (95a) can't. It can only be mapped into the restrictive clause of always.
Johnston (1994, 48-55) argues that the lack of the (c)-reading with sentence-
initial when-clauses can be explained as a consequence of the application of
Diesing's (1992) mapping procedure to when-clauses: Diesing argued for
indefinite noun phrases that they are mapped into the restrictive clause of an
adverb of quantification when part of the IP-structure, and into the nuclear scope
when part of the VP. Johnston applies this to temporal adverbials in general, and
to when-clauses in particular. Specifically, he argues that when·-clauses in
sentence-final position can be either IP-adjuncts or VP-adjuncts and can thus be
mapped into the restrictive clause or the nuclear scope of the adverb of
quantification, respectively. But when-clauses in sentence-in~tial position can
only be IP-adjuncts and are thus mapped into the restrictive clause.
So far Johnston's explanation. Whether or not this particular explanation of
the lack of the (c)-reading of (95) turns out to be adequate, it should be obvious
at this point that whatever explains the lack of the reading can also be applied to
the lack of the (c)-reading in ·(92). Thus, the lack of the reading is a special case
of the mapping behavior of temporal adverbials with adverbs of quantification".
Note that in order for this explanation to work, it is crucial to assume that
temporal adverbials are suitable predicates of the type of entities adverbs of
quantification quantify over. Only because of this can they appear directly as
restrictors in the restrictive clause of the generic operator.
Recall that determiner-quantified noun phrases do not share the tendency of
generics to be temporally determined by topicalized temporal adverbials. This
difference in the behavior of determiner-quantifiers and the generic quantifier. is in
fact expected, given the proposal I have sketched: it simply follows from the
assumption that determiner-quantifiers quantify over individuals or stages of
individuals, not over ~ituations. Thus, temporal adverbials cannot function
directly as restrictors of determiner-quantifiers. I argued above that when they
have some effect on the restriction of determiner-quantifiers (i.e., when they
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modify the resource domain variable of a determiner-quanti.fier in order to give
rise to temporally independent noun phrase interpretations), this is an indirect
effect mediated by the context. Thus, tenlporal adverbials can provide a
contextually salient time interval which can modify the resource domain of a
determiner-quantifier, but they can crucially not function directly as restrictors of
determiner-quantifiers.38
"'Neineinja , sag1e~Prinz, 'wohleherndn.' "
-Janosch, DerFrosdIkOnig-
8. Remarks on temporally independent noun phrases
Above, I have argued that restrictive noun phrases can in general have temporally
independent interpretations. However, when looking at particular occurrences of
restrictive noun phrases, it turns out that not all restrictive noun phrases can have
all conceivable temporally independent readings, or at least not with equal ease.
In this section, I want to determine at least some of the factors that play a role in
whether a particular occurrence of a restrictive noun phrase can have a particular
temporally independent interpretation. We will see that the relevant factors are of
a pragmatic nature.
38 As pointed out in von Fintel (1994, 177f), this is usually so, but perhaps not always.
The tendency of a distinction between entity-restrictors and situation-restrictors seems to be
clear though. Here are some more examples of his, illustrating the point at issue here with
wif/when-clauses. The original source of these sentences are lecture notes by Irene Heim
(a, b) and Carlson (1977, 420) (c-e). With (a) and (b), the if-clauses can restrict the entities
quantified over, but the when-clauses in (c-e) can't.
(a) Most letters are answered if they are shorter than 5 pages.
(b) Few people like New York if they didnIt grow up there.
(c) * Bill hates any dog when it is of a rare breed.
(d) * All hotels are uneconomical when they have less than 200 rooms.
(e) * Each wolf is intelligent when it has blue eyes.
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8.1. The salience of properties and the choice of nouns
In general, common nouns can be viewed as characterizing individuals by
ascribing a property to them. En9 (1981, 88) observed that there are some very
strong pragmatic restrictions on which properties of an individual are salient
enough so that they can characterize the individual in question successfully. This
effect is illustrated with two of her examples in (96), which appear quite strange
when uttered out of the blue.
(96) a. # All the little boys are eighty years old.
b. # The tadpoles croaked all night long.
En~ suggests that "this deviance may ,be explained by appealing to certain
pragmatic principles" (p89). She points out that "[t]he property a speaker
chooses to pick out the objects is important in that it must enable the other
participants in the discourse to access the objects easily. Therefore these
properties tend to be permanent properties or salient temporary properties." (p89).
In other words, the use of nouns is pragmatically restricted by the necessity
to link properties and individuals. The property denoted by a noun must be
salient enough to identify the individuals characterized by the noun. And in
general, we expect that the most salient property results in the most felicitous
noun phrase. What precisely affects the degree of salience of a property and,
consequently, the degree of felicitousness of the use of a particular noun in order
to characterize particular individuals? There are various factors that playa role
here. Let me list some of the obvious ones.
First, a property of an individual that is accessible by general world-
knowledge is more salient than a property that is not accessible by general world-
knowledge. Consider the noun phrase most students in (97a) and (98a) with the
context indicated in square brackets. Since world-knowledge tells us that
students were kids at some time and that students are usually grown-ups, reading
(97b) is much less likely than reading (97c), although (97b) exhibits a temporally
dependent reading. But world-knowledge doesn't suggest a special
developmental link between soccerplayerhood and studenthood. Thus, (98b)
rather than (98c) is the preferred reading for (98a).
",
1
1I
(97) a. [1 have to tell you something about the people Amanda met when
she studied: as far as I know, ...]
... most students were terrifying kids.
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b. Possible reading, unlikely for reasons of world-knowledge:
When Amanda studied, most of the individuals who were students
then were terrifying kids at that time.
. c. Possible reading, preferred for reasons of world-knowledge:
At some time in the past, most of the individuals who were students
when Amanda studied were terrifying kids.
(98) a.
b.
c.
[I have to tell you something about the people Amanda met when
she studied: as far as I know, ...]
... most students were terrifying soccerplayers.
Possible, and preferred, reading:
When Amanda studied, most of the individuals who were students
then were terrifying soccerplayers at that time.
Possible reading:
At some time in the past, most of the individuals who were students
when Amanda studied were terrifying soccerplayers.
Second, a related effect occurs when one tries to make sense of sentences that
would be plainly contradictory if a noun phrase were not understood with a
temporally independent reading. This is illustrated in (99).39
(99) a.
b.
[Today, the social system is comparatively progressive and humane.]
Most homeless people live in publicly financed apartments.
Possible reading, easily accessible:
Most former homeless people live in publicly financed apartments
now.
Third, some notion of familiarity and novelty of decriptive content seems to be
relevant for the felicitousness of temporally independent noun phrases. Thus, a
property that was mentioned in the previous discourse is certainly more salient
than a property that has never been mentioned before. Thus, since the students
are mentioned in the context surrounding (IOOa), it is easily possible to exploit
the temporally independent noun phrase in most studerzts giggled. But since the
softballteam of the class of 1982 was not mentioned before, it is hardly possible to
utter (lOla) with the reading (10lh) felicitously.
(100) a.. [36 former students of the class of 1982 came to the alumni meeting
last year. When it was announced that the campus was haunted by
a ghost, ... ]
... most students giggled.
39 This example is due to Kai von Fintel (pc).
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Possible reading, easily accessible:
Most of the individuals who were students of the class of 1982
giggled at the alumni-meeting after the ghost-announcement.
[36 former students of the class of 1982 came to the alumni meeting
last year. When it was announced that the campus was haunted by
a ghost, ... ]
... most softbal1players giggled.
Possible reading, hardly available:
Most of the individuals who belonged to the softballteam of the
class of 1982 giggled at the alumni-meeting after the ghost-
announcement.
But also properties that are not directly mentioned but are indirectly strongly
suggested by the discourse context can be relatively salient. (102) is an example
that shows this.
(102) a.
b.
[At the alumni meeting in 2004, it will be announced that the
·campus is haunted by a ghost. (I am sure the audience will listen
attentively.)] .
Most students will giggle.
Possible reading:
Most of the individuals who are now students will giggle.
Fourth, a property that characterizes an individual in a completely different state
than the one it has at the predication time of the main predicate is certainly less
felicitous than one that is less different. Thus,(a) is less felicitous than (b).
(103) a. # The ice cubes, which had become steam, went up to the ceiling.
b. The water, which had become steam, went up to the ceiling.
Interestingly, the inappropriateness of sentences like (a) disappears when the
relationship between two. fundamentally different states is an issue of the
utterance. Thus, the following two predicate nominal constructions illustrate this.
They are perfectly acceptable.
(104) a.
b.
The steam is now ice.
My tadpole is now a frog.
L
Moreover, assuming that the inappropriateness of the sentences in (96) is due to
the significant difference between the boy- or tadpole-state and the man- or frog-
state of an individual, it is important to note that depending on the context, one
can in some situations easily use predicates that would u.nder other circumstances
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be quite inappropriate. For instance, imagin.e a class meeting about sixty years
after the class left school. The former teacher, now about 100 years old, is also
invited to the meeting. Entering the room) she cries in surprise "Oh! All the little
boys are eighty years old!" - I think there is' almost nothing especially strange
about the utterance of (96a) in this situation.
Note that at least some of the factors that I just listed are not only relevant for
licensing temporally independent noun phrase interpretations; at least some of
them are in principle equally important for the choice of a noun whose
predication time coincides with the event time of the main predicate, or for nouns
that are modified by temporal modifiers like former or future. Thus, consider the
following examples that try to transfer some of the principles at work in (96)-
(103) to cases that exhibit a noun phrase whose predication time coincides with
the predication time of the main predicte of their clause.
Consider (100') and (101') and imagine that the 10 students who came to the
meeting were all members of the softball team. Imagine furthermore that it is well-
known that these students are softball players. Even if this is well-known, (101')
appears inappropriate.
(100') [About 10 students came to the meeting on Wednesday morning. When
one of the faculty ~enlbers started arguing as usual, ... ]
... most students giggled.
(101') [About 10 students came to the meeting on Wednesday morning. When
one of the faculty members started arguing as usual, ... ]
... most softballplayers giggled.·
We also get the effect that properties that are not directly mentioned but are
indirectly strongly suggested by the discourse context can be used without
problems:
(102') [About 19 members of the department were at the meeting on Wednesday
morning. When a greenish ghost appeared from behind the blackboard, ...]
... most professors were totally upset.
And (103') shows that the use of modifiers like former and future doesn't help
much with respect to making the use of noun phrases felicitous if the noun
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phrases used try to characterize individuals by mentioning some very far-fetched
states of them.40
(103') # The former pile of bricks collapsed into a future wall.
To summarize, in this subsection, I have looked at the ease with which one
can get temporally independent interpretations for noun phrases from the
perspective of the choice of nouns. In general, the more salient a property is in a
context, the more felicitous it is to use the corresponding predicate to characterize
individuals.
8.2. The salience of the time of utterance and the choice of predication times
In this subsection, I want to briefly look at the ease with which one can get
temporally independent interpretations for noun phrases from another
perspective, namely from the perspective of how much the predication time of the
noun matters.
In general, it seems easiest to get a temporally independent reading when the
noun holds at the time of utterance: when a noun phrase is temporally
independent, the most likely predication time of the noun phrase intersects with
the time of utterance, i.e., the easiest, most salient temporally independent noun
phrase interpretation assumes that the noun can be truly predicated of. the
characterized individual(s) at the time of utterance. This is illustrated in (105).
(105) a.
b.
c.
[On July 15, 1992, there was a big party in Washington.]
Most of the congressmen were there.
Possible temporally independent reading where the noun's
predication time coincides with the time of utterance; preferred:
Most of the individuals who are now congressmen were at the
party.
Possible temporally independent reading where the predication time
of the noun does not coincide with the time of utterance; less
accessible:
Most of the individuals who were congressmen at any time were at
the party.
40 This sentence was given to me by David Pesetsky (pc) who thinks the example was
used in a talk by Mtirvet En~.
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It seems most likely that this effect is due to the fact that the time of utterance is
for any utterance naturally a particularly salient time.
Furthermore, for times that differ from the time of utterance, although in
principle all times can provide felicitous predication times for the noun, we can
observe that past times are in general much more accessible than future times.
Recall example (2) from the beginning of this chapter, repeated here as (106).
(106) a.
b.
c.
d.
John's murderer hid behind the curtain.
John was murdered on May 15th 1992. At some time in the past,
the man who murdered John (which was that man's fITst murder) hid
behind the curtain.
John is being murdered just while (105a) is uttered. At some time in
the past, the man who is murdering John (which is that man's first
murder) hid behind the curtain.
It is known that a certain man plans to murder John. According to
what we know about that man (whatever he plans, he does it), we
know that he will commit the murder. At some time in the past, the
man who will murder John (which will be that man's first murder)
hid behind the curtain.
We can observe that of the three possible readings (106b-d), it is most difficult to
get (106d), where the predication time of the noun is located in the future. In"
order to get a reading like (106d), we need to make specific assumptions about a
future time. And, moreover, we have to treat these assumptions as knowledge
about future situations, although we cannot really have knowledge, in a serious
sense, about these future situations. In Chapter IV, we will be concerned with
certain effects - called tlupper limit effects II - which are probably· related to the
restricted accessibility of future predication times for nouns.
8.3. Competing times and the saliellce of established discourse topics
An interesting question to be raised is what happens when there are several
competing factors at work that can potentially affect the temporally independent
interpretation of a particular noun phrase. Are the potential factors equally
strong? If not, which factors "win" against other factors?
I want to look here at a particular case. We have seen above that the time of
utterance is particularly salie~t and preferredly chosen as the predication time of a
temporally independent noun (105). We have also seen that a previously
established set of individuals seems to be easily accessible for temporally
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independent interpretations (100). What happens when these two factors are
both present?
Suppose (107) is uttered now, and the noun president means "president of
the U.S.". Suppose furthermore that (107) occurs in a context where someone is
telling stories about Ronald Reagan. The relevant situation about presidents is
the following: Bill Clinton is president now, George Bush was president on July
15, 1992, and Ronald Reagan was president before Bush. According to what we
learned above about the salience of predication times, the president in (107)
would preferredly either get a temporally dependent interpretation - i.e., refer to
George Bush - or it will refer to the president at the time of utterance - i.e. to Bill
Clinton.
(107) On July 15, 1992, the president hid behind the curtain.
I think intuitions are very clear that in the context of story-telling about Ronald
Reagan, the president will most likely be understood as refering to Reagan, that
is, to an individual that is neither the president of the U.S. now nor was the
president on July 15, 1992.
To summarize, the example IJconsidered in this subsection showed that when
the discourse has already identified a salient individual we are talking about, the
factors regarding the salience of predication times of the noun do not play an
important role anymore. .
8.4. Different types of noun phrases
Overtly partitive noun phrases can particularly easily get temporally independent
interpretations, more easy than non-partitive restrictive noun phrases. Thus, with
(108h) it is easier to get an independent interpretation than with (108a)
(108) a.
b.
Most criminals were at the party.
Most of the criminals were at the party.
Although both sentences can have a reading "Most of the individuals who are
now criminals were at the p~rty (when they were not yet necessarily criminals)",
one can observe that the reading is more salient with (108b), where the restrictive
noun phrase is overtly partitive. Thus, overt partitivity seems to affect the
temporal interpretation of noun phrases insofar as it makes temporally
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independent interpretations easier. Why do partitive noun phrases have thts
effect?
Partitive noun phrases presuppose a previously established set of discourse
referents to which they are linked This link licenses the use of the definite
description that is part of a partitive noun phrase. As pointed out to me by Kai
von Fintel (pc), the previous establishing of a set of discourse referents can take
place in a temporal frame that is completely independent of the temporal frame of
the clause in which the partitive noun phrase occurs. This independently
establishing of the set of discourse referents is responsible for the significant ease
of temporally independend interpretations with partitive noun phrases.
9. Conclusion
I started out this chapter by reviewing Bny's (1981) claim that the temporal
interpretation of noun phrases is independent of the temporal interpretation of
the rest of their clause and only dependent on the discourse context. I showed
that this claim is an overgeneralization, and raised the questions of what the
distribution of temporally dependent noun phrases is and what mechanisms are
responsible for the occurrence of temporally dependent and independent noun
phrases. In concluding this chapter, I would like to reconsider and relativize the
results of Eny's (1981) dissertation in addition to summarizing my own results.
I showed that in for most cases, we can state that a noun phrase can be
temporally independent if and only if it is restrictive. This generalization does not
hold for existence-independent arguments though. I argued that the distribution
of temporally dependent and independent noun phrases can be explained in a
semantics that assumes that determiner-quantification is quantification over
stages of individuals. How do these results relate to En~'s (1981) work?
One of the things we learned from En~'s work is that a sentence-operator
analysis of tenses is in~dequate to capture the temporal interpretation of noun
phrases. There is no doubt that En~'s work has shown this convincingly.
Second, according to En~, nouns are in general temporally independent. I
have argued at length that this is an overgeneralization; there are systematic cases
of noun phrases that cannot be temporally independent. En~ts generalization
holds correctly though for the types of noun phrases she looked at when
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drawing her conclusion - which were exclusively noun phrases that can be
restrictive.
Third, En9 suggests an indexical analysis of nouns (pp77-92). As far as I can
see, the indices are a kind of contextual restriction, i.e., on a certain level, they can
be compared to resource domain variables. En9 sees the source for temporal
freedom in these indices. In my analysis, it is in fact the value of resource domain
variables that provides the possibility to "anchor" the main predicate1s time in the
stage given by the restrictive material. Thus, the contextual restriction provides in
a certain sense the possibility to create the necessary temporal dependence of the
main predicate's stage on the restrictive-material-stage.
Fourth, for the explanation of noun phrases that should be able to exploit
temporally independent readings but don1t, En9 exploits pragmatic principles. In
Section 8, I showed that there are in fact principles like the one she suggested at
work. Some ~f the important observations concerning the ease of availability of
temporally independent interpretations of noun phrases were these: Restrictions
on felicity and contextual salience playa role. Furthermore, among restrictive
noun phrases, overtly partitive noun phrases can most easily get temporally
independent interpretations.' Yet another observation is that temporally
independent interpretations are easiest to get in cases where the temporally
independent noun has a predication time that intersects with the time of utterance
of the sentence in which the noun phrase occurs. These factors are all pragmatic.
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IThewireha5 atwo-fokl
clistin.:iion armng tOOfishes:
firs~ wlxnseenfromad5taoce, itloorrn largearmng tmn
and, se:nndly, onclcreexamiruiion
itis found to~no fish atall. "
-M F. ~er, cited in:
Kaz&Fcxlor, The St1Udure afLangJa~ -
10. More on stages
10.1. Ships passing through locks and how to determine and count stages
10.1.1. Object-related readings and event-related readings
Krifka (1990, 487) observes that sentences like the ones in (99) are ambiguous.
They exhibit two readings which Krifka calls OBJECT-RELATED READINGS and
EVENT-RELATED READINGS, respectively.41
(109) a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Four thousand ships passed through the lock last year.
The library lent out 23,000 books in 1987.
12,000 persons walked through the turnstile yesterday.
National Airlines served at least two million passengers in 1975.
After facing 35 batters, the pitcher got tired.
With (t09a), the object-related reading means something like "There are four
thousand (different) ships which passed through the lock last year". The event-
related reading means something like "There were four thousand events of
passing through the lock by a ship last year (some of which were possibly
undertaken by the same ship)". Analogous considerations apply to the other
examples in (109).
Krifka points out that event-related readings occur also in cases with
quantificational noun phrases (pp509ff). Here are his examples:
. (110) a.
b.
c.
Most ships passed through the lock at night.
Every ship passed through the lock at night.
No ship passed through the lock at night.
41 Examples (a-d) are directly taken from Krifka (1990, 487f), example (e) is made up
using Krifka's comments.
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According to Krifka, "[(I lOa)] can either mean that more than half of the ships (of
a given domain of entities) passed through the lock during the night. Or it can
mean that more than half of the lock traversals of a ship occurred at night. 11 Again,
analogous readings occur with the examples (110b) and (IIDe).
Krifka observes that the choice of interpretation in the case of
quantificational noun phrases depends on which constituent is focussed (pSI!).
He illustrates this with the following two sentences, which both trigger event-
related readings, but different ones (pp511f):
(111) a.
b.
Most books were lent out from counter A in-the MORNINGS
(rather than in the afternoons).
=Most events of lending out a book from counter A happened in
the mornings.
Most books were lent out in the mornings from COUNTER A
(rather than from counter B}.
~ Most events of lending out a book in the mornings happened
from counter A.
For (lIla), Krifka states that U[i]n the most natural reading of [(lIla)], the
adverbial phrase at night is in focus, and it is said that most events of a ship
passing through the lock happened at night (rather than at daytime)" (p512). It
seems that a strong focussing is not obligatory in order to get the object-related
reading. Thus, we have:
(112) a'.
a".
object-related reading: Most ships passed through the lock at night.
event-related reading: Most ships passed through the lock AT NIGHT.
Krifka discusses briefly two possible analyses of the basic ambiguity between
object-related readings and event-related readings by Gupta (1980) and Carlson
(1982).42 According to Krifka (p488), Gupta's analysis assumes that common
nouns are not predicates of individuals but predicates of individual concepts,
where the ambiguity may be derived from the assumption that two non-identical
individual concepts might have the same value at certain reference times without
being identical altogether. Carlson exploits his 1977 stage-ontology and can
derive the ambiguity from the assumption that individuals have stages that can
optionally be counted instead of individuals.
Krifka's conclusion is that neither Gupta's nor Carlson's approach can treat
the ambigUIty adequately, because they locate-the event-related reading.in the
42 For a new approach of the ambiguity, see Honcoop and Doetjes (1995).
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meaning of tbe noun, but the set-up of their approaches allows only for capturing
the ambiguity with stage-level nouns like passenger or batter. . If this is so, then
neither Gupta nor Carlson can deal with the occurrence of the ambiguity in
(109a-c), where it clearly shows up. Krifka argues further (p489):
"If we want to... claim that a noun like ship is indeed ambiguous and
de~otes either ships or, say, ship stages, we face a serious problem. (...) we
cannot count just any stages of ships, but only those which perform one,
and only one, complete pass through the lock. Now, take the ship
Eleonore, which has two stages, 81 and S2, which passed through the lock.
But then our way of counting breaks down: we have suddenly at least
three stages, SI, S2, and the sum of SI and S2, which passed through the
lock."
For obvious reasons, the ambiguity and Krifka's comments are relevant for the
stage-semantics I have adopted in this chapter. In particular, the question should
be raised whether my stage-semantics is capable of dealing with the ambiguity
between object-related readings and event-related readings. One of the core
questions in this respect is how stages should be determined, counted and/or
merged for purposes of quantification. In the following subsection, I want to
recall the notion of maximality I introduced in Section 4.2.3.3.
10.1.2. Maximality of stages
In Section 4.2.3.3., I introduced a notion of maximality. The reason for this step
was that without such a notion, we wouldn't have known how to count stages
for a sentence like (53), Many students cooked for parties. Since stages can in
principle be instantaneous, there would always be many student-stages that
cooked for parties, whenever there was a single student that cooked for parties.
In order to avoid this problem, I introduced a maximality-requirement as part of
the lexical entry of quantifiers. The idea of this step was to quantify over
"maximal" stages that satisfy the restriction of the quantifier. The way I wanted
this to be understood in Section 4 was to "count" per individual at most one
stage, namely the maximal stage, that fulfills the restriction. Since we crucially
allowed for merging discontinuous stages within an individual, the maximality-
requirement would force us to merge all discontinuous student-stages of a single
individual to the maximal student-stage of that individual. For purposes of
quantification, this would thus count as one stage. At the end of Section 4, I
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arrived at truth conditions like (71) and (72) for sentences with quantificational
noun phrases, repeated here as (113) and (114).
(113) a.
b.
c.
(114) a.
b.
c.
Most students were sick.
MOSTX-st C [student] [sick]
For most maximal stages Xst
such that 3ysh Zst such that Xst = Yst E9 Zst,
and [[C] (Yst) =1 and [[student Il (zst) =1,
Xst has a part Vst,
such that [[sick] (vst) =1.
There were few students sick.
FEWx-st C [student & sick]
For few maximal stages Xst
such that [[C] (xst) = 1 ,
Xst has a part Vst
such that [student] (vst) =1 and [sick] (vst) =1.
}
\
1
Following a suggestion of Kai von Fintel (pc), we may define of maximality of a
stage ast with respect to a predicate P as exploited in this chapter as in (115):
(115) ast is maximal with respect to a predicate P
"iff P (O:st) & -,3Yst ( P (ast ~ Yst) & ast *" (ast E9 Yst))
(115) gives us the desired result, because we assumed that the ontology provides
only stage-entities that belong to the same host individual.
Since for our lexical entries to give us the maximal stage per individual of
which the restrictor holds, we have to consider not only one predicate, but at
least two (one provided by the overt restrictor and one by the resource domain
variable), (115) has to be modified as shown in (115').
(115') ast is maximal with respect to a restrictor consisting of a resource domain P
and a restrictive predicate Q
iff 3vst, Zst [O:st = (vst ffi Zst) & P (vst) & Q (zst)]
& -,3Yst ( [P (ast ~ Yst) v Q (ast <i' Yst)] & ast:/:. Cast ffi Yst))
The question that must be raised now is whether we really want to count
always only one stage that fulfills the restriction per individual. Krifka's
sentences suggest that it may be desirable to count at least sometimes different
restrictor-stages of a single individual separately where the stages that fulfill the
main predicate provide a limiting criterion. Despite l<rifka's refutation of Carlson's
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stage-account, I want to investigate here whether my particular stage-semantics
can account for the ambiguity between object-related readings and event-
releated readings. In my discussion below, I am basically following an idea of Kai
von Fintel (pc).
10.1.3. How to account for the ambiguity of object-related readings and
event-related readings
Let me summarize the observations we are facing at this point. It is clear that for
the purpose of quantification we want to count only one ship-stage for the case
of a situation as described and illustrated in (116), where a ship underwent
exactly one lock transferral. In the pictures below, lock-transferral stages are
marked with bubbles.43
X IS a shiJ
(116)
It is also clear that, for the purpose of capturing object-related readings,-we don't
want to consider several stages of lock transferrals of a single ship separately.
Rather, we just want to look at the ship-individual as a temporal whole and say
whether it passed the lock at all. A situation illustrating an object-related reading
is shown in (117).
x-st IS a shi D, x-st has a part y-st that Dassed throu h the lock
(117)
And, finally, the occurrence of event-related readings suggests that we sometimes
want to count several stages of lock transferrals of a single ship separately. This
is illustrated in (118).
43 I want to point out here that for this observation it is not crucial that to pass the lock is
an accomplishment.
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(118)
X IS a s 1
~llij >:B::U~ .....
~
Let us see how we can capture object-related readings and event-related
readings. I will exploit here the individual-level noun ship and the lock-
transferral-sentences that were presented above. Stage-level nouns are expected
to behave analogously in all relevant aspects. The basic idea of the account is
that the choice of appropriate values for the resource domain variable of the
determiner leads either to object-related readings or to event-related readings.
Let us see how the choice of values for the resource domain variable
accounts for the readings with restrictive noun phrases. We are considering the
sentence Most ships passed through the lock at night. Suppose we take a
neutral predicate like "exist" as a value for the resource domain variable of most
as in (119). With this choice of value, we quantify over ships in their whole
temporal extendedness. Not caring about lock-transferral-stages, we count ea~h
ship once and get the object-related reading.
(119) a.
b.
Most ships passed through the lock at night.
= more than 50% of the ships passed through the lock at night
For most maximal stages Xst
such that 3Yst, Zst such that Xst = Yst 61 Zst,
and [[exist] (yst) = 1
and [[ship]] (zst) = 1,
Xst has a part Vst,
such that [passed through the lock at night n(vst) =1.
The entities counted may look as indicated in the picture (119c). Note that the
second lock-transferral-stage of Xst is simply irrelevant here.
x-st is a shi I
_illllllllllllllllll··::·(lcxt:t~~I--t~(119c)
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Suppose now we take a different value for the resource domain variable, namely a
value like "passed through the lock once".44 With this value, each lock-
transferral-stage of any ship counts as a stage Yst that is merged with a ship-stage
Zst. As a result, we count any ship for each time when it passed through the lock.
This gives us the event-related reading.45
(120) a.
b.
Most ships passed through the lock AT NIGHT.
= (Krifka's paraphrase) most events of a ship passing through the
lock happened at night
= (my paraphrase) most ship-stages that passed through the lock
once are ship-stages that passed through the lock at night
For most maximal stages Xst .
such that 3Yst, Zst such that Xst = Yst e3 Zst,
and [[passed through the lock once] (Yst) = 1
and [[ship]] (zst) = 1,
Xst has a part vst,
such that [[passed through the lock at night]] CYst) =1.
To make the manner of counting clear, it is important to realize that a ship that
passed through the lock twice - like the one illustrated in (118) - is counted twice,
whereby each time only one of the lock-transferral-stages is relevant. Thus, the
two entities that are counted can be illustrated as follows.46
44 Note that we cannot just take the value "passed through the lock". Since according to
my assumptions, stages can merge discontinuously and \ve quantify over maximal stages
that satisfy the restriction, this would give us for each ship one big lock-transferral-stage
that contains all smaller lock-transferral-stages of that ship. This would make it impossible
to count single lock-transferral-events of ships separately.
45 Recall that Krifka (1990) claimed that with presuppositional noun phrases, the
placement of focus on at night is crucial in order to get an event-related reading at all.
Actually, I don't see why that is so. Of course, focus structure is well-known to help
constructing quantifier domains. But in this particular case I don't see why the reading
should be unavailable without focus on at night. Kai von Fintel argues that it might be
relevant that the choice of lIpass through the lock at night" as a value for the resource
domain variable instead of ".pass through the lock" leads to a trivial reading.
46 Note that these two entities are not distinguished by standard assumptions of mereology:
the sum of an entity Zst and an entity Yst that is part of Zst gives us just Zst again. Thus, the
ability to distinguish the two zst-entities in the picture must come from some other level.
Irene Heim (pc) points out that both entities are different situations (cf. Kratzer (1989)).
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z-st is a shi
:i~'
Let us now consider unrestrictive noun phrases. We will see that they differ
from restrictive noun phrases in that we quantify over differently looking entities
with the two readings. Suppose we take again the value "exist". as a value for the
resource domain variable of fourthousand. This results in counting again whole
ships only once and yields the object-related reading.
(121) a.
b.
Fourthousand ships passed through the lock last year.
For fourthousand maximal stages Xst
such that [[exist] (xst) = 1,
Xst has a part Vst
such that [ship]] (vst) = 1
and [[passed through the lock last year]] (vst) =1.
The entities counted in (121b) can be illustrated as in (121c). Since existence
determines how entities are counted, the Xst is counted only once, even if it
passed through the lock twice.
x-st exists
(121c) IIIIlflleri_... ...........
But when we take "passed through the lock last year once" as the value of the
resource domain variable, we count stages that passed through the lock last year
rather than whole ships. This gives us the event-related reading.
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Fourthousand ships passed through the lock last year.
For fourthousand maximal stages Xst
such that [passed through the lock last year once]] (~st) =1,
Xst has a part Vst
such that [ship]] (vst) = 1
and [[passed through the lock last year] (vst) =1..
Here the illustrating picture looks quite different from the pictures we saw in
(119)-(121). The reason for this is that the entities counted are here really
determined by the temporal extendedness of the lock-transferral-stages alone.
The counted entities we get for a ship that passed through the lock twice last
year look as shown in (122c).47
v-st is a ship-stage and
passed through the lock last year
v-st is a ship-stage and
passed through the lock last year
For getting the event-related readings, I exploited predicates like "passed
through the lock once". Here I want to raise the question of whether there is
some additional motivation or some trigger for taking a· value like this that
narrows the perspective down to stages of single lock-transferral-events.
According to what we know about implicit quantifier restrictions, the
modification of the resource domain variable is highly dependent on the
preceding or surrounding context of the quantification. Thus, we expect that
implicit restrictions like "passed through the lock once" are most felicitous in
contexts that suggest lock-transferral-events. There seems to be some evidence
that this indeed plays a role for the availability of event-related readings.
Consider (123). It seems that the change from the definite description the lock to
a lock or some lock makes it much harder to get event-related readings for the
resulting sentences. This effect is predicted by my approach to the ambiguity.
When exploiting the definite description the lock, locks and presumably lock-
transferrals are familiar in the context. Consequently, reference to single lock-
47 The picture does not really quite show what we quantify over: to make the point clear
that the lock-transferral stages Xst are what is counted, I drew them bigger than the Vst-
stages. In fact, both have exactly the same size.
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transferral-events for restricting the quantifier is much more felicitous for thos.e
sentences than for sentences that introduce locks as unfamiliar in the context.
(123) a.'
b.
4000 ships passed through a lock/some lock last year.
Most ships passed through a lock/some lock last year.
Moreover,-consider again (112a"), repeated here as (124). Krifka argued that the
presence o·f focus plays an important role for the availability of event-related
readings.
(124) Most ships passed through the lock AT NIGHT.
A natural explanation of the presence of the focus on at night is that pass
through the lock is here destressed because it is familiar from the context. This
corresponds nicely to my claim that when we get the most felicitous event-related
readings with our ship-sentences, lock-transferral-events are suggested by the
context. Thus, the focus on at night is an .epiphenomenon of the familiarity of
lock-transferral-events.
Thus, my proposal can account for the occurrence of event-related readings
as well as object-related readings. Since I did not have to make any additional
stipulations but just exploited the mechanisms of resource domain variables
which seem to be independently necessary, the account of the ambiguity seems
highly desirable. It remains to be shown whether and how this approach can deal
with other constructions (cf. 'Krifka (1990, 507ff)). Furthermore, it may be
interesting to investigate how the occurrence of event-related readings is
restricted. For instance, sentence (125), which is due to Kai von Fintel, does not
seem to be able to exhibit an event-related reading.
(125) Last semester, most students met with Chomsky.
Sentences like· (125) raise the question how the relevant restrictions can be
incorporated into my account.
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10.2. The president of the U.S. and how to merge stages
10.2.1. Stages merging across individuals?
In Section 4.2.1., I proposed that only stages belonging to the same host
individual can be merged. Equivalently, one may say that I proposed that any
stage has only one host individual. There are data that make it advisable to
reconsider this assumption: Carlson (1977, 451-462) investigates a certain aspect
of the behavior of definite descriptions. He considers sentences like. (126a),
which exhibit an ambiguity between readings like (126b) and readings like
(126c).
(126) a.
b.
c.
the president fears the people.
The individual who is the unique contextually relevant president
fears the people.
Whoever is the president at some time fears the people.
Exploiting his stage-ontology, Carlson illustrates the situation underlying these
readings graphically roughly as shown in (127). The letters "a" - "0 " are stages of
the host individuals Nixon, Ford, and Carter, and the stages connected by lines
with lithe President" are the stages when they were president. Basically, the idea
is that in order to represent reading (126c) adequately, one has to assume the
existence of the entity represented as "the President", which at first sight appears
to be the result of merging stages that belong to a plurality of host individuals.
(127)
Individuals:
Stages:
host-individual1 host-individual2 host-individual3
Nixon Ford Carter
...a~ ......f~ ......k~O ...
Does this mean that we have to revise the basic assumption that stages belonging
to different individuals cannot be merged, i.e. that a stage has only one host
individual?
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10.2.2. Individuals, stages, and kinds
Carlson doesn't draw this conclusion. Rather, he assumes that the entity
represented as "the President" above is not a stage merged of stages of different
host individuals, but a KIND. And kinds are a special, primitive, type of entity. If
this is so, then the first i~pression of (127) was just misleading: the entity "the
President" is not the result of merging stages; rather, it is an entity that counts as a
host individual of stages that happen to be also stages of non-kind individuals
like Nixon, Ford, and Carter. Assuming that reading (126c) arises because the
president is understood as referring to the kind "the President" makes it possible
to avoid having to give up the assumption that every stage has only one host
individual, or in Carlson's terms: "the assumption that for every stage there is one
and only one object that that stage realizes" (Carlson (1977,455)).
I will adopt Carlson's proposals that kinds are a special type of entity and that
"the Presidenf' in the picture above is a kind. Thus, let us tentatively assume that
the domain of entities De consists of elements as indicated in (128): individuals in
their whole temporal extendedness, stages of individuals, and kinds.
(128) [TO BE REVISED SHORTLy]
De = {Nixon, Ford, Carter, Kaline, ... ,Carter-on-March-15-1977, Carter-
on-June-lO-1995, Kaline-on-June-10-1995, , the kind "the
President", the kind cats, ... }
Assuming that kinds are" a special type of entity raises the question what kind of
entity they are - i.e., what does belong to a particular kind and what doesn't? I
propose the definition (129). As with stages, I will indicate variables ranging over
kind-individuals with a subscript "k".
(129) For any predicate-P, a kind xk is the kind of Ps if and only if Xk is the sum
of all stages Xst such that [[P]] (xst) =1.48
48 This definition is built on the assumption that in principle every noun can be used as a
kind-noun. I believe that this is indeed what is needed. There is certainly a preference for
kind readings with nouns that denote natural kinds; in these cases the idea of having kind-
entities is spontaneously more accessible. I think that is depends on the context how easily
kind-readings are accessible for other nouns - or noun phrases. The following example,
which is due to Kai von Fintel, shows that even a noun phrase like Annegretes Auto
(,Annegrete' car') can be used as referring to the kind of Annegrete's cars: Annegrete's
Auto wird auch immer groj3er.
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According to definition (129), the kind the President is the sum of all stages Xst
such that [president] (xst) = 1.
Note that (129) is only supposed to characterize what is contained in a kind,
but it does not necessarily have any linguistic implications. That taking the sum-
character of a kind linguistically too seriously may have undesirable
consequences ~s shown in Krifka et ale (1992, 56). There it is pointed out that
although it may be true that the collection of all the existing rabbits has a weight
of more than 10,000 tons, a sentence like (130) is quite strange.
(130) The rabbit has a weight of more than 10,000 tons.
10.2.3. On the behavior of kind-nouns
It is important to note that just as we can distinguish between INDIVIDUALS in
their whole temporal extendedness and STAGES OF INDIVIDUALS, we can also
distinguish between KINDS in their whole temporal extendedness and STAGES
OF KINDS.
(131) De = {Nixon, Ford, Carter, Kaline, ... ,Carter-on-March-15-1977, Carter-
on-June-l0-1995, Kaline-on-June-lO-1995, ... ,the kind "the
President", the kind cats, ... ,the-kind-"the President"-in-this-
century, the-kind-cats-Iast-week, ... }
Kinds can have a very different outer appearance, as far as their
correspondence to stages and individuals in reality is concerned. Thus, the kind
of cats in its whole temporal extendedness can be split up into cat-individuals in
their whole temporal extendedness as well as into cat-stages. But there is no way
to split up the kind of students or the kind the President systematically into
individuals in their whole temporal extendedness. This is because student and
president are stage-level nouns; consequently the host individuals of student-
stages and president-stages contain many non-student-stages and non-president-
stages, respectively.
The possibilities to split up kinds into entities of a different level have
consequences for the behavior of noun phrases in \'arious contexts and for their
ability to co-occur with predicates.
One of the predictions I am making is that for a definite kind-noun-phrase like
the President it is not possible to get temporally independent interpretations that
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pick up non-president-stages of individuals that have president-stages. It seems
to me that this prediction is borne out. Thus, for (132), it seems to be impossible to
get the reading indicated.
(132) The President was often a boring child.
-# The kind the President is such that many of the individuals that it
consists of are such that they have stages where they were boring
children.
If the kind President consisted of individuals in their whole temporal
extendedness that happened to be president at some time of their life, the reading
should be possible. But if the kind President consists only of president-stages of
individuals - i.e. stages like the ones marked by bubbles in (133) - then the lack of
the reading in (132) is predicted.
(133) childhood presidency
~¥i~:: .,.---------~ E
The only reading that seems to me to be available for (132) is the one where many
presidents were kids while being presidents.49
49 En~ (1981, 175t) assumes that such noun phrases can have a temporally independent
reading. Thus, she suggests two possible readings for the sentence The president marries
an influential woman in order to get elected to lzis first term.. Judgements of
informants are - as usual - not entirely clear but show a clear tendency towards my
judgements: of 26 judgements I got about my. and Enc;'s example, 16 declare the
independent reading to be completely impossible, 3 judge it as available, and 5 as available
with varying degrees of difficulties (and sometimes slight changes of the sentences).
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CHAPTER IV.
ON TEMPORAL NP-MoDIFIERS
AND UPPER LIMIT EFFECTS
1. Introduction
1.1. Preliminaries on temporal NP-modifiers
DPs can contain 'various kinds of expressions that function semantically as
temporal modifiers of the noun. Here are some examples:
(1) a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
clausal modifiers: [The war when my grandfather was youngl
lasted four years.
genitive modifiers: [The sixties' rebels] are quite established today.
adverbial modifiers: [The quarrel yesterday I was totally
superfluous.
adjectival modifiers: [The present wife of Klaus] is [a former
student of ltis}.
prepositional modifiers: [The chancellor in 19891 made some
serious mistakes.
In this chapter, I will focus solely on prepositional phrases as in (Ie). Relying on
the commonly accepted assumption that in V2-constructions in German only one
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constituent can stand in the position before the finite verb, we can conclude that
in the following sentences the PPs am Donnerstag ('on Thursday') and am
Freitag ('on Friday') are indeed part of the DP.
(2) a.
b.
c.
[Den Vortrag am Donnerstagl hat Viviane gehalten.
the talk . on-the Thursday has Viviane hold
('Viviane gave [the talk on Thursday].' or, to make the structure
clearer: 'The talk on Thursday was given by Viviane.')
[Die Vortragende am Donnerstagl war Viviane.
the speaker on-the Thursday was Viviane
('The speaker on Thursday was Viviane.')
[Den Spinatsalat am Freitag] hat Colin zubereitet.
the spinach-salad on-the Friday has Colin prepared
('Colin prepared [the spinach salad on Friday].' or 'The spinach salad
on Friday was prepared by Colin. ')
It is important to note that in addition to the syntactic evidence provided by V2-
constructions, there is also semantic evidence that DP-internal modifiers as
illustrated in (1) and (2) are NP-modifiers and not modifiers of the main predicate
of their clause. This can be shown with sentence (2c) for instance. Sentence (2c)
can easily be understood as meaning something like "Colin prepared the spinach
salad that was present at the party on Friday" or "Colin prepared the spinach
salad we ate on Friday". Whereas the spinach salad must have been present on
Friday, its preparation need not have taken place on Friday - Colin may have
prepared it on Thursday. This shows clearly that on Friday modifies the NP but
not the main predicate of the clause.
Temporal modifiers can modify nouns denoting temporary properties as well
as nouns denoting life-time properties. The former type of predicate corresponds
intutively to the class of stage~level predicates, whereas the latter type of
predicate corresponds intutitively to the class of individual-level predicates as
described by Kratzer (1988). But since I will make reference to the classes of
predicates in this chapter with regard to nouns and moreover in a non-technical
sense - i.e., disregarding grammatical differences attributed to the difference
between stage-level predicates and individual-level predicates (Kratzer (1988)), I
will also use the terms TEMPORARY-PROPERTY NOUN and LIFE-TIME-
PROPERTY NOUN: If a nominal predicate holds of an individual during all its life
or time of existence, then I classify it as a temporary-property noun. For example,
an individual that is once a spinach salad is always a spinach salad until it ceases
to exist, i.e., in this case, until it's eaten; thus spinach salad is classified as a life-
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time predicate. But an individual that is once a speaker is typically not a speaker
during all his or her life, thus speaker is classified as a temporary property. Since
the temporal modifier in (2b) modifies a temporary-property noun and the one in
(2c) modifies a life-time-property noun, the acceptability of temporal modifiers
cannot in principle depend on whether the head noun is a stage-level or
individual-level predicate. But there is a difference between temporary-property
nouns and life-time-property nouns that concerns the way in which the temporal
modifier is interpreted. The temporal modifier in (2b) locates the being a speaker
temporally, but the modifier in (2c) does not locate the being a spinach salad
temporally. Rather, it needs some kind of contextual specification in order to
make the sentence perfectly acceptable and perfectly interpretable - in the
suggested readings fOf example (2c), the contextual specifications are the being
present on Friday Of the being eaten on Friday.
The modification of an NP by a temporal modifier leaves space for a certain
degree of semantic variability when the modifier does not locate the situation (or
event) argument of the noun. In the case of such a semantic-variability-
interpretation, the modifier relates the individual referred to by the NP to a
temporal location. The specific relation between the individual and the location is
contextually determined. For (2c) the relation can be "x be present at ttl or "x be
eaten at til Of, depending on the context, something else. Such a semantic-
variability-interpretation is in general the only possibility of interpretation for a
temporal modifier when the noun is an individual-level predicate. 1
1 The property of being interpreted by the addition of contextually determined relations in
dependency of the lexically given argument structure is by no means a special characteristic
of temporal modifier construc~ions. In fact, there are many constructions in natural
language whose compositional interpretation involves systematically a contextually
specified relation that leads to a significant degree of semantic variability: For instance,
Partee (1984) and Barker (1991) argued that genitive or possessive modifiers are often
interpreted by the addition of a contextually specified relation. This is illustrated in (Ab).
(Aa), which contains the inherently relational noun brother, does not show the degree of
semantic variability that arises ·with CAb).
(A) a. John's brother
strongly preferred meaning: "the individual x, such that x is. the brother of John"
b. John's team
possible meanings, depending on the context: "the team John is leading", "the
team John is a fan of', "the team in which John plays or works"
The semantic variability in (Ab) can be analyzed in terms of Partee's (1984) proposal
concerning the interpretation of genitive or possessive constructions: Partee suggests that it
can be accounted for by giving John's team a semantic representation thex [team (x) &.R
(John, x)] where R is a contextually or pragmatically determined relation. What the
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1.2. In-modifiers and oj-modifiers
There are two types of PPs that can appear as temporal modifiers in DPs. Because
of the prepositions they are'most typically headed by in English, I call them IN-
MODIFIERS and OF-MODIFIERS. I will show shortly that they differ crucially
with respect to their 'semantic behavior. (3) shows some examples of both types.
(3) a.
b.
in-modifiers:
oj-modifiers:
lottery winners in the forties
speakers on Sunday
lottery winners of the forties
professors .from the forties
i
l
Thus, in-modifiers are headed by in or on in English; in German, prepositions
heading in-modifiers are in and an. OJ-modifiers are headed by of or from in
English, and by von or aus in German.
In contrast to oj-modifiers, in-modifiers have inclusive meanings. Thus,
whereas from Sunday establishes a relation between Sunday and some other time,
on Sunday locates something within Sunday. Note that because of their
relation R is can be pragmatically determined and can often not possibly be detected without
precise knowledge of the context of utterance.
Stump (1984) suggested a similar analysis involving additional contextually determined
relations for the semantic variability of certain free adjunct constructions (B) and also with
absolute constructions (see, for example, pp325ff).
(B) Being a sailor, John sometimes smokes a pipe.
possible meanings, depending on the context: "John sometimes smokes a pipe,
because he is a sailor", tlJohn sometimes smokes a pipe, although he is a sailor"
Also compounds are notorious for the vaguely pragmatically restricted freedom of
interpretation (cf. Fanselow (1981) e.a.). A beautiful example for the wide range of
possible interpretations of compounds is provided by the expression Kaffeestrasse
('coffee-road') (C). What might a IIKaffeestrasse" be? One might think at first of a road
that was traditionally used for transporting coffee - analogously to the so-called
"Seidenstrasse ll (,silk-road') in Asia. In a fairy-tale, it might be a street built of coffee -
similarly as the yellow brick road in "The Wizard of Oz" or any ordinary gravel walk. In
fa~t, it can be something quite different: Once when driving in a car with my parents, my
mother offered me a cup of coffee. Unfortunately, the field-path on which we were driving
made it quite impossible to drink without spilling the coffee. Reacting to my swearing, my
mother gave me the advice: "Warte doch, bis eine Kaffeestrasse kommt!" ('Wait until we
are driving on a coffee-street!') - In this situation, Kaffeestrasse means obviously
something like IIstreet that is appropriate for drinking coffee while driving on it". Of
course, this meaning would not at all be detectable without my description of the context.
(C) Kaffeestrasse ('coffee-street')
possible meanings, depending on the context: "street that is traditionally used for
transporting coffee", "street that is built of coffee", "street that is appropriate for
drinking coffee while driving on it"
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inclusive meaning, in-modifiers can, if standing in another syntactic configuration,
function as VP-modifiers. Thus, (4c) is grammatical, but (4d) is ungrammatical.
(4) a. [Most professors in the sixties] played badminton.
b. [Most professors from the sixties] played badminton.
c. Most professors played badminton in the sixties.
d. * Most professors played badminton from the sixties.
The aim of this chapter is to explain some observations concerning the
distribution of these modifiers and their ability to affect the temporal
interpretation of the rest of the clause:
First, in-modifiers are only fully acceptable when modifying restrictive noun
phrases, but unacceptable when modifying unrestrictive noun phrases. As an
initial illustration, compare (5a) and (5b). The host noun phrase of the modifier in
(Sa) can be restrictive, the one in (5b) is obligatorily unrestrictive. (5a) is
acceptable, but (5b) is unacceptable.
(5) a. Many students in the sixties were rebellious then.
b. *? There were [many students in the sixties] rebellious then.
Second, in-modifiers cause incompatibilities with tenses whose exact nature
will be made precise below. (6) is again just a first illustration of the effect: (6a) is
a past tense clause, whereas (6b) is a present tense clause. Since the difference in
tense is the only significant difference between (6a) and (6b), the contrast in
acceptability between (6a) and (6b) is most likely caused by the difference in
tense.
(6) a. [Most students in the sixties] were rebellious then.
b. * [Most students in the sixties] are established professionals today.
Third, oj-modifiers exhibit neither of the aforementioned properties. This is
shown in (5b') and (6b'). These examples differ from the corresponding data (5b)
and (6b) in that the in-modifiers are here replaced by oj-modifiers. The resulting
sentences are acceptable.
(5b') There were [many students from the sixties] happy then.
(6b') [Most students from/of the sixties] are established professionals today.
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The aim of this chapter is to account for the restricted distribution of in-
modifiers and their effect on the tense of their clause. My claim will be that it is
not a coincidence that the restricted distribution and the effects on tense co-
occur with in-modifiers. Thus, I will derive both effects from some deeper
property of in-modifiers that is not shared by oj-modifiers. I will assume that in-
modifiers differ from of-modifiers in that they are inherently restrictive - in the
sense that they want to restrict a quantifier. Although it is not yet clear to me
why in-modifiers have this property, I will exploit this assumption because it can
explain the behavior of in-modifiers. The chapter proceeds as follows:
In Section 2, I will provide more evidence supporting the generalization that
in-modifiers need to be patt of a restrictive noun phrase, whereas the
unrestrictive/restrictive distinction does not matter for the acceptability of of-
modifiers. In Section 3, I will establish the assumption that in-modifiers are
obligatory restrictors of quantifiers and I will derive their distributional
restrictedness "from this property. Section 4 serves to give a thorough description
of the effects in-modifiers have on tenses. Section 5 aims at providing an
explanation of why in-modifiers affect the tense of their clause. Section 6 finally
is a conclusion and summary of the results achieved in the chapter and raises
some further questions.
2. On the distribution of in-modifiers: unrestrictive and restrictive
DPs
The purpose of this section is to provide extensive evidence supporting the-
generalization that the distribution of in-modifiers correlates with the distinction
between unrestrictive and restrictive noun phrases, i.e. that in-modifiers are
acceptable with restrictive noun phrases, but not (or hardly) with unrestrictive
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noun phrases. As I mentioned in Section 1, this generalization does not hold for
of-modifiers. The evidence for these' claims is presented in (7)-(11).2,3
Restrictive noun phrases are partitive DPs, DPs with strong detenniners (e.g.,
most, all, every), DPs with weak determiners (e.g., some, few, many... ) that are
stressed on the determiner, and generic bare plural noun phrases. Unrestrictive
noun phrases are DPs with weak determiners in certain syntactic positions (e.g., in
there-constructions), DPs with weak determiners that are stressed on the noun,
and existential bare plural noun phrases (cf. Milsark (1974), Diesing (1992), and
others).
First, the data in (7) involve again in-modifiers in there-constructions and
contrasting sentences. DPs occurring in a there-construction are commonly
assumed to be unrestrictive or cardinal. The modified DPs in (7a, b) and (7d, e)
occur in there-constructions and can consequently be classified as unrestrictive
DPs. But whereas the DPs in (7a, d) contain in-modifiers and are unacceptable,
the DPs in (7b, e) contain oj-modifiers and are acceptable. Moreover, (7c, f)
contain the same DPs as (7a, d) - but here they stand in a position where they are
not obligatorily cardinal but can be strong or restrictive. In such a position, they
are acceptable.
(7) a. *1 There were [many speakers on Sunday] in the department then.
b. There were [many speakers from Sunday] in the department then.
c. [Many speakers on Sunday] were in the department then.
d. *1 There were [many students in the sixties] living in Cambridge then.
e. There were [many students of the sixtieslliving in Cambridge then.
f. [Many students in the sixties] were living in Cambridge then.
Thus, the data in (7) confirm both the generalization that in-modifiers are
acceptable as part'of restrictive DPs, but not as part of unrestrictive DPs, and the
generalization that oj-modifiers don't show this distributional restrictedness.
Second, the sentences in (8) involve the German ja-doch-construction. The
particle ja doch (following a suggestion of Diesing translated as 'indeed') has
2 Note that the specific constructions used below make sure that the in-modifiers are indeed
syntactically part of the DP. In (7) and (8), this is for instance achieved by the presence of
damals ('then'), in other examples by the preverbal position of the DP or by word order
regularities. In all the data used in this chapter, one device or other makes sure that the in-
modifiers are syntactically part of the DP with which they occur.
3 All judgements used below are confirmed by other speakers. Apparently not all speakers
are sensitive to all contrasts illustrated in the various constructions below. But since ALL
speakers get the relevant contrast at least with some constructions, I consider the
generalization sufficiently justified.
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been claimed to mark roughly the left edge of the VP and thus, the areas in a
clause where either generic, i.e. restrictive, or existential, i.e. unrestrictive, readings
of bare plurals are preferredly triggered (cf. Diesing (1992»). In (8), the position of
the host noun phrase of the modifier in den siebziger Jahren ('in the seventies')
varies with respect to the particle ja doch. When an indefinite subject of a stage-
level predicate occurs to the left of the particle ja doch, the restrictive reading of
the indefinite is usually strongly preferred. When it occurs to the right of the
particle, usually the unrestrictive reading of the indefinite is strongly preferred. In
(8a), the noun phrase appears to the left of ja doch and is thus preferredly
restrictive. In (8b) and (8c), it appears to the right of ja doch and is thus
preferredly unrestrictive. (8b) and (8c) differ insofar as the noun phrase in (Sc) is
modified by an in-modifier, whereas the one in (8b) isn't. Whereas (8a) and (8b)
are acceptable, (8c) is unacceptable. (8d) illustrates that oj-modifiers - in contrast
to in-modifiers - don't care at all about the restrictiveness of their host noun
phrase: (8d) is fine in contrast to (8e), although the noun phrase ein paar
Studenten aus den sechziger Jahren is preferredly unrestrictive in (8d).
(8) a. (weil) [Feuerwehrleute in den siebziger Iahren] damals
(since) firemen in the seventies then
(ja dachl verfiigbar waren
indeed available were [RESTRICTIVE reading]
('since fIremen in the seventies were available then')
b. (weil) jjadochl [Feuerwehrleute] damals verfiigbar waren
(since) indeedfiremen then available were
[UNRESTRICTIVE reading]
('since fIremen in the seventies were available then')
c.* (weil) jja dochl [Feuerwehrleute in den siebziger Jahrenl
(since) indeed firemen in the seventies
damals verfiigbar waren
then available were [UNRESTRICTIVE reading]
('since frremen in the seventies were available then')
d. (well) lia dochl [Feuerwehrleute aus den siebziger Jahren]
(since) indeed firemen from the·seventies
damals verfiigbar waren
then available were [UNRESTRICTIVE reading]
('since frremen from the seventies were available then1)
Thus, the generalizations formulated above are also supported by the behavior of
in-modifiers and oj-modifiers inja-doch-constructions.
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Third, the construction in (9) exploits the fact that DPs u~:ed as p~eqiG~te
nominals are obligatorily unrestrictive. The fact that (9a) is unacceptable confrrms
again that there is an incompatibility of in-modifiers with unrestri.ctiv~_no~n
phrases. And the fact that (9b) is acceptable illustrates that this incompatibility
does not show up with the temporal modifier aus den vierziger Jahren.4
(9) a. * Hans war [ein Professor in den vierziger Jahrenl.
Hans was a professor in the forties
('Hans was a professor in the forties.')
b. Hans war [ein Professor aus den vierziger Jahren].
Hans was a professor from the forties
('Hans was a professor from the forties. ')
Fourth, informants' judgements lead to the conclusion that there is also a
contrast in (10) which corresponds to the distribution of restrictive and
unrestrictive readings of the DP: Definite DPs are restrictive and can easily host
the temporal modifier. Indefinite DPs are restrictive when their determiner is
stressed, and unrestrictive when it is not stressed. That (lOe-f) are less acceptable
than (lOa-d) correlates with the fact that (lOe-f) are constructed with unrestrictive
noun phrases and (lOa-d) with restrictive n01:1n phrases. Also, (lOa-c) contrast
with (lOg-i); here we do not find a difference in acceptability varying with
restrictiveity of the host DP. Again, the only difference between the sentences is
the choice of preposition; (lOa-c) contain am, wh~r~as (lOg-i) contain voin.
(10)a. [Die Vorlesung am Montag] war furchtbar langweilig.
the lecture on Monday was awfully boring
('The lecture on Monday was terribly boring')
b. [about a certain bookstore:]
[Der Besitzer in den siebziger lahren] war immer nett, wenn man komische BUcher
the owner in the seventies was always nice when one strange books
bestellen wollte.
order wanted
('The owner in the seventies was always nice when someone wanted to order
strange books.t)
c. [EINE Vorlesung am Montag] war furchtbar langweilig.
a lecture on Monday was awfully boring
('A lecture on Monday was terribly boring1)
4 Note that in the German sentence (a) the temporal modifier can hardly be ~ temporal
adverbial because of its sentence final position, whereas it can in the corresponding English
sentence Hans was a professor in the forties.
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d. [EIN Besitzer in den siebziger Jahren] war immer nett, wenn man komische
an owner in the seventies was always nice when one strange
books bestellen wollte.
books order wanted
('An owner in the seventies was always nice when someone wanted to order
strange books.')
e. ? [Bine VORlesung am Montag] war furchtbar langweilig.
a lecture on Monday was awfully boring
('A lecture on Monday was terribly boring')
f. ? [Bin BeSITzer in den siebziger Jahren] war immer nett, wenn man komische
an owner in the seventies was always nice when one strange
books bestellen wollte.
books order wanted
('An owner in the seventies was always nice when someone wanted to order
strange books. ')
g . [Der Redner vom letzten Sonntag] war erkaItet.
the speaker of last Sunday was having-a-cold
('Last Sunday's speaker had a cold')
h. [BIN Redner vom letzten Sonntag] war erkaItet.
a speaker of last Sunday was having-a-cold
('A speaker of last Sunday had a cold.')
i. [Ein REDner vom letzten Sonntag] war erkaItet.
a speaker of last Sunday was having-a-cold
('A speaker of last Sunday had a cold.')
Fifth, (11) illustrates an interesting related observation. Note that, in a world
where Martians do not exist, (lIb) and (lId) are judged false, whereas (lla) and
(ltc) seem to be cases of presupposition failure, because an existence
presupposition is not met. Thus, locative in seems to trigger an existence
presupposition.
(11) a.
b.
c.
d.
Die meisten Marsmenschen sind auf der Terrasse.
most Martians are on the porch
('Most Martians are on the porch.')
Viele Marsmenschen sind auf der Terrasse.
many Martians are on the porch
('Many Martians are on the porch.')
[Viele Marsmenschen in meinem Garten] haben weiBe Ohren.
many Martians in my garden have white ears
('Many Martians in my garden have white ears.')
[Viele Marsmenschen mit weissen Ohrenl sind in meinem Garten.
many Martians with white ears are in my garden
(IMany Martians with white ears are in my garden.')
To summarize, in-modifiers cannot, or not easily, occur within unrestrictive
noun phrases, but only within restrictive noun phrases. This generalization does
not hold for oj-modifiers. The observations made so far in this chapter raise the
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questions why in-modifiers and oj-modifiers differ in this striking way and how
the distributional constraints on in-modifiers can be captured. The next section
starts a discussion of these issues.
3. In-modifiers as obligatory restrictors
3.1. The restricted distribution of in-modifiers
In this section, I will establish the claim that in-modifiers differ from oj-quantifiers
in that they are inherent restrictors of quantifiers. I will argue that their specific
distribution, i.e. their inability to occur as part of an unrestrictive noun phrase, can
be explained as a consequence of this property.
Recall my analysis of unrestrictive and restrictive noun phrase which I
presented in Chapter III. According to my proposal: all determiners - i.e., weak
ones as well as strong ones - are raised at LF and all determiners are associated
with a resource domain variable C, which can get a value supplied by the
context. Unrestrictive DPs and restrictive DPs differ with respect to the presence
of the restrictive clause: restrictive DPs have a restrictive clause at LF, whereas
unrestrictive ones don't. Accordingly, nouns are interpreted differently
depending on whether they occur in an unrestrictive or in a restrictive DP. A
noun that occurs as the complement of a restrictive DP is raised into the restrictive
clause, whereas a noun that occurs as the complement of an unrestrictive DP
remains in the nuclear scope. Thus, we have two types of LFs for determiner-
quantifiers, (12) and (13). (12) is the quantificational structure of an unrestrictive
noun phrase, whereas (13) is the quantificational structure of a restrictive noun
phrase. In the former case, the common noun phrase is part of the nuclear scope
of the determiner-quantifier. In the latter case, it is part of the restrictive clause of
the determiner-quantifier.
(12) unrestrictive noun phrase:
(13) restrictive noun phrase:
DETC lNs NP ]
DETC m.c NP ] lNs ... ]
Moreover, I argued that the resource domain variable of any determiner is
restrictively interpreted. Thus, according to this proposal, all DPs provide at LF a
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nuclear scope as well as restrictively interpreted material. With restrictive DPs, the
restrictively interpreted material consists of the resource domain variable and the
overt restrictive clause, whereas with unrestrictive DPs, it consists only of the
resource domain variable. I will refer below to the restrictively interpreted
material of a quantifier as its restrictive area.
Since in-modifiers are syntactically part of their host-NP aQd semantically a
modifier of the noun, they appear at LF wherever the NP ends up. If the NP
appears in the nuclear scope of a determiner because it is the complement of an
unrestrictive DP, then the in-modifier will also appear as part of the nuclear scope
(14). And if the NP appears in the restrictive clause because it happens to be the
complement of a restrictive DP, then the in-modifier will also appear as part of the
restrictive clause (15).
(14) unrestrictive noun phrase:
(15) restrictive noun phrase:
* DET C lNs [N}l N PP] ]
DET C ffic [N}l N PP] ] lNs ... ]
Now if .being an inherent restrictor meant for in-modifiers just that they need to
occur as part of the restrictive area of some quantifier, we would be all set at this
point and have an explanation for why in-modifiers are unacceptable when
contained in unrestrictive noun phrases: according to my argument above, in-
modifiers contained in an unrestrictive noun phrase would not be able to appear
as part of the restrictive area, because they have to stay with the NP they modify
in the nuclear scope, resulting in a structure like (14). But if in-modifiers are of an
inherently restrictive nature in the sense that they want to occur as part of the
restrictive area of a quantifier, then a structure like (14) would conflict with the
requirement of the in-modifier to appear in the restrictive clause. Consequently, a
structure like (14)' could not be acceptable. But if a restrictive noun phrase
contains an in-modifier, then the requirement of the in-modifier at LF would be
fulfilled (15).
Unfortunately, it seems that things are not quite that simple; exploiting a
typology of restrictors suggested by von Fintel (1994, 33f and 77), it seems likely
that in-modifiers are a type of restrictor that doesn't make it possible to make use
of the simple account I sketched in the preceding paragraph. According to von
Fintel, there are three ways in which particular expressions may serve
(obligatorily or optionally) as restrictors of quantifiers.
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First, expressions may be syntactic restrictor arguments of quantifiers and
thus be syntactically required to be present, like nouns for restrictive determiner-
quantifiers,
Second, expressions may be restrictors that affect quantifiers indirectly
because they affect the context directly and thus can influence which value the
hidden resource domain variable gets assigned by the context.· Von Fintel treats
the interactions of topic-focus-structure and presuppositions with quantification
as processes of ~estriction of this type: Since topic-focus-structure or
presuppositions impose requirements on what an appropriate context for an
utterance is, it often seems that they supply the functions that modify the
resource domain variable directly. Von Fintel argues that they can do this
indirectly by imposing requirements on the context.
Third, expressions may be restrictors that constrain a quantifier via a hidden
resource domain variable without being a syntactic argument of the quantifier
Von Fintel argues that this may be the correct analysis of conditional clauses.
Given this typology, which type of restrictors do inmodifiers belong to? It is
clear that in-modifiers can't be syntactic restrictor arguments of quantifiers, for
their presence is not at all required by the presence of a determiner-quantifier.
Thus, the first of the three possibilities can be immediately excluded. Is one of the
other two possibilities able to give us an adequate account of the behavior of in-
modifiers?
Suppose in-modifiers were expressions that affect the context directly and
thus influence which value the resource domain variable gets a~signed by the
context. · Why then should it be the case that in-modifiers want to be part of the
restrictive clause at LF and are unacceptable if they are bound to occur in the
nuclear scope? This would remain a complete mystery, for if in-modifiers affected
the resource domain variable indirectly by affecting the context directly, there
would be no (obvious) motivation for why in-modifiers have to be in a special
structural position at LF in order to perform the function of affecting the context.
Thus, we are left with the third possibility, according to which in-modifiers
are obligatory modifiers of resource domain variables - as perhaps conditional
clauses are. I will assume that this is the adequate analysis of in-modifiers.
But this step raises obvious further questions. Since according to my
proposal, unrestrictive as well as restrictive noun phrases provide a resource
domain variable, we must crucially assume that items in the restrictive clause can
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perform the function of being obligatory modifiers of resource domain variables,
but that items in the nuclear scope can't. Why should this be the case?
I will assume that in-modifiers are obligatory modifiers of resource domain
variables and that their modification' of the resource domain variable presupposes
that the in-modifier is copied to the resource domain variable at LF. Thus, given
that the resource domain variables and the overt restrictive material are
intersectively interpreted, as suggested in von Fintel (1994) and shown in (16),
(16) IT QcTI (A, B) =IT Q]] (ellA, B)
and given that noun and in-modifier are also intersectively interpreted, we predict
that a sentence like Most students in the sixties were rebellious has roughly the
truth conditions in (17).5
(17) IT Most students in the sixties were rebellious]] = 1
iff [[ moste]] ([[ students in the sixties ]) ( IT were rebellious ]]) =1
iff [by copying of the in-modifier to the resource domain variable]
[most[in the sixties]]] ([students in the sixties]D([were rebelliousJD =1
iff for most x such that x is located in the sixties and x is a student and x is
. located in the sixties, x was rebellious.
In order to account for the fact that in-modifiers can't perform their function of
modifying the resource domain variable when being part of the nuclear scope, but
only when they are part of the restrictive clause, I will assume henceforth that
copying of material can happen within the restrictive area, but not across the
boundary between the nuclear scope and the restrictive clause.6 In the structures
5 For ease of presentation, I am disregarding here the stage-semantics I suggested in
Chapter TIl as well as details of temporal interpretation. See Section 7 for a more detailed
semantics.
6 Kai von Fintel (pc) drew my attention to the fact that in this respect, copying of material
differs crucially from movement of material. Thus, Diesing (1992) argued for LF-
scrambling of certain object noun phrases from the nuclear scope into the restrictive clause.
Moreover, the process of presupposition accommodation from the nuclear scope into the
restrictive clause as exploited in Berman (1989) works differently - if it exists at all
(According to Berman, presuppositions of the material in the nuclear scope of a
quantificational structure are accommodated into the restrictive clause.). However, von
Fintel (1994, 66ff) argues at length, and convincingly, against Berman's proposal. With
an alternative approach as suggested in von Fintel (1994), where apparent presupposition
accommodation is captured as a case of discourse anaphora, these cases do not pose any
questions or problems for my constraint on copying of material from the nuclear scope into
the restrictive area.
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below, the copying of in-modifiers to resource domain variables will be indicated
by coindexing the modifier and the resource domain variable.
Thus, the following picture emerges. Suppose an in-modifier occurs as part of
an unrestrictive noun phrase. The unrestrictive NP stays in the nuclear scope of
the determiner at LF. Since the in-modifier is a modifier of the NP, i~ has to stay at
LF in the same area as the NP. But when it remains in the nuclear scope, it can't
be copied across the boundary of the nuclear scope to the resource domain
variable, as indicated by the index i in (18a). Consequently a structure like (18a)
can't occur. But if that is so, then the in-modifier cannot function as it wants to -
namely, it can't modify the resource domain variable of the determiner. As a
consequence of this, structur~s with an in-modifier as part of an unrestrictive
noun phrase are not well-formed. But with restrictive noun phrases, the in-
modifier can be together with its NP in the restrictive clause. Thus, the copying
indicated by the index i in (18b) is possible, and the structure is well-formed.
(18) a. unrestrictive noun phrase:
* many [Ci] [NS ... [NP N PPi ] ...]
b. restrictive noun phrase:
most [Ci] [RC ··.mp N PPi ]...] [NS ...]
In this way, the observation that in-modifiers are acceptable in restrictive noun
phrases but unacceptable in unrestrictive noun phrases can be explained as a
consequence of their being obligatory modifiers of resource domain variables.?
3.2. On obligatory restrictors in natural language
Although the hypothesis I just suggested appears to be plausible, it is so far
unclear why in-modifiers should be of an inherently restrictive or restrictive
nature. Here, I can offer only vague speculations concerning the issue. I believe
'7 Here it may be important to note that in-modifiers are at least marginally acceptable with
proper names: cf. (?) Angela in den siebziger Jahren warein braves Schulmiidchen. I
am not quite sure about the acceptability of this type of sentence, but it doesn't seem too
odd. Paul (1994, 269) also seems to assume in the text of his paper that temporal in-
modifiers are acceptable with proper names, although he actually doesn't use them in any
examples, but exploits only oj-modifiers, e.g. in The Paris of the 20s was exciting. If
in-modifiers are fully acceptable with proper names and proper names don't have resource
domain variables (which seems to me the most likely analysis), then my generalization that
in-modifiers are always modifiers of resource domain variables turns out to be problematic.
174
MUSAN: TEMPORALIN'TERPRETATION OFNPS - N. NP-MODIFIERS
that the reason must be some internal properties of the modifier - perhaps it has
something to do with the inclusive meaning of in-modifiers. In light of this
vagueness, it may appear as if saying that in-modifiers are inherently restrictive or
restrictive just shifts the question of why they are largely incompatible with
unrestrictive noun phrases to another question. Raising one question or the
other may indeed not make a big difference with respect to explanatory
adequacy.
But it becomes evident that the question is part of a larger unsolved problem.
There is some evidence that natural language exploits expressions which are only
acceptable if they can function as the restrictor of some quantifier. This is for
instance arguably the case with if-clauses (cf. Lewis (1975), Roath (1985, 203),
Kratzer (1991) and von Fintel (1994): they are only acceptable when functioning
as restrictors of a quantifier.
This is demonstrated in (19) and (20) with an argument taken from Rooth
(1985, 203). "(19a) and (19b) show that the sentence He always shaves when he
is in the shower can have two readings, depending on the focus structure of the
sentence. When shaves is focussed, as in (19a), the when-clause functions as the
restrictor of the adverb of quantification always. But when shower is focussed,
the when-clause does not have to function as a restrictor. Instead, the material
provided by the matrix clause does.
(19) a.
b.
He always SHAVES when he is in the shower.
ALWAYS [he is in the shower] [he shaves]
He always shaves when he is in the SHOWER.
ALWAYS [he shaves] [he is in the shower]
The crucial observation now is that if-clauses behave differently. In (20a), and
(20b), shaves and shower are focussed, respectively, analogously to the variation
in (19a) and (19b). But here focus doesn't trigger reading alternations: in each
case, the if-clause has to function as the restrictor of the adverb of quantification.
(20) a. He always SHAVES if he is in the shower.
ALWAYS [he is in the shower] [he shaves]
b. He always shaves if he is in the SHOWER.
ALWAYS [he is in the shower] [he shaves]
* ALWAYS [he shaves] [he is in the shower]
To summarize, If-clauses are only acceptable when serving as restrictors. Thus, if-
clauses are obligatory restrictors of quantifiers. Under this analysis, one has to
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assume implicit quantifiers whenever an if-clause occurs without an overt
quantifier. Although (19) and (20) seem to suggest at first sight that when-
clauses differ from if-clauses in that they do not have to function obligatorily as
restrictors, when-clauses may in fact be another case of an expression that serves
obligatorily as a restrictor of some quantifier. This is the view taken for instance
by Kratzer (1988, 7). Kratzer's view is refused though by Johnston (1994, see for
instance pp SIf) - at least on a certain level. On the other hand, wh~n-clauses
appear in Johnston's approach always either in the restrictive clause of an adverb
of quantification (with readings like (19a»), or in the restrictive clause of an
existential quantifier within the nuclear scope of an adverb of quantification
(with readings like (19b») (p71), or in the restrictive clause of an existential
quantifier (with episodic constructions involving when-clauses) (p114). Thus,
Johnston's proposal may in fact be viewed as a special version of Kratzer's claim.
To conclude this section, it seems plausible that there is a larger class of
expressions in natural language that are obligatory restrictors. This observation
may lend some support to my hypothesis that in-modifiers are obligatory
restrictors. They are just one particular kind of expression in the class of
obligatory restrictors in natural language. Thus, the question must be raised why
there are obligatory restrictors at all in natural language, but as far as I can see,
there is not yet an answer to this question.
I'YoucnJldcheatIDout~d£ia.. II_- ''No, ldon'twant
todo1HAT..."-- 'WenyoucnJldIIEAllZE~data.I'
- AnonynnJS -
'Wehavetoseewha~fais are. 't
-Mnis-
4. Interactions of in-modifiers and tense
4.1. What precisely are the effects?
As I mentioned in Section 1, in-modifiers can trigger incompatibilities with the
tense of their clause. Thus, we have seen above that in-modifiers with a past
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meaning seem to. be incompatible with present tense. In contrast to in-modifiers,
of-modifiers do not interact with the tense of their clause. In the remainder of this
chapter, I will discuss the question of how this observation can be explained. In
order to do this, I will spend this section on showing what precisely the effect of
in-modifiers on the tense interpretation is. In the next section, I will then link the
occurrence of tense incompatibilities to the distributional requirements on in-
modifiers that were discussed in the preceding sections and provide an account
of how the effects on tense come about. Before I present the cruciai data, I want
to summarize here briefly on a ·purely descriptive level what they will show8:
Basically, we will see that in-modifiers impose an upper limit on the event
time of their clause, i.e., the event .time of the clause is not allowed to follow the
time denoted by the modifier. Thus, the effects in-modifiers have on tenses do
not concern incompatibilities with certain tenses viewed as morphemes. Rather,
the incompatibilities at issue concern crucially the meaning of temporal elements.
On the other hand, there is evidence that - as far as the in-modifier's contribution
to the incompatibilities is concerned - it is not only meanings that count. Thus,
implicit material that has arguably the same meaning as a certain in-modifier does
not share its ability to affect tenses. After this survey, let's have a look at the data.
.(21) shows that modifiers with a past meaning - like in the sixties - are good
with past tense.
(21) Die ~eistenLottogewinner in den sechziger Jahren waren damals unglticklich.
the most lottery winners in the sixties were then unhappy
('Most lottery winners in the sixties were unhappy then')
(22a) shows that past modifiers with present tense and the temporal adverbial
today are unacceptable. Note that the incompatibility in (22a) must be caused by
the modifier and hot by the meaning of the sentence; this can be concluded from
the fact that (22b) is perfectly acceptable even when it gets a contextual
restriction of the DP that is synonymous with the meaning resulting from the
overt modifier in (22a), i.e., when it is understood as having a meaning like "Fot
most x, such that x was a lottery-winner in the sixties, x is unhappy today".
(22) a.* Die meisten Lottogewinner in den sechziger Jahren sind heute unglticklich.
the most lottery winners in the sixties are today unhappy
('Most lottery winners in the sixties are unhappy today.t)
8 The English data behave very much like the German data, but since I worked mostly with
German informants, I will rely on the German data here.
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b. [context: In the sixties, lots of people won amazing amounts of money in the
lottery, but. ..]
... die meisten Lottogewinner sind heute ungliicklich.
the most lottery winners are today unhappy
Thus, it is not the meaning resulting from the presence of the in-modifier that
causes the incompatibility with present tense in (22a), but it is rather something
else about the modifier that is responsible for the unacceptability of (22b).
(23) illustrates that present modifiers together with present tense are
acceptable.
(23) Die meisten Lottogewinner in diesem Jahrzehnt sind ungliicklich.
the most lottery winners. in this decade are unhappy
CMost lottery winners in this decade are unhappy.')
Thus, the incompatibility in (23) cannot be caused by a general incompatibility of
in-modifiers with present tense.
(24) shows that past modifiers can sometimes occur with present tense.
However, (24) is only good when it gets a historic present tense reading - i.e. in
the context of a report about the lives of lottery winners, but only when it has a
reading "Most lottery winners in the sixties were unhappy then. II
(24) Die meisten Lottogewinner in den sechziger Jahren sind unglticklich.
the most lottery winners in the sixties are unhappy
('Most lottery winners in the sixties are unhappy.l)
The data presented so far may suggest at first sight that for some reason, the
modifiers lead to obligatorily temporally dependent readings. Thus, (21) seems to
be acceptable and true if and only if for most x, such that x was a lottery-winner
in the sixties, x was unhappy in the sixties. (23), where the time of winning the
lottery is located in the decade that includes the time of utterance, is also
acceptable. On the historic present tense reading of (24), the predication times of
the noun lottery winner and the predicate be unhappy coincide. Thus, using the
terminology introduced in Chapter III, these three sentences have in common that
the subject noun phrases appear to have temporally dependent interpretations.
And coinciding predication times of the subject and the main .predicate are made
impossible in (22a) by the presence of the temporal adverbial heute; the sentence
is unacceptable. Hence, the data presented so far seem compatible with the
hypothesis that in-modifiers are acceptable if and only if the host DP of the
modifier has a temporally dependent interpretation.
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But other sentences show that this cannot be quite the right generalization.
There are fully acceptable sentences with in-modifiers which can easily have
predication times of host DP and main predicate that don't coincide. When a
temporal adverbial is present in the clause, as in den vierziger Jahren in (25), the
predication tIme of the main predicate can be located at a time that does not
overlap the time denoted by the temporal modifier.
(25) Die meisten Lottogewinner in den 60er Jahren waren in den 40er Jahren arm.
the most lottery winners in the sixties were in the forties poor
CMost lottery winners in the sixties were poor in the forties.')
Thus, the incompatibilities with in-modifiers are not caused by some requirement
that forces in-modifier clauses to exploit temporally dependent readings of the
host DP.
If this is not the right generalization, how then can we capture the
incompatibilities illustrated above? The most informative contrast for finding the
right generalization is presented in (26). (26a) and (26b) are almost the same
sentence. The only difference between (26a) and (26b) is that (26a) contains the
temporal adverbial in the twenties, and (26b) contains the temporal adverbial in
the sixties. And (26a) is acceptable, but (26b) is mostly judged unacceptable.9
(26) a. Die meisten Politiker in den 40er Jahren waren in den 20er Jahren unzufrieden.
the most politicians in the forties were in the twenties dissatisfied
('Most politicians in the forties were dissatisfied in the twenties. I)
b.*? Die meisten Politiker ip. den 40er Jahren waren in den 60er Jahren unzufrieden.
the most politicians in the forties were in the sixties dissatisfied
('Most politicians in the forties were dissatisfied in the sixties.')
I find the comments of one of my informants in connection with in-modifiers very
enlightening. Basically, she complained about the "temporal jumping back and
forth" in sentences like (26b) and sentences with '[+PAST] modifiers and present
tense. tO This intuition is surprising, since there does not seem to be any more
9 Since judgements are not entirely clear, I want to add that (a) was judged acceptable by
about 72% and unacceptable by about 28% of the 15 informants I asked. (b) was judged
acceptable by 25% and unacceptable by 75% of the 8 informants that gave me judgements
on this sentence.
10 "Das zeitliche 'Hin-und-her-gehopse' in den Satzen (1) und (4) mag mir so gar nicht
gefallen, am schlimmsten finde ich dabei Satz (4), der meiner Meinung nach irgendwie
eigentlich gar nicht gehen konnen sollte, auch wenn rnir Idar ist, daB er erklarbar ist. Ich
finde ihn aber ganz furchtbar." (Andrea G.)
(1) Die meisten Politiker in den 40er Jahren sind heute tot.
(2) Die meisten Politiker in den 40er Jahren waren unzufrieden.
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objective "jumping back ~nd forth" in (26b) than in (26a). The crucial difference
between (26a) and (26b) is that, because of the choice of different temporal
adverbials, the event time of the main predicate in (26a) is located before the
time denoted by the modifier, whereas it is located after the time denoted by the
, modifier-in (26b). Thus, it seems as if it is somehow conceptually more difficult to
relate an in-modifier's time to a following main predicate's event time than to a
preceding event time.
In light of the contrast in (26), the adequate descriptive generalization for all
the sentences in (21) - (26) seems to be that the event time of the main predicate is
not allowed to follow the time of the modifier. The picture in (27) shows the
possible and impossible temporal configurations of in-modifiers and event times.
(27) event time event time *event time
_____1 +1-------1----->
in-modifier
What is interesting about this generalization is that there are other constructions
in natural language that seem to be subject to a similar constraint, i.e. complex
sentences. Abusch (1994) suggested that there is an UPPER LIMIT
CONSTRAINT on the reference of tenses in matrix and embedded clauses. What
this constraint says is basically that the reference of the tense in an embedded
clause is not allowed to follow the reference of the tense in the matrix clause - or:
the reference of the tense of the matrix clause imposes an UPPER LIMIT on the
reference of the time of the embedded clause. Using these terms, one might say
that the time of the in-modifiers discussed in this chapter imposes an upper limit
on the event time of the main predicate of its clause. The following subsection
introduces Abusch's Upper Limit Constraint and its original range of application.
4.2. Abusch's (1994) Upper Limit Constraint in co~plexsentences
There are two constructions relevant with regar~ to the behavior of tenses in
embedded clauses, the sequence-of-tense construction and the double access
construction.
(3) Die meisten Politiker in den 40er Jahren waren in den 20er Jahren unzufrieden.
(4) Die meisten Politiker in den 40er Jahren waren in den 60er Jahren unzufrieden.
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Sequence-of-tense constructions are sentences where an intensional past
tense verb has a complement with a stative past tense verb - as in (28a) John said
that Peter was sick. In such a configuration, the embedded clause can have a
backward shifted tense reading (28b) or a simultaneous reading (28c), but not a
forward shifted reading (28d). Thus, the event time of Peter's being sick in (28a)
can be located before (28b) or at the time of John's saying (28c). But it cannot be
located at a time between John's saying and the time when (28a) is uttered, as in
(28d).
(28) a.
b.
c.
d.
John said that Peter was sick.
Backward shifted tense reading: John said at a time t before tu that
Peter was'sick at a time t' before t.
.Simultaneous tense reading: John said at a time t before tu that Peter
was sick at t .
NO forward shifted tense reading: *John said at a time t before tu
.that Peter was sick at a time t' before tu (and after t).
With the backward shifted tense reading, John said that Peter was sick
corresponds to a situation where what John said at t was something like "Peter
was sick". I.e., roughly speaking, the embedded clause takes the event time of
the embedding clause as its evaluation time and constructs from that point a past
meaning. With the simultaneous reading the sentence corresponds to a situation
where what John said originally was something like "Peter is sick". At this point,
it is - although much simplified compared to Abusch (1994) - adequate enough to
explain the possibility of these two readings by saying that the embedded past
tense may locate the event time of the embedded predicate somewhere before the
time of utterance tu.
But what about the lack of the forward shifted reading? According to what I
jl1st said, the forward shifted reading (28d) should also be possible. Adopting a
referential analysis of tense, Abusch captures the lack of the forward shifted tense
reading by stating the Upper Limit Constr~int (ULC, p24) on the reference of
tenses. This constraint prohibits basically a situation where the reference of the
tense in the embedded clause is located after the reference of the tense of the
matrix clause. Since the reference of the tense of the matrix clause is taken by
Abusch to be the local evaluation time for the embedded clause, the effect can be
formulated as a constraint on the relation between local evaluation times and
tenses.
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(29) Upper Limit Constraint:
The local evaluation time is an upper limit for the reference of tenses. 1I
The resulting picture of possible relations between matr~x tenses and embedded
tenses (30) is exactly parallel to (27).
(30) ernbeddedtense embedded tense *embeddedtense
_____1- ......1 ,1-_----->
matrix tense
The idea of the ULC is, according to Abusch, that tenses can only refer to
times with which one can be "acquainted" from the perspective of the respective
local evaluation time. Roughly speaking, possible acquaintance relations involve
in general some kind of causal connection. Since causal connections can only go
backward but not forward, forward relations between the local evaluation time
and a time referred to by a tense are prohibited.
Note that the "local evaluation time" in Abusch's proposal does not do what
one expects from an evaluation time in traditional approaches: The "local
evaluation time" set by a matrix clause is in Abusch's proposal not a time from
which past tense "counts" backwards. This is due to Abusch's referential tense
semantics. If the "local evaluation time" were a time from which past tense
counted backwards, the occurrence of simultaneous readings for past-~nder-past
constru"ctions would not be captured. The effect of the "local ev~luation time" is
that it provides a hierarchically higher temporal element in the sentence that
determines the relevant point of view or orientation as far as the ULe is
concerned. This point is crucial in connection with my application of the ULC to
the behavior of in-modifiers below.
A very important point about A,bnsch's proposal is that the ULC concerns
only tenses. It does not concern" modalities. Since Abusch treats future "tense"
not as a tense category, but as a modal category (as has been suggested before
for independent reasons12), the constraint allows for future tenses to refer to times
that are located after the local evaluation time given by a matrix clause - i.e., they
can change the evaluation time.
11 According to Abusch, future "tense" is a modal category and does consequently not
undergo the ULC. .
12 See for instance En~ (1985). Of course, the opposite claim has also been defended, for
instance by Declerck (1991).
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Speaking on a descriptive level, one may say that the event time of an
embedded clause is subject to an upper limit imposed by the event time of the
matrix clause. Since the tense semantics I am exploiting in this thesis is not
referential, I will henceforth assume that it is the event time of clauses that are
subject to the ULC. Thus, adopting this terminology, the ULC prohibits basically
a situation where the event time of the embedded clause is located after the event
.time of the matrix clause. For the present purpose, I will thus reformulate the ULC
as in (31).
(31) Upper Limit Constraint (fIrst reformulated version):
The event time of the matrix clause is an upper limit for the event time of
the embedded clause.
Thus, it seems that the ULC is a more general constraint on possible relations
of the denot~tions of temporal elements. It not only captures an aspect of the
behavior of embedded event times in relation to matrix event times, but also the
behavior of event times of clauses in relation to in-modifiers that are contained in
the clause. I.e., just as the event time of a matrix clause fixes an upper limit for the
event time of an embedded clause, the time of an in-modifier fixes an upper limit
for the event time of the clause.
The Upper Limit Constraint can also capture the lack of forward shifted
readings with double access constructions. In double access constructions, a
present tense is embedded under a matrix past tense - as in (32a) John said that
Peter is sick. The crucial property of this construction is that in English, it admits
only readings where the event time of the complement clause denotes an interval
that includes the time of John's saying as well as the time at which the wh~le
sentence is uttered. I.e., Peter's time of being sick cannot be located completely
after the time of John's saying. The picture in (32b) illustrates this effect.
------>
John's utterance utterance
"Peter is sick" of (a)
__1 1
John said that Peter is sick.
b.
(32) a.
Peter's sickness
Thus, roughly speaking, present tense under past tense leads to interpretations
where the event time of the embedded main predicate extends at least from the
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evaluation time provided by the embedding clause until the time of utterance of
the whole sentence. 13,14
4.3. Other combinations of in-modifiers and tenses
My claim is that the incompatibilities of in-modifiers with certain tense
interpretations are due to some generalized version of the ULC. We have seen
above that some combinations of in-modifiers and tenses behave accordingly. In
this subsection, I will show that other combinations of in-modifiers and tenses
provide further evidence for the hypothesis that the relations between in-
modifiers and event times obey some such constraint.
In particular, the proposal to view the observed incompatibilities as an effect
of the ULC predicts that in-modifiers denoting present time intervals or future
time intervals should be acceptable with past tenses and with present tense. This
prediction is indeed borne out, as the sentences and judgements in (33) show.15
13 This is a very rough characterization of the reading. The event time of the embedded
clause does not have to extend like this. In fact, the double access effect does not concern
an actual event time, but rather an interest of the speaker in the asserted maIn property
during the respective span of time (cf. Ogihara (1989) and Abusch (1994, 33f)).
14 In German, the situation is not quite that clear; judgements vary among speakers and
even among sentences, and it seems that contextual information can playa crucial role on
whether a particular sentence like (A) gets a double access reading.
(A) Hans sagte, daB Peter krank ist.
Hans said that Peter sick is
('Hans said that Peter is sick.')
With (A), about 50% of the German speakers I asked get the DA effect. But with a more
elabora~e sentence the DA effect may be much weaker if present at all. This can be
observed with (B).
(B) Als ich Hans am Montag traf, sagte er mir, daB ihm schlecht ist
when I Hans on Monday met said he me that him sick is
('When I met Hans on Monday, he told me that he feels sick.').
Thus, the DA phenomenon occurs at least to a certain degree also in German. In fact, there
are good reasons why the intuitions of German speakers should not be all that clear: Kai
von Fintel suggests that the vagueness of judgements may be due to the fact that German
also exploits subjunctive forms in certain embedded clauses, e.g., for speech reports; this
may confuse intuitions - even more so since German seems to undergo a process of
eliminating subjunctive constructions.
15 (a), (b), (d) were judged acceptable by all speakers, (c), (e), and (f) were judged
unacceptable by 20-25% of the informants.
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Die meisten Politiker in diesem Jahrzehnt sind resigniert.
the most politicians in this decade are resigned
('Most politicians in this decade are resigned')
Die meisten Politiker in diesem Jahrzehnt gingen 1960 zur Schule.
the most politicians in this decade went 1960 to-the school
('Most politicians in this decade went to school in 1960.')
Die meisten Politikerin diesem Jahrzehnt waren 1960 zur Schule gegangen.
the most politicians in this decade were 1960 to-the school gone
('Most politicians in this decade went to school in 1960.')
Die meisten Politiker in diesem Jahrzehnt sind 1960 zur Schule gegangen.
the most politicians in this decade are 1960 to-the school gone
('Most politicians in this decade went to school in 1960.1)
Die meisten Politiker in den 90er Jahren werden 2020 pensioniert seine
the most politicians in thie nineties become 2020 retired be
('Most politicians in th~ nineties will be retired in 2020.')
Die meisten Politiker im nachsten Jahrhundert sind heute noch Kinder.
the most politicians in tthe next century are today still kids
CMost politicians in the next century are today still kids. ')
All these judgements are compatible with the proposal that the ULC applies to
the relation between in-modifiers and the event time of their clause.
Another question to be asked is what the ULC-analysis predicts with regard
to the behavior of future tenses. As I mentioned above, Abusch (1994) does not
treat future "tense" as a tense category, but as a modal category. This analysis
accounts for the fact that future "tense" do not undergo the ULC, as can be easily
seen with (34); here, the event time of the embedded clause can be located at a
time after the event time of the matrix clause.
(34) John said that Peter will be sick.
Thus, according to Abusch, the range of the ULC is restricted to proper tenses.
Considering again in-modifier constructions though, this does not mean that
future "tense" is predicted to be acceptable with all in-modifiers, regardless of
what time they denote. The reason for that is that analyzing future IItense" as a
modal category doesn't. mean that the respective clauses are tenseless. Thus, I
propose to analyze future "tense" as the present tense version of a modal
category. If we assume such an analysis, then our proposal predicts that future
"tense" clauses behave just like present tense clauses. Thus, they are predicted to
be unacceptable with in-modifiers that denote past time intervals. This prediction
is indeed borne out, as is shown in (35). Note that the sentences in (35) contrast
with (33e), where the,in-modifier denotes a present time interval. 16
16 Here, (a) was judged unacceptable by 100% of the informants, (b) by about 86%.
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(35) a. *? Die meisten Studenten in den 50er Jahren werden im nachsten
Jahrzehnt pensioniert seine
('Most students in the fifties will be retired in the next decade.')
b. *? Die meisten Studenten in den 50er Jahren werden im nachsten
Jahrzehnt pensioniert worden seine
('Most student in the fifties will have been retired in the next
decade.')
Furthermore, future "tense" clauses should be acceptable with in-modifiers
denoting present time intervals. This prediction is also borne out, as (36) shows.
(36) a. Die meisten Politiker in diesem Jahrzehnt werden im nachsten
. Jahrzehnt pensioniert seine
('Most politicians in this decade will be retired in the next decade. ')
b. Die meisten Politiker in diesem Jahrzehnt werden im nachsten
Jahrzehnt pensioniert worden seine
('Most politicians in this decade will have been retired in the next
decade.')
Having thus dealt with future tenses, the behavior of the present perfect
tense deserves also some more attention. In German, present perfect is usually
used exactly like past tense in English. That is, in contrast to English, in German
present perfect requires no particular link to the time of utterance. In fact, in some
southern dialects, simple past tense is completely substituted by present perfect.
English behaves quite differently from German in this respect; present perfect in
English is notoriously bound to contexts that provide a strong connection to the
present. Interestingly, English speakers judge present perfect clauses with past
temporal modifiers different than German speakers: Thus, sentences like (37)
(37) Most professors in the sixties have been unhappy recently/since then.
are judged just as bad as the corresponding present tense construction by two
speakers; another speaker judged it as intermediate between. the present tense
construction and the past tense construction.. Thus, it seems that present perfect
behaves in English in an important respect like present tense, whereas in German
it behaves in this respect like past tense. This explanation seems even more
convincing because 'present perfect sentences in Germa~ seem also pretty bad
when present perfect is used in a variety where it implies a strong connection to
the time of utterance. This is illustrated in (38), where (38a) corresponds to the
English example (37).
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(38) a. ?? Die meisten Professoren in den sechziger Jahren sind seitdem ungliicklich
the most professors in the sixties are since-then ~nhappy
gewesen.
been
('Most professors in the sixties have been unhappy since then.')
b. ?? Die meisten Professoren in den vierziger lahren sind schon gestorben.
the most professors in the forties are already died
('Most professors in the forties have already died.')
To summarize, various combinations of in-modifiers and the event time of
their clause support the generalization that the relationship between the
denotations of these two temporal elements is subject to some version of the
ULC.
'Thatsretltr,"sanWnn;ey. 'Nap:>hJnocsorrrlxxlysaidyoo rou1d always tum a
tragedyintoacornrly, bysittin' down Perfectlytn.r, ~n'tit?Lefs talkmrt:
sorrethingordinary till1v1issPl$ro~in. Shallwe?'
-DJrothyL Sayas, The Unpleasantness at the Bella1aOub-
5. In-modifiers and upper limits
What I have shown in the preceding section is that in-modifiers impose an
"upper limit" on the event time of the main predicate of their clause. Thus, I have
argued that the temporal incompatibilities arising with in-modifiers are a special
case of more generally occurring incompatibilities between temporal elements that
have to do with temporal ordering. In this section, I will deal with the question of
. why in-modifiers are able to fix upper limits for the event time of their clause. In
5.1., I will consider and abandon a pragmatic account of the conditions under
which upper limit effects can be triggered. Since this approach fails, I will then in
the remainder of the chapter consider and adopt a syntactic account.
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We have already seen that the ability of in-modifiers to fix upper limits is not
only due to their meaning, but also to their explicit presence. This was shown
with the contrast between examples that exploit implicit restrictions on
quantifiers and examples with explicit in-modifiers that have the same meaning:
whereas the former construction is' not able to fix upper limits, the latter
construction is. I will propose that elements that can fix upper limits have to
stand in a certain syntactic relation to the element that is subject to the Upper
Limit Constraint in order to be able to impose an upper limit on that element.
Evidence for this claim is provided by the contrast between partitive and non-
partitive DPs. Whereas in-modifiers contained in the former type of DP cannot fix
upper limits for the event time of their clause, in-modifiers contained in the latter
type of DP can. This has to do with the depth of embedding of the minimal host
DP of the in-modifier.
I will assume. that the element that corresponds structurally to the event time
is the time argument of the main predicate. Syntactically, it appears as the sister of
the predicate. The syntactic relationship between upper-limit-fixer and upper-
limit-fixee will be linked to my claim that in-moqifiers are modifiers of resource
domain variables. Moreover, the syntactic relationship seems to be a general
condition on the occurrence of ULC-effects. The observation that the depth of
embedding of the host DP is relevant will be linked to the claim that in-modifiers
are obligatory modifiers of resource domain variables.
Knowing why in-modifiers have effects on the tense interpretation of their
clause is not necessarily the same as knowing how they do it. Although I will
speculate somewhat about this point, many questions concerning the ULC-
approach will still be left open at the end of the chapter.
5.1. Do in-modifiers pragmatically provide local evaluation times?
The goal of this subsection is to check whether one can plausibly argue that in-
modifiers fix a kind of local evaluation time for their clause. The initial motivation
for this idea are observations concerning the interaction of in-modifiers and
implicit temporal restrictions. The interaction of these two elements shows that
in-modifiers are suitable providers of semantic values for implicit temporal
restrictions. This suggests that they may perhaps also be suitable providers of
semantic values for local evaluation times. However, I will argue at length that
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the strong ability of in-modifiers to provide semantic values for implicit temporal
elements cannot usefully be applied to the fixing of upper limits.
Let us begin by having a look at the interaction of implicit temporal
restrictions and in-modifiers. (39a) is a well-known example of Partee (1973). It
shows that many sentences behave as if they contain an implicit temporal frame
adverbial; it has a meaning like (39b), where the bracketed expression provides a
definite time interval that seems to provide a temporal frame for the main predicate
of the clause. In Chapter II I attributed this effect to the presence of an implicit
temporal restriction of an implicit adve.rb of quantification. The specific meaning
of the implicit temporal restriction is supplied by the discourse context.
(39) a.
b.
I didn't turn off the stove. (Partee (1973))
[At the time before we left], I didn't tum off the stove.
(40) shows a. related observation: when there is an in-modifier in the clause, it
introduces a time interval which is then preferredly used as the value for the
implicit temporal restriction. As a result, (40a) can get a reading that is
indistinguishable from a temporally dependent reading of the host DP - i.e., a
reading where the predication time of the noun lottery winners and the
predication time of be poor coincide: "Most lottery winners in the sixties 'Yere
poor in the sixties" (40b). Many informants get this reading preferredly, although
it is pragmatically certainly not favoured.
(40) a.
b.
Most lottery winners in the sixties were poor.
[In the sixties], most lottery winners in the sixties ~ere poor.
However, if there is another suitable time interval introduced either iIi the context
or in the same clause, we can see that the in-modifier doesn't.provide the value for·
the temporal restriction obligatorily. (41a) shows that the in-modifier need not
provide a value for the temporal restriction when there is an explicit temporal
adverbial present in the clause. Here, no conflict arises about which item provides
a temporal frame for the clause as it does when there are two temporal adverbials
simultaneously present in the same clause (41h).
(41) a. Most lottery winners in the sixties were poor in the forties.
b.· * In the sixties, most lottery winners were poor in the forties.
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Thus, an in-modifier can, but does not have to, provide a value for the implic~t
temporal restriction of its clause. This shows that the effect illustrated in (40)
probably comes about because the time interval introduced by the in-modifier is
contextpally salient in its clause.
Let us now return to the observed ability of in-modifiers to fix "upper limits"
for the event time of their clause. What one might try to argue for in light of the
observations above is that the fixing of the upper limit is another case of fixing
the value of an implicit element. Let us call this element for the moment the "local
evaluation time" of the clause - where·I want to leave open for now what kind of
element this might be precisely. In other words, one may be led to argue that in~
modifiers fix an upper limit for their clause because they introduce a contextually
salient time interval that serves as the local evaluation time.
(42) may be viewed as providing further evidence for this claim. The
sentences presented in (42) show that in-modifiers fix an upper limit for the main
predicate regardless of their position in the clause.
Thus, (42a, b) show that in-modifiers in subject as well as object noun phrases
can trigger upper limit effects. Furthermore, (42c, d) shows that in-modifiers in
German scrambled DPs can also trigger upper limit effects regardless of ..their
position.
(42) a. *? David kennt die meisten MIT-Studenten in den gOer Jahren.
David knows the most MIT-student in the eighties
('David knows most MIT-students in the eighties')
b. *? Marianne liebt aIle bertihmten Schauspieler in den 50er Jahren.
Marianne loves all famous actors in the fifties .
('Marianne likes all famous actors in the fifties')
c. *1 weil den David die meisten MIT-Studenten in den BOer Jahren kennen
since the-ACC David the most MIT-students in the eighties know
('most MIT-students in the eighties know David')
d. *? weil aIle berilhmten Schauspieler in den 50er Jahren die Marianne liebt
since all famous actors in the fifties the-NOM Marianne loves
('Marianne likes all famous actors in the fifties')
If the fixing of the local evaluation time is pragmatically determined, then this is
expected. Thus, at first sight it does not seem implausible to assume that in-
modifiers fix upper limits for their clause by way of pragmatics.
However, there is plenty of evidence against a pragmatic account in these
terms. In the remainder of this subsection, I will present some arguments against
it.
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First, the relation between in-modifiers and the event time of main predicates
is - as we already know - not the only relationship between temporal elements
that undergoes the tILe. It seems desirable to find a unified account of upper
limit phenomena. So far, we have dealt with two upper limit sensitive
relationships, the one between in-modifiers and the event time of main predicates,
and the one between matrix tenses and embedded tenses.
There is at least one other ULC-sensitive relationship that was not yet
mentioned, namely the one between topicalized temporal adverbials and in-
modifiers. (43a) shows that temporal adverbials are capable of fixing upper limits
for an in-modifier in their clause. In (43a), the time of th~ modifier follows the
time of the temporal adverbial, and the sentence is bad. Thus, the temporal
adverbial imposes here an upper limit on the temporal modifier. But (43b), which
differs from (43a) only with regard to ordering, is fully acceptable. Thus, it seems
that the temporal adverbial can only impose an upper limit on the temporal
modifier, when it is topicalized but not when it is in sentence-final position.
(43) a. *?.In the forties, most lottery winners in the sixties had been poor.
b. Most lottery winners in the sixties had been poor in the forties.
In a pragmatic account, one may perhaps argue that temporal adverbials get more
salient in the context when they are topicalized and can therefore only impose
upper limits on anything when topicalized.17
Let us try also to give a pragmatic account for the ULC-relationship between
matrix tenses and embedded tenses. Note that in an account based on contextual
salience, we may expect that the fixing of upper limits by contextually salient
times works similar to the determination of the reference of pronouns: one of the
standard strategies for finding a referent for a pronoun is to go back to the last
possible referent introduced in the discourse. If the fixing of upper limits works'
17 In a pragmatic approach, the phenomena may perhaps roughly be accounted for as
follows. Whereas in-modifiers are able to fix upper limits regardless of their position in
the clause, temporal adverbials fix upper limits only when topicalized. It seems that, with
respect to the ULC, in-modifiers behave like topicalized temporal adverbials in that they
play quite in general a special role in the discourse. If in-modifiers are inherently
restrictive, and if restrictfve material is in general contextually salient, then we expect in-
modifiers to be always able to fix evaluation times. Temporal adverbials on the other hand
are not inherently appropriate elements for fixing upper limits, but only when their position
in the clause causes them to play a special discourse role that makes them contextually
especially salient. Thus, for a temporal element to impose an upper limit on another
temporal element, it may be necessary that the former is contextually salient.
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similarly, then one would expect to find constructions where a second time is
introduced after the matrix time that is contextually more salient when the
embedded clause is processed. Thus, what we would need to argue agaiQst the
pragmatic approach would be a sentence exploiting the temporal relationships
indicated in (44a). If this sentence showed an upper limit effect, then one might
argue that the pragmatic approach failed. (44b) is in principle an example of the
type we are looking for. Here, the blocking time is introduced by an in-modifier.
(44) a.
time of the in-modifier =
blocking time, introduced
matrix tense embedded tense in the embedded clause
____1 1 1__>
b. # John told me two months ago that every speaker on this Sunday
was mentioned in an interview last week.
(44b) shows in fact an upper limit effect - i.e., it is not possible to have a forward
shifted reading for the embedded tense. Since the definite temporal adverbials
allow only for such a reading, the sentence does not allow for any acceptable
reading and is just strange. Thus, (44) seems to provide an argument against a
pragmatic account in terms of contextual salience. But note that in order show
anything with that example, one has to prove that the temporal element that is
supposed to block the upper limit effect of the matrix tense by introducing
another contextually salient time, i.e., the "in-modifier does not stand in an ULC-
sensitive relationship with the matrix tense. This can indeed be shown; consider
(45).
(45) a.
time of the in-modifier =
blocking time, introduced
embedded tense matrix tense in the embedded clause
__1 1 1__>
b. John told me last week that every speaker on this Sunday was
me~tioned in an interview two months ago.
(45b), where the time of the embedded tense and the time of the matrix tense are
exchanged, is fine. Thus, the matrix tense does not impose an upper limit on the
in-modifier. Thus, at least under the assumption that the fixing of upper limits
works similar to the search for antecedents of pronouns, this provides an
argument against the contextually-salience-approach.
/
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Second, a fundamental question must be raised: what is it that is fi~ed? With
the fixing. of values for implicit temporal restrictions, it is clear what is being fixed;
the implicit temporal restriction is an independently motivated entity that plays an
important role for temporal interpretation, as should be clear from preceding
chapters. But an upper limit as fixed by in-modifiers does not seem to correspond
to some particular entity. In order to make this point clear, I want to discuss here
the question whether upper limits can be identified with reference times.
Reichenbach (1947) introduced the concept of reference time (R) in addition to
event time (E) and time of utterance (U) for a treatment of temporal interpretation
in natural language. Roughly speaking, the reference time of a clause is the time ,
. starting with which the time of the event is located.I8 Tenses are then defined by
specific orderings of reference time, event time, and time of utterance. Here are
some examples, where "+" means that the elements are simultaneous or at least
intersecting, and "••" means that the time on the right side follows the one on the
left side.
(46) simple past: E+R·· U
past perfect: E •• R •• U
simple present: E+R+U
Corresponding to the distinction between reference time and event time, one
can distinguish two types of temporal adverbials. 1;emporal adverbials can either
locate the event time of the main predicate, i.e. the time when the event (action,
process, state, property) of the main predicate takes place, or they can locate the
"reference time" of the clause (e.g. Hornstein (1990, 25) and others). I will refer to
them as event-time-adverbials and reference-time-adverbials, respectively. The
difference is visible with past perfect clauses as in (47) (taken from Hornstein
(1990)).
(47) a.
b.
John had left the store at 3 p.m.
= John's leaving the store took place at 3 p.m.
At 3 p.m., John had left the store.
= At 3 p.m., John was in a state of having left the store.
. 18 The reference time of a clause has been characterized as lithe time from which the
perspective on the action... of the clause is construed lt (Helbig and Buscha) or "the time
that is the topic of the clause" (Klein), i.e. it is a kind of "topic time" that is taken as a
source of perspective on the event (action, process, state, property) denoted by the main
predicate.
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As (47) indicates, event-time-adverbial~ and reference-time-adverbials are -
though not strictly, but only by preference - associated with different positions in
the clause. When a temporal adverbial is sentence-initial, it is preferredly
understood as a reference-time-adverbial. When it is sentence-final, it is
preferredly understood as an event-time-adverbial.
The question I want to investigate briefly is whether either of the two times
can be identified with upper limits. Since topicalized temporal adverbials are able
to fix upper limits but non-topicalized temporal adverbials don't (as we have seen
above), this may suggest at first sight that upper limits are reference times. Note
that if upper limits fixed by in-modifiers correspond in general to reference times,
then we make the following prediction: When a past modifier occurs in a past
perfect clause without temporal adverbials, the in-modifier provides the reference
time. Unfortunately, this prediction is not borne out. (48) exploits on Sunday
afternoon in reading (b) as an event-time-adverbial and in reading (c) as a
reference-time-adverbial. Both readings seem to be clearly possible.
(48) a.
b.
c.
Die meisten Redner am Sonntagnachmittag hatten einen Schnupfen
gehabt..
('Most speakers on Sunday afternoon had had a cold.')
=On Sunday afternoon, most then-speakers had a cold.
= On Sunday afternoon, most th~n-speakers were in a state of
having had a cold.
Thus, it seems that in-modifiers can fix either event times or reference times. As
we can conclude from the fact that constructions violating the ULC are in general
unacceptable, in-modifiers in either of these roles can fix upper limits for tense (for
if they couldn't in one of these roles, we would expect constructions to be more
acceptable). Thus, an upper limit is not a particular independent entity that is
implicit, but it can correspond to various elements. - sometimes to reference times,
sometimes to event times, and perhaps sometimes to still other elements~ Thus, the
pragmatic account, which is based on the idea that in-modifiers can fix values for
implicit temporal material, looses much of its appeal.
Third, (49) (which corresponds to (22) above) show's that pragmatics can't be
the only relevant factor that is at work for the triggering of the upper limit effect
in (49a), for if there is - in an example like (49b) whose meaning is very similar to
the meaning of (49a) - only pragmatics at work, then there is no upper limit effect.
(49b) contains a contextually derived implicit modification of the resource
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domain of the quantifier most that has the same meaning as the in-modifier in
(49a). But in contrast to the explicit restriction provided by the in-modifier in
(49a), the implicit restriction in (49b) does not trigger an upper limit effect.
(49) a. * Most lottery winners in the sixties are unhappy today.
b. [context: In the sixties, lots of people won amazing amounts of
money in the lottery, but...]
... most lottery winners are unhappy today.
Thus, it seems that the presence of the in-modifier plays some important role for
the triggering of the upper limit effect and that pragmatics alone is not enough to
account for upper limit effects.
Fourth, there are data that suggest strongly that the depth of embedding of
the in-modifier plays a role. There is a contrast between partitive and non-
partitive DPs· as far as the triggering of upper limit effects by in-modifiers is
concerned; in-mo.difiers in non-partitive DPs trigger - as we have frequently seen
- upper limit effects, but in-modifiers in partitive DPs don't. 19 Consider (50) and
(51). (50) shows the by now familiar construction where the event time of the
main predicate is located after the time of the in-modifier; as expected, the
sentence is unacceptable since the in-modifier imposes an upper limit on the
event time of the clause. In contrast to (50), (51) is acceptable, i.e. here the in-
modifier does not impose an upper limit on the event time of the clause. Note that
in (51), the host DP of the in-modifier is a partitive DP.
(50) * [DP Die meisten [NP Politiker in den 60er Jahrenl] sind heute verzweifelt.
the most politicians in the sixties are today desparate
('[DP Most [NP politicians in the sixties]] are desperate today.')
(51) [DP Die meisten [pp von [DP den [NP Politikern in den 60er Jahren]]]] sind
the most of the politicians in the sixties are
heute verzweifelt.
. today desperate
('[DP Most [pp of [oP the [NP politicians in the sixties]]]] are desperate
today.')
19 For some reason which I do not yet understand, the contrast is pretty stable and strong
for German speakers but much less clear for English speakers. .
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Since the in-modifier is more deeply embedded in partitive DPs than in non-
partitive DPs, this suggests that syntactic hierarchy plays a role for whether an
element can trigger upper limit effects.
I will discuss the implications of these data below ~n more detail. Let me
conclude here just that the arguments I presented cast serious doubt on accounts
of the fixing of upper limits that attribute the fixing to a pragmatically determined
process and try to treat upper limits as some independent element in a clause (like
the local evaluation time, for instance). Thus, I will present in the remainder of this
section an account of upper limit effects that assumes fITst, that upper limit effects
can in principle occur between any temporal elements, and se~ond, that the
occurrence of upper limit effects is subject to some syntactic condition.
5.2. The syntactic relation between ULC-related temporal elements
The contrast between (50) and (51) provides an argument for the relevance of
syntactic configurations. T1)us, it seems that the depth of the embedding of the
in-modifier determines whether it imposes an upper limit on the event time of the
clause.
Recall that I suggested to analyze in-modifiers as obligatory modifiers of the
resource domain variable of their host DP. I assumed that the modification of the
resource domain variable is made possible by copying the modifier from the
restrictive clause of the quantifier to its resource domain variable at LF. Resource
domain variables are associated with their quantifier. By copying tne in-modifier
to the resource domain variable, the modifier gets in turn associated with the
determiner. It seems plausible to aSS\lme that when the in-modifier is in this way
associated with the determiner, its scope of upper limit effectiveness projects to
the maximal projection of the determiner, that is, to DP. Because of this, the scope
of upper limit effectiveness of the modifier is the c-command domain of the DP.
To summarize, relying on this analysis, we can state that an in-modifier
imposes an upper limit on the event time of its clause when the DP whose
resource domain variable it modifies c-commands into the sentence structure at
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LF, the level at which the in-modifier's being a resource domain variable-modifier
is relevant.20 The structures are illustrated in (52a, b). 21
(52) a. Non-partitive DP (LF): ULC-effects triggered
IP
IDPi/ll
D NP
die meisten C1
N PPl
Politiker in den 60er Jahren
IP
... ti ...
b. Partitive DP (LF): ULC-effects not triggered
IP
IP
... ti ...
von
DPi
D PP
die meisten C
P IDP11
D NP
denel
N PPI
Politikern in den 60er Jahren
According to this proposal, in-modifiers extend the scope of their upper limit
effectiveness beyond their NP to t~e scope or c-command domain of their minimal
host DP, because they are obligatory modifiers of the resource domain variable
that is associated with the determiner of their host DP, If that is so, then in-
modifiers that are part of a non-partitive DP have a scope of effectiveness that
includes their whole sentence. But in-modifiers that are part of a partitive DP
have only a scope of effectiveness that includes the lower DP. This predicts that
in-modifiers in non-partitive DPs can yield upper limit effects with the main
20 Incidentally, the DP in question also c-commands into the sentence structure at S- or D-
structure. Nevertheless, I will take LF to be the relevant level.
21 Here, the DPs whose RDVs are modified by the in-modifier are marked by boxes; the
modification of the RDV and the projection to DP is indicated by the index "Ill; the index
"i" results from the application of Quantifier Raising.
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predicate of their clause, whereas ill-modifiers in partitive DPs don't, because they
are too deeply embedded.
There are data that provide support for the assumption that the LF-position
rather than the S-structure position or D-structure position of a DP is crucial: (53)
shows another construction that exhibits an ULC-effect. But here the relevant
upper-limit-relations do not occur between an in-modifier and the event time, but
between two in-modifiers. Note that the value of in the sixties is strongly
preferredly taken as the temporal frame during which the hating takes place.
Thus, since with simple past tense, event time and reference time coincide, in the
sixties may be viewed as providing ~ frame for the event time as well as for the
reference time of the clause. Since the the forties are not located af~er the sixties,
we can safely assume that the ULC-effect in (53) is not one between reference
time and in-modifier (or, perhaps, between event time and in-modifier), but .one
between the two in-modifiers.
In (53), the time of the in-modifier in the subject DP comes after the time of the
in-modifier in the object DP. If,o,nly S-structural configurations were relevant for
the triggering of ULC-effects, there would be no reason for the unacceptability of
(53).
(53) *1 [Many professors in the 60s] hated [some students in the 40s].
But if LF-configurations are relevant, then the unacceptability of (53) can be
captured as a special case of ULC-effects: at LF, the object DP is QRed and can
thus be in a position where it c-commands the subject D~.
Moreover, the in-modifier that is contained in the object DP can also trigger
ULC-effects in the subject DP when the subject DP has wider scope than the
object DP. (54) shows this. In (54a), the occu.rrence of the bound variable
pronoun in the object DP forces the subject DP to have wide scope, and the
sentence is still bad. The same holds for (54b).
(54) a. * [Many professors in the 60s]i hated [some students in the 40s who
theYi knew very well].
b. * [Many professors in the 40s]i hated [some students in the
60s who theYi knew very well].
These data suggest that the triggering of ULC-effects can be described as
formulated in (55).
198
(55) a.
b.
MUSAN: TEMPORAL INTERPRETATION OFNPS - IV. NP-MODIAERS
Temporal elements trigger ULC-effects from their LF-position.
Temporal elements are subject to .the ULC in their base position.
These facts could presumably be captured in a copy theory of movement as
suggested by Chomsky (1992).
Since the ULC does not only concern the relation between event times in
matrix clauses ~d event times in embedded clauses, I propose to reformulate the
ULC as in (56), where it is taken as a constraint between elements in the class of
ULC-triggers and elements that are subject to the ULC.
(56) Upper Limit Constraint (fIrst reformulated version):
The event time of the matrix clause is an upper limit for the event time of
the embedded clause.
It is not yet clear what exactly makes a temporal element be an ULC-trigger (as
event times, in-modifiers, or reference-time-adverbials) or an element that is
subject to the ULC (as event times and in-modifiers).
(57) is a structure that shows the relevant positions of items that enter into
the occurrence of ULC-effects. Here, bold print marks elements that fix upper
limits, whereas underlining marks elements that are subject to the ULC.
(57)
~
matrix TENSE I
I
~QRedin-DP~
topicalized I
(reference-time-) I
adverbial AGRsP
~
subject DP TP
~(event-time-) TP
adverbial I
~
TENSE AGRoP
~
objectDP VP
~
DP base positions I
~
time argument V
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'IAzel:rafe1tlike~ arxl tookoff"
-Angelika.Knizer, A1lInvestigItiooqfthe Imnps ofThoudd-
6. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have investigat~d a particular type of NP-internal modifier, so-
called in-modifiers, that differs crucially from other NP-internal modifiers, e.g. af-
modifiers. I have argued that in-modifiers, like if-clauses, belong to the class of
obligatory restrictors in natural language. In particular, they can be analyzed as
modifiers of resource domain variable.s. Because of their being inherent
restrictors, in-modifiers can only appe~ as part of restrictive DPs. Since resource
. . l
domain variables are associated with determiners, the modification of a resource
domain variable by an in-modifier leads in turn to an association of the in-
modifier with the determiner and furthermore, with the DP. Because of their
association with their host DP, in-modifiers can affect temporal elements in the c-
command domain of the DP.
I argued that the effects of in-modifiers are due to their special syntactic
properties which are caused by their being modifiers of resource domain
variables. For a temporal element to impose ULC-effects on another item, the
elements have to stand in a· certain syntactic configuration. In particular, the LF-
position of the element triggering the ULC-effect has to c-command the S-
structural position of the element that are subject to the ULC.
I want to add here that the occurrence of ULC-effects is even more
widespread than the work in this chapter suggested. Recall that we observed in
Section 8.2. of Chapter III that the access to predication times .'of noun phrases
was restricted insofar as future times are in general less available. This effect is
obviously related to the phenomenon of ULC-effects we saw in this chapter.
Moreover, there are also examples that show ULC~effects in connection with
times of existence. The following examples are due to David Pesetsky (pc).
Consider the sentence Her crib was beautiful in a situation where we are talking
about a baby's crib where the baby has died before but the crib is still there. The
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sentence seems entirely felicitous in that situation. But the future oriented
counterpart Her crib will be beautiful in a situation where the baby is not yet
conceived but the crib is already present seems rather strange.
Despite the interesting results presented in this chapter, there are many
questions left open which require thorough further investigations in order to be
answered. Let me conclude by sketching some interesting and important
problems for future research:
First, one problem that was mentioned above concerns the class of obligatory
restrictors in natural language. We have argued that there is such a class of
expressions that hae the property of being obligatory restrictors. This raises the
question 6f what makes certain expressions or types of expressions members of
this class.
Second, I observed above that the fixing of upper limits can be captured by
saying that elements in their LF-position can fix upper limits, but elements in their
base position are subject to the ULC. It would be highly desirable if this aspect
of the behavior of temporal elements could be derived from independent
principles.
Third, recall that I tentatively concluded that temporal adverbials can fix upper
limits when they function as ref~rence-time-adverbials, but not when they
function as event-time-adverbials. This raises the question why reference-time-
adverbials and event-time-adverbials differ in this way.
Fourth, the specific effects in-modifiers have on the temporal interpretation of the
main predicate of their clause provide additional support for the ULC proposed
by Abusch (1994). On the other hand, they raise further questions concerning
the ULC. It seems that the ULC has a wider range than suggested in Abusch's
work: it affects not only relations between matrix tense.s and embedded tenses
and does not only work in intensional contexts, but it also causes effects between
temporal elements within the same clause. Abusch's conceptual explanation of
the existence of the ULC is that tenses can only refer to times with which one can
be "acquainted" from' the perspective of the local evaluation time. Roughly
speaking, possible acquaintance relations involve in general some kind of causal
connection. Since causal connections can only go backward but not forward,
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forward relations between the local evaluation time and a time referred to by a
tense are prohibited. It is not at all clear how this explanation of the background
of the ULC could be applied to the case of in-modifiers.
Fifth, it remains unclear why ULC-effects between event times in matrix clauses
and embedded clauses are absolutely strict, whereas the effects within clauses are
in general not that strong.
7. How to interpret in-modifiers
For the sake of simplicity and clarity, I have so far avoided integrating my
approach to in-modifiers into a detailed framework of temporal interpretation and
my stage-semantics as suggested in Chapter III. Before concluding this chapter, I
want to show in this section how in-modifiers can be interpreted in the
framework I developed and exploited in this thesis up to this point. To illustrate
this, I will go again, and now in det~il, through the calculation of the truth
'conditions of (17), repeated here as (58a).
(58) Most students in the sixties were rebellious.
I will assume here basically the framework of temporal interpretation as
developed in Section 3.2. of Chapter II and the stage semantics. developed in
Chapter III. Moreover, I will assume that the quantificational noun phrase most
students in the sixties is raised at LF by Quantifier Raising to a posItion above
the adverb of quantification 3. Thus, (58) has the LF (59). '
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(59)
<i,t>
AtTP
t
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The calculation of truth conditions follows in (60). I will assume that the in-
modifier in the sixties and the noun students are interpreted by Predicate
Modification, i.e. intersectively.
<i,t>
At*TENSE
t
r-----
<i,t> i
~t*
<i <i t» i
PAST t
TP
<e,t>
2,TP
t
<i, t>
At*VP
t
~
e <e, t>
DP V'
t2 r-----,
<i <ef» I
V i.
be rebellious t*
<it <it, t»
QAP
3 C
<<et>, t>
DPj
<et.<~
D <e, t>
NP
mostcj ~
<e, t> <e, t>
N PPj
students in the sixties
(60) [At [moste students in the sixties]2 [3 C t2 were reQellious] ]Jc, g (tu) = 1
iff [by A-Conversion]
IT At [mostc students in the sixties]2
[3 C t2 were rebellions] ]] c, g [t~tu] = 1
iff [by (obligatory) copying of the in-modifier to the resource domain
variable and by (optionally) taking the time of the in-modifier as a
value for the temporal restriction of 3J
[ [most[in the sixties] students in the sixties]2
[3 [the sixties] t2 were rebellious] ]c, g [t~tu] (now) = 1
iff [by 2x Functional Application and the lexical entry of most as
suggested in Chapter .ill]
for most maximal Xst E De, such that there is a (whole) individual x,
such that Xst is a part of x and there is an X'st E De and an X"st E De,
such that Xst = X'st E9 X"st and
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[in the sixties]]c, g [t~tu] (x'st) =1 and
[student in the sixties]]c, g [t~tu] (x"st) =1,
there is a Yst E De, such that Yst is part of Xst E De and
[2 [3 [the sixties] t2 were rebellious] ]]c, g [t~tu] (Yst) =1
iff [by Predicate Modification, entry of translations, and Tripartite Structure
Construction] -
for most maximal Xst E De, such that there is a (whole) individual x,
such that Xst is a part of x and there is an Xlst E De and an X"st E De,
such that Xst = X'st ffi X"st and
[in the sixties]] c, g [t~tu] (xlst) = 1 and
[student]]c, g [t~tu] (x"st) = 1 and [~n the sixties]]c, g [t~tu] (x"st) =1,
there is a Yst E De, such that Yst is part of Xst E De and
[2 [(3[At* ([the sixties] (t*)) & At* (PAST (t)(t*))]
[At* (be rebellious (t*) (t2))]) ]]c, g [t~tu] (Yst) =1
iff [by Predicate Abstraction and lexical entries related to student in the
sixties]
for most maximal Xst E De, such that there is a (whole) individual x,
such that Xst is a part of x and there is an Xlst E De and an X"st E De,
such that Xst = Xlst 61 X"st and
X'st is located in the sixties and
X"st is a student and X"st is located in the sixties,
there is a yst E De, such that Yst is part of Xst E De and
[3[At* ([the sixties] (t*» & At* (PAST (t)(t*»)]
[ t~tu][At* (be rebellious (t*) (t2)] ]] c, g 2~ y-st =1
iff [by lexical entry of 3 and Predicate Modification applied to the
restrictive clause]
for most maximal Xst E De, such that there is a (whole) individual x,
such that Xst is a part of x and there is an X'st E De and an X"st E De,
such that Xst = X'st ffi X"st and .
Xist is located in the sixties and
X"st is a student and X"st is located in the sixties,
there is a Yst E De, such that Yst is part of Xst E De and
there is a time t* such that
[ t ~ tu ][ At* ([the sixties] (t*»]] c, g 2~ y-st (t*) = 1 and
[ t~ tu ][At* (PAST (t)(t*» TIc, g 2~y-st (t*) = 1 and
[ t ~ tu ][At* (be rebellious (t*) (h» ]] c, g 2~ y-st (t*) = 1
iff [by A-Conversion]
for most maximal Xst E De, such that there is a (whole) individual x,
such that Xst is a part of x and there is an X'st E De and an X"st E De,
such that Xst = X'st ffi X"st and
x'st is located in the sixties and
X"st is a student and X"st is located in the sixties,
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there is a Yst E De, such that Yst is part of Xst E De and
there is a time t* such that
. [2~Y~st]
[[the sixties] (t*) ]] c, g t* ~ t* = 1 and
[2~Y~st][PAST (t)(t*) ] c, g t* ~ t* =1 and
[2~Y~st][be rebellious (t*) (t2) ] c, g t* ~ t* = 1
iff [by lexical entries of the remaining elements, variable assignment
applied to t, t*, and t2 ]
for most maximal Xst E De, such that there is a (whole) individual x,
such that Xst js a part of x and there is an X'st E De and an X"st E De,
such that Xst = X'st ffi X"st and
X'st is located in the sixties and
. X"st is a student and X"st is located in the sixties,
there is a Yst E De, such that Yst is part of Xst E De and
there is a time t* such that
t* is a subinterval of the time in the sixties, and
t* < tu , and
(yst is alive at t*, and)
Yst is rebellious at t* .
As should be obvious at this point, the occurrence of ULC-effects does not
follow from independently exploited principles of temporal interpretation.
Rather, clauses containing in-modifiers that violate the ULC are perfectly
interpretable and yield interpretations that seem, on a theoretical level, just as fine
as interpretations of clauses that don't show ULC-effects. Thus, for a sentence
like (59), which involves an ULC-violation, we would get the truth conditions in
(60), which seem quite reasonable.
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(59)*1 Most students in the forties were rebellious in the sixties.
(60) [At [moste students in the forties]2
[3 [in the sixties] t2 were rebellions] TIc, g (tu) =1
iff for most maximal Xst E De, such that there is a (whole) individual x, such
that Xst is a part of x and there is an X'st E De and an X"st E De, such
that Xst = X'st ffi Xltst and
X'st is located in the forties and
x Itst is a student and
X"st is located in the forties,
there is a Yst E De, such that Yst is part of Xst E De and
there is a time t* such that
t* is a subinterval of the time in the sixties
t* < tu, and
(Yst is alive at t*, and)
Yst is rebellious at t* .
Thus, it is clear that the ULC is a constraint that has to be stipulated in addition to
the semantics we have developed so far.
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CHAPTER V.
CONCLUSION AND SPECULATIONS
1. Results achieved in previous chapters
In Chapters II-IV, I investigated the temporal interpretation of noun phrases. The
most important results were achieved in Chapter II and Chapter III, where I
explored the temporal location of individuals and the temporal location of
predication times, respectively. Let me present here a survey of the relevant
Gomponents of these two aspects of sentence interpretation.
TEMPORAL LOCATION OF INDIVIDUALS
Is the temporal location of existence times of
individuals affected by the temporal
interpretation of the rest of the clause?
Previous result: yes.
My result: no - at least not directly.
How come previous research didn't come to this
conclusion? - Because life-time effects were treated
as a semantic phenomenon. In fact, they are a
pragmatic phenomenon.
TEMPORAL LOCATION OF PREDICATION
TIMES
Is the temporal location of predication times
of nouns affected by the temporal
interpretation of the rest of the clause?
Previous result: no.
My result: yes, because determiners quantify over
stages of individuals.
How come previous research didn't come to this
conclusion? - Because it doesn't always show; some
noun phrases are temporally independent.
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What does tense do?
- Individuals are not located by tense.
- Tenses (and temporal adverbials) locate the time
within which a truth interval of the main predicate
is asserted to exist.
What is crucial to the temporal location of
individuals?
- Some predicates impose life-time presuppositions
on (some of) their arguments. I.e., most
individuals must exist at the asserted predication
time of the predicate that introduces them.
What does the semantics do?
- With a sentence of the form "At that time, a
was pit, where "pit stands for a predicate that
imposes a life-time presupposition on its subject
argument, it is presupposed that a exists at that
time.
What does tense do?
- Predication times are not located by tense.
- Tenses (and temporal adverbials) locate the time
within which a truth interval of the main predicate
is asserted to exist.
What is crucial to the temporal location 9f
predication times?
- Detenniner-quantifiers quantify over stages of
individuals. Specifically, they quantify over the
largest stages that satisfy the (implicit or explicit)
restrictive predicates of the quantifier:
IT everyc P was Q ]]=1 iff every maximal stage
Xst that satisfies C AND P contains a part Yst that
satisfies Q.
What does the semantics do?
- Roughly speaking,
1. the predication time of Q is located by tense, e.g.
past tense
I I
~ t-u
I
2. Yst is located by the life-time presupposition of
Q: with most predicates, the time of Yst must be
part of the predication time of Q,
past tense
I I
~ t-u
--- ' .....
3. Xst is located by the relation that the lexical
entry of a detenniner-quantifier imposes on Xst and
Yst:
Xst must include Yst.
x-st
4.·the predication time ofP and C is located
a. by the relation that the lexical entry of the
det~~minet-quantifier imposes on P and C and Xst:
basically, the (sum of the) predication time(s) of P
and C coincides with the time of Xst.
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b. by the life-time presupposition that P and C
impose on Xst: with most predicates I, the
predication time of P and C must include Xst.2
Pragmatics
(1) A proposition <I> is more informative than a
proposition 'P if and only if
1. for all worlds w such tpat <I> is true in w, \}J is
true in w, and )
2. it is not the case that for all worlds w* such that
'II is true in w*, <I> is true in w*.
(2) 1. For all worlds w such that "A is BIt is true in
w, "A was B" is true in w, and
2. It is not the case that for all worlds w* such that
t1A was B" is true in w*, "A is B" is true in w*.
(3) Maxim of Quality: Be informative.
Consequence 1: If both "A is B" and "A was Btl are
true, use "A is B".
Consequence 2: If "A was B" is used, one concludes
that "A is B" is not true. I.e., A's being B is over.
I.e., if ItB" is an individual-level predicate, A
doesn't exist anymore.
This effect can be neutralized by temporally specific
contexts. If "Yesterday, A was B" is used, the
present tense version of the clause is not an
appropriate altemativee
Pragmatics
Temporal restrictions, explicit ones as well as
implicit ones, can modify resource domain v~ables
of noun phrases. Because of this, stages introduced
by the restrictive material of a detenniner-quantifier
can be extended beyond the predication time of the
overt r~strictors.
As should be obvious from the summary above, the role of pragmatics and the
role of semantics are differently weighted for the temporal location of individuals
and the temporal location of predication times. For phenomena concerning the
former aspect of the temporal interpretation of noun phrases, the pragmatics does
more work than the semantics, whereas for the latter aspect, the se~antics does
more work.
In the course of this thesis, I investigated various aspects of the interaction
between the temporal interpretation of main predicates and noun phrase
interpretation.. We have seen that there are some· interesting connections
between the temporal interpretation of main predicates and noun phrase
interpretation. Here is a list of some important results:
• Existence times introduced by topic noun phrases can provi~e time intervals
that serve as values for implicit temporal restrictions of temporal adverbs of
1 Maybe with all predicates, as far as nouns are concerned - ~f. the contrast Frege ist
beruhmt vs. #Frege ist eine Beruhmtheit.
2 At first sight, 4a and 4b appear redundant and one might think that 4a is dispensable. But
this would lead to wrong predictions: we need the maximal stages that satisfy the restrictive
material.
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quantification in their clause. Evidence for this was presented in .Chapter II in
order to explain the presence or absence of life-time effects. Since it was
shown that topichood plays a role for the triggering of this restricting effect,
we can safely assume that the effect is not syntactically governed, but
mediated by the context.
• Implicit temporal restrictions and explicit temporal adverbials can modify
resource domain variables of noun phrases. I argued for this in Chapter III. I
also presented an argument exploiting functionally interpreted temporal
adverbials that proved that the crucial modification of resource domain
variables must be able to happen indirectly (i.e., via the context) and not
directly (for instance, via binding).
• In Chapter IV, I argued that resource domain variables of qu~ntificational
noun phrases can also be modified by in-modifiers. This assumption was used
to explain the distribution of in-modifiers and also their ability to impose
upper limit effects on the event time of their clause. According to what I said
in Chapter IV, the effects of in-modifiers on the event time undergo syntactic
restrictions. I.e., they are not mediated by the context.
We have thus seen that temporal interpretation on the one hand side and
noun phrase interpretation on the other hand side affect each other in several
respects. Interestingly, the effects between the~e two components of
interpretation can be attributed to a large extent to effects that elements of one
component have on quantifier restrictions of the other component: times of
existence introduced by noun phrases provide implicit restrictions for temporal
adverbs of quantification, temporal restrictions can also restrict determiner-
quantifiers, and in-modifiers affect the resource domain variable.of their host DP.
As far as the interactions of temporal interpretation and noun phrase
interpretation are concerned, we have thus arrived at a picture roughly as follows,
where elements and processes concerning the temporal! "Interpretation of noun
phrases appear on the left side of the chart below and elements and processes
concerning the temporal interpretation of the main predicate of a clause
(including temporal adverbials and tense) appear on the right side:
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DPs introduce individuals
(or stages of individuals).
These have times of existence CONTEXT implicit temporal restrictions,
which can provide values for ---------.....................---...which behave like it special
case of temporal adverbials
. DPs can bind variables in
temporal adverbials
~dkad~ -~~-~~---~~-~~~function~~i~~re~d
temporal adverbials
resource domain. variables ~.__----'lc......Q~NTE..................XT........__ temporal adverbials and
(RDVs) of detenhiners implicit temporal restrictions
t can modify
in-modifiers in n~un phrases ~ impose upper limits on the
are modifiers of the RDV of event time of their clause
the DP they are contained in
In the remainder of this chapter, I want to consider some speculations about
the.possibilities of extending the proposals I presented in this thesis. In particular,
I want to sketch connections to some issues that are not directly related to
temporal interpretation but that, in my opinion, deserve some comparative
consideration in continuing research, namely. spatial aspects and mO'dal aspects of
noun phrase interpretation.
2. Possible extensions I: Time and space
The stages I exploited in this thesis, especially in Chapter III, were defined as
. temporal parts of individuals. So far, I did not at all care about the spatial
dimension. In the literature, stages have usually been constructed as temporal-
spatial parts of individuals.3 Thus, one m~y want to investigate whether a slightly
differently constructed ontology in these terms makes interesting predictions
3 See for instance Goodman (1951), Quine (1960), Carlson (1977), Hinrichs (1985),
Lewis (1986), and Paul (1994).
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about natural language. Quite in general, temporal and spatial aspects are often
seen in connection with each other.
In analogy to the research presented in this thesis, one of the questions to ask
is how individuals that are introduced by noun phrases are spatially located with
respect to the eventuality of their clause. The answer to this question seems
pretty straightforward: just as some predicates impose temporal presuppositions -
i.e., what I called "life-time presuppositions" - on their arguments, some predicates
also impose locative presuppositions on their arguments. For example, in order to
perform an action of running around Building 20, one obviously has to be
present both at the time and at the place where the action of running occurs. It is
not necessarily the case that temporal presuppositions and locative
presuppositions imposed on individuals are simultaneously present.
Note though that there is an important difference concerning the temporal
and spatial location of individuals. Since - at least in the languages I have been
considering in this thesis - there are no locative elements corresponding to tenses, .
there won't be any locative effects corresponding to life-time effects - i.e., there
.won't be any locative "having-left-the-scene"-effects.
To follow the line of investigation concerning the temporal interpretation of
noun phrases, a second question to ask is whether it makes sense to distinguish
anything like spatially dependent and spatially independent readings of' noun
phrases. Keeping things analogous to the question of temporal dependence of
noun phrases, a spatially dependent reading of a noun phrase would be one
where the place where the noun can be truly predicated of an in~ividual has to
coincide with the place where the eventuality denoted by the main predicate of
the clause is located.
Of course, there are more open questions about the relation between the
temporal interpretation of noun phrases and their spatial interpretation that
deserve being considered. We have seen at least one interesting case of
interaction between temporal and spatial interpretation, namely with the behavior
of in-modifiers in Chapter IV: we observed that spatial in-modifiers also have a
.restriction with respect to their distribution, i.e., they also seein to be restricted to
presuppositional noun phrases. - In general, it seems desirable to aim at a detailed
analysis of the ways in which temporal and spatial interpretation are. similar, and
in what respects they differ.
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3. Possible extensions II: Times and worlds
Similarly to the case of the spatial dimension, one might also want to consider
. .
cross-world aspects of noun phrase interpretation in comparison to their temporal
interpretation. An important question to ask is under which circumstances the
interpretation of noun phrases is bound to particular worlds and under which
circumstances it isn't. Furthermore, we may ask how world-dependent and world-
independent interpretations of noun phrases relate to temporally dependent and
independent interpretations.
Let me illustrate with an example what world-dependent and world-
independent interpretations of noun phrases may look like. The following
example (Ia) has at least two possible readings, (1 b) and (Ie), depending on
whether the. king's belief is about someone who is the archbishop in the actual
world or not. For reading (Ib) to be true, there has to exist an archbishop in the
actual world, while for (Ic) to be true there doesn't have to exist an actual
ar~hbishop.4
(1) a.
b.
c.
The king believes that the archbishop is bald.5
In all the possible worlds w* compatible with what the king in the
actual world Wo believes in wo, it is the case that the individual who
is the archbishop in WQ is bald in w*.
In all the possible worlds w* compatible with what the king in the
actual world WQ believes in wo, it is the case that the individual who
is the archbishop in w* is bald in w*.
Analogous to the notion of temporally (in)dependent noun phrase interpretation,
I used in the preceding chapters, I will call the noun phrase the. archbishop in (1b)
WORLD-INDEPENDENTLY INTERPRETED because it can be interpreted relative
to wo, a world which is not the evaluation··world of the main predicate be bald.
In the remainder of this section, I only want to sketch some points that I
consider important for an investigation of the world-interpretation of noun
phrases. Although I am not in a position to achieve much in terms of results, I
hope to be able to sketch at least some promising questions and directions for
future research.
4 The example is my English version of an example of Bauerle (1983, 130).
5 Paraphrases for propositional attitude sentences basically like the ones in (lb) and (Ie)
are suggested by Hintikka (1969, 145).
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3.1. Basic considerations
There is at least one crucial difference between considering world-dependence
and considering time-dependence of noun phrases. This difference has to do
with the basic ontology of individuals in relation to possible worlds. There have
been two views on this issue defended in the literature. One is that individuals
strictly belong to one world only and cannot be extended across worlds (cf.
Lewis (1968, 1986)); a particular individual in one world may have a
COUNTERPART in another world, but the individual itself exists exclusively in
one world. The other, more traditional, view is that a particular individual can be
present in different worlds.
Depending on which view we take, our perspective on individuals implies
already to a certain extent that we can say gertain things about the world-
interpretation of noun phrases, but not others. Consequently, the ontological
assumptions might restrict us too much for us to express what we want to say.
Whether this is the case or not is, of course, ultimately an empirical question. But
I think it is in any case important to be aware of it.
For instance, if we take the counterpart-view of individuals, then of course it
doesn't make sense to think literally about individuals having different properties
in different worlds in the same way in which we thought about individuals
having different properties at different times. Consider the following exampl~
(2a) and its rough paraphrases in (2b) and (2c).6
(2) a.
b.
c.
Jahn thinks that every cat meowed.
In all the possible worlds w* compatible with what John believes in
Wo, it is the case that every individual who is a cat in WQ meowed in
w*.
In all the possible worlds w* compatible with what John believes in
wo, it is the case that every individual who is a cat in w* meowed in
w*.
Suppose we took the counterpart-view of individuals. If individuals can't extend
across worlds, then it doesn't make sense to say that a ·cat that exists in one world
meows in another world - he simply can't meow ~n a world other than his world,
because he has to exist in order to be able to meow. Thus, (2b), if taken literally,
6 The example is taken from Cresti (1995, 11).
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doesn't make sense. Thus, the paraphrase (2b) should be reformulated to
something like (2b t). (2c) could be reformulated as (2c').
(2) b'.
ct.
In all the possible worlds w* compatible with what John believes in
wo, it is the case that every individual in Wo that is a cat has a
counterpart y in w* such that y meows (in w*).
In all the possible worlds w* compatible with what John believes in
wo, it is the case that every individual in w* that is a cat meowed (in
w*).
Note that this formulation shows that when investigating the world-interpretation
of noun phrases under a strict counterpart-theory of individuals, we couldn't
really say anything about the world-location of properties (i.e. what corresponds
in the investigation of the temporal interpretation of noun phrases to the temporal
location of predication times). Instead we would have to investigate the world-
location of ~ndividuals and their options of establishing relationships to
counterparts in other worlds.
Thus, under the counterpart-view of individuals, a formulation like (3a) below
means the same as (3b). I.e. it doesn't play an important role in the question of
whether the world-interpretation of the noun phrase we saw above is taken as a
world-argument of the noun or as a restriction on quantification.
All this of course does not mean that the world-dependence of noun phrases
can't be investigated under a counterpart-view of individuals. This is even more
so since it is of course possible to construe trans-world individuals, or MODAL
CONTINUANTS, in a counterpart theory of individuals. This can be done by
construing cross-world sums of individuals that are counterparts of each other.
The single "original" individuals can then be viewed as world-stages of the cross-
world sum. Lewis (1968, 40ff) considers this possibility. Ijust think that using a
version of the counterpart-theory might be somewhat confusing, because some
parallels to results concerning the temporal interpretation of noun phrases might
be lost. Hence I will assume for the present purpose that individuals can be modal
continuants. For the moment, I want to leave open whether these modal
·continuants should be treated as primitives in the ontology or as entities
constructed from sets of counterparts of individuals.
(3) a.
b.
"all individuals x, such that x is a cat in w*"
"all individuals x in w* such that x is a catll
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3.2. Previous results: Bauerle (1983)
In a paper on noun phrase interpretation, Bauerle (1983) suggests to treat the
distinction between transparent and opaque readings, which has traditionally
been viewed as a semantic ambiguity, as a pragmatic phenomenon. Here is an
illustration of the ambiguity. According to Bauerle, (4a) can' be true in two
different sets of possible worlds, (4b) and ~4c). Under its opaque reading, (4a) is
true in worlds from the set described in (4b); under its transparent reading, it is
true in worlds from the set described in (4c).7
(4) a.
b.
c.
Ismay wants to marry the king of France.
the set of worlds 1:1 in which Ismay has the wish to marry someone
who is the king of France
the set of worlds v such that there is exactly one king of France in v
and Ismay wants to marry him in v
. Thus, under the transparent reading, the noun phrase is interpreted relative to the
actual world. Under the opaque reading, it is interpreted relative to some non-
actual world~
Bauerle's arguments in favor of a pragmatic treatment are derived from scope
paradoxes that arise when the ambiguity is treated as a scope phenomenon
(pp123f). For instance, (Sa) has a reading that can be roughly paraphrased as
(5b). Under this reading, Georg believes that there is a woman from Stuttgart
who loves every actual player of the VfB.8 Since the woman in question may
only exist in Georg's belief-world, the underlined noun phrase, under this reading,
is interpreted relative to Georg's belief-worlds w*.
(5) a.
b.
Georg believes that a woman from Stuttgart loves every player of
the VfB.
In all the possible worlds w* compatible with what George believes
in Wo, it is the case that there is a woman from Stuttgart in w* who
loves in w* every player of the VfB in WOe
7 To be precise, (4c) is relevant for the transparent-attributive reading of the noun phrase
the king of France. There is also a transparent-referential reading where (4a) is true in
worlds belonging to the set of worlds w such that there is in w a particular person a such
that Ismay wants to marry a in w, and coincidentally a is in the actual world the king of
France (Bauerle (1983, 121)). Since the attributive/referential distinction is irrelevant for
our present purpose, I will ignore this reading completely. - The examples here are taken
from Bauerle's paper but are translated into English.
8 I think the VfB is a famous German soccer team.
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It seems plausible at first sight, and has often been assumed~ that the transparent
and opaque readings are due to the scope of the noun phrase. Basically, the idea
is that a noun phrase is transparent when having wider scope than a belief-
operator and opaque when it has narrower scope. For (Sa), this approach may
give rise to the readings in (6).
(6) a.
b.
c.
There is an (actual) woman x from Stuttgart such that for every
(actual) player of the vm y, Georg believes that x loves y.
There is an (actual) woman x from Stuttgart such that Georg
believes that for every player of the vm y, x loves y.
For every (actual) player of the vm y, there is an (actual) woman x
from Stuttgart such that Georg believes that x loves y.
For every (actual) player of the vm y, Georg believes that there is a
woman from Stuttgart x such that x loves y.
The problem' is that none of these representations captures the occurrence of the
possible reading (5b) from above. In fact, in a scope approach, (5b) is not
representable at all, because (5b) implies three different scope requirements which,
are obviously incompatible:9
(7) believe < a woman from Stuttgart
every player of the vm < believe
a woman from Stuttgart < every player of the vm
The occurrence of such scope paradoxes is reminiscent of some of En9'S
arguments concerning the temporal interpretation of noun phrases (Chapter I,
Sectio~ 2.1.). Actually, Bauerle remarks that noun phrases seem to behave in a
largely parallel manner, insofar as their temporal and their world-interpretation is
concerned (p124). Interestingly, independently of En9 (1981), Bauerle develops
an indexical analysis of noun phrases that is very similar to En~'s analysis.
Specifically, Bauerle suggests to treat the occurrence of transparent and
opaque readjngs of noun phrases in terms of pragmatically assigned indices. His
idea is that during interpretation, a store is created that contains a list of
contextually salient evaluation worlds. IO Verbs of propositional attitudes shift the
9 This is in fact only so for a simple scope approach. Irene Heim (pc) pointed out to me
that one can get the relevant reading by quantifying in the NP player of the VfB. This
mechanism gives rise to LFs like (A).
(A) player of the VfB AX [George believes that a woman' from Stuttgart loves every X]
10 His treatment of evaluation times is analogous.
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evaluation index of a clause and thus provide a new evaluation world in the
store. Hence they make it possible to gain access to different world~indices for
noun phrases.
3.3. Individuals and worlds
I think that the notion of shifting evaluation indices can be enhanced by making
more precise what it means for evaluation indices to be shifted. Let me say that
when a predicate shifts the evaluation index for the interpretation of one of its
arguments, then it does so because it doesn't impos.e a SAME-WORLD-
PRESUPPOSITION on these arguments. Since shifting the evaluation index with
· a verb like believe does not only give access to a particular, single world, but to a
certain set of worlds that can be characerized in a certain way (namely by the
content of the belief), the shifting of the evaluation index is associated with
quantification over worlds - in the paraphrases exploited above, with universal
quantification. Viewed from the other perspective, I want to say that most
predicates impose same-world-presuppositions on their arguments.
The idea behind the concept of same-world-presuppositions is very simple.
Moreover, it is' very similar to the idea behind the concept of life-time
presuppositions which I introduced in Chapter II. We can do many things to
individuals in the actual world, but we can't do too many things to individuals in
other worlds. We can, for instance, think about non-actual individuals, i.e.
individuals in other worlds, or want to have individuals that exist only in o~her
worlds, but we can't meet or see individuals in worlds other than the actual world.
3.4. Properties of individuals and worlds
In the preceding subsection, I have briefly outlined how one might approach the
question of the world-location of individuals. Another question now is what we
can say about the world-location of properties of individuals.
A fust question to ask is under which conditions is it possible at all to ascribe
to individuals properties they have in a world other than the actual world?
A second question to ask is under which conditions can a noun be
interpreted world-independently? Note that this is a question that should be
carefully distinguished from the first question. The first questions asks under
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which circumstances we have the possibility to switch to worlds other than the
actual world for interpreting a noun phrase; the second question asks under
which circumstances we really have a free choice of evaluation worlds, provided
that there is a possibility to switch.
I think that the first question is easy to answer, and it can be answered by just
considering the assumptions established above: given the existence of same-
world-presuppositions postulated in the preceding subsection, we expect that we
can ascribe to an individual properties it has in a non-actual world whenever one
of the following situations is given:
• the individual occurs in a linguistic context where a predicate of which it is
an argument does not impose a same-world-presupposition on it (as in (8a)
below), or
• the individual is part of an argument of a predicate that does not impose a
same-world-presupposition on that argument (as in (8b)), or
- -.
• there is a contextually salient world other than the actual world introduced
into the discourse context, for ,instance by a WORLD FRAME ADVERBIAL; in
this case, the adverbial also determines the world relative to which the main
predicate of the clause is interpreted (as in (8c)).
Here are some examples that illustrate each of these cases. It
(8) a.
b.
c.
Ismay is looking for the king of France.
Ismay believes [that the king of France loves her]
In Ismay's dream, the king of France married her.
The second question is much more difficult to answer, and it can only be
answered on the basis of an empirical investigation of linguistic data. It would be
quite nice if the distribution of world-independent interpretations of noun
phrases were basically parallel to the distribution of temporally independent
interpretations of noun phrases, and if discrepancies between the two aspects of
noun phrase interpretation could be explained by independently motivated
assumptions or principles.
There is some initial evidence that there are in fact significant parall~ls
between the two aspects of noun phrase interpretation. Consider the following
two examples. It seems that (9a) has two readings as roughly indicated, while
(9b) has only one reading, namely one where the underlined noun phrase has a
11 There are probably other devices that make it possible to get access to non-actual worlds
for the interpretation of noun phrases.
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world-dependent interpretation. Note that the underlined noun phrase in (9a)
can have a presuppositional reading, whereas the underlined noun phrase in (9b)
can only have a cardinal reading because it occurs in a there-construction.12
(9) a.
b.
Things would be different if a senator had grown up to be a rancher
instead.
= For all worlds WI such that there is a senator in WI that grew up
to be a rancher in WI, things are different in WI.
=For all worlds WI such that there is a senator in WQ that grew up
to be a rancher in WI, things are different in WI.
Things would be different if there was a senator having grown up
to be a rancher instead.
= For all worlds WI such that there is a senator in WI that grew up
to be a rancher in WI, things are different in WI. .
"# For all worlds WI such that there is a senator in WQ that grew up
to be a rancher in WI, things are different in WI.
Thus, the example suggests that there is a correspondence between the
occurrence of cardinal and presu'ppositional noun phrases and the occurrence of
world-dependent and world-independent interpretation of noun phrases. .
If the distribution of world-independent noun phrases indeed turns out to be
subject to the same conditions as the distribution of temporally independent noun
phrases, then this indicates that on some lev~l we have to· assume modally
continuant individuals that can be split up into world-stages. As I said above, I
have to leave a thorough investigation of these issues to future research.
12 The sentence in (9a) is taken from Abusch (1994, 104). (9b) is due to Kai von Fintel
(pc).
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